People v. Calvin S. (In re Calvin S.), B265382

• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: B265382
• Citation: 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 46,5 Cal.App.5th 522
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE CALVIN S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Calvin S., Defendant and Appellant.

5 Cal.App.5th 522

210 Cal.Rptr.3d 46

IN RE CALVIN S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Calvin S., Defendant and Appellant.

B265382

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Filed November 15, 2016

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL, J.

INTRODUCTION

After sustaining allegations that 14–year–old Calvin S. committed assault with a firearm and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, the juvenile court declared Calvin a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) for a maximum term of 15 years four months.

Calvin contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF rather than placing him in a less restrictive setting. He also argues that, pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the juvenile court should have stayed execution of the term of commitment imposed for assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, and that his attorney's failure to argue for a shorter maximum term of commitment deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. We agree that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing Calvin to the DJF and that the court should have stayed the term of commitment for assault with intent to commit a sexual offense. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new disposition hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Petition

The People filed a second amended petition asking the juvenile court to declare Calvin S. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The People alleged Calvin committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ), assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) ), assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) ), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) ), forcible rape of a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2) ), and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1) ). The People alleged in connection with the counts of second degree robbery, assault with a firearm, and forcible rape of a child under 14 years of age that Calvin personally used a firearm in committing the offense, and in connection with the counts of second degree robbery, assault with a firearm, assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury, and assault with a deadly weapon that Calvin inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.

B. The Jurisdiction Hearing

At the jurisdiction hearing the juvenile court heard evidence that on September 21, 2014, at approximately 8:00 p.m., R.R. was walking down a street in Los Angeles when she saw a male, whom she later identified as Calvin, chasing her. When Calvin caught up with R.R., he hit her on the head with a firearm, fracturing her skull and rendering her unconscious. R.R. had been wearing khaki pants, with no underwear, and when she awoke she discovered her pants had been removed. Police officers arrested Calvin in the vicinity shortly after the attack. Swab samples from his hand, arm, and penis contained DNA matching that of R.R., but no male DNA was detected on R.R. The criminologist who performed the DNA analysis testified it was possible the DNA from R.R. on Calvin's penis had come from Calvin's hand.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that Calvin was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court found true the allegations that Calvin committed assault with a firearm and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, and dismissed the other counts.

C. The Disposition Hearing

At the disposition hearing Calvin's mother and grandmother testified about Calvin's behavior at home and his performance in school, including that other children bullied him extensively at school because of a learning disability. An adaptive living skills instructor from Westside Regional Center, who had experience with developmentally disabled youth, testified about the services he and his organization could provide Calvin in various settings.

In letters submitted to the court, Westside Regional Center stated it could provide services that would address Calvin's diagnosed developmental disability, help him transition back into the community upon release, and involve appropriate mental health professionals and others who could help Calvin with his educational and vocational needs. The letters indicated Calvin had already begun receiving these services at juvenile hall, and would continue to have access to them there, but Calvin would not have access to those services if the court placed him with the DJF.

The People asked the court to commit Calvin to the DJF because of the violence of his offenses and the need to protect him and the community. The People argued the DJF could provide Calvin with services to address his behavioral issues, including a sexual offender program. The People also argued commitment to the DJF was appropriate because it would require Calvin to register as a sexual offender.

Counsel for Calvin asked the court not to commit him to the DJF, but to place him in a less restrictive, local facility where he could receive services from Westside Regional Center. Counsel for Calvin conceded Calvin needed to be "locked up" so that he would not "wander the streets free," but suggested commitment to the DJF was unduly harsh, especially with its requirement that Calvin register as a sexual offender, which would make it difficult to place him in a residential home in the future. Counsel for Calvin noted Calvin had "functioned extremely well here in juvenile hall."

The juvenile court stated that, because of the violence of Calvin's offenses, the court would remove him from the home, "which would leave placement, camp, or [DJF]." The court expressed concerns with each of these options, particularly in light of Calvin's young age, the violence of his offenses, his disruptive behavior during the jurisdiction hearing, and the psychiatric evaluations reporting that Calvin had an IQ of 58 and an intellectual ability "in the extremely low range." The court invited counsel to address these concerns and propose any realistic alternative, at one point observing, "Obviously, we're struggling with this case." In response, counsel for Calvin noted Westside Regional Center had indicated it could continue to provide services to Calvin at juvenile hall, and asked the court, "Is there any reason why he cannot remain in juvenile hall?" The court responded, "We're not a treatment center. We're a detention center."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court declared Calvin a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed him to the DJF for a maximum period of 14 years for the offense of assault with a firearm and one year four months for the offense of assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, for a total maximum period of 15 years four months. The court awarded Calvin 251 days of predisposition custody credit. Calvin timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. On This Record, the Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion in Committing Calvin to the DJF

Calvin contends the juvenile court erred by committing him to the DJF, rather than letting him remain in juvenile hall, where he could continue to receive services from Westside Regional Center. He argues placement in juvenile hall would allow him to receive the rehabilitative and other services he needed, while at the same time serving the goals of protecting the public and ordering the least restrictive placement.

" ‘The decision of the juvenile court may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing a minor to [DJF].’ ... An appellate court ‘must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law.’ " (In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 ; see In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 [" ‘ "[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence" ’ "].)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, which states the purpose of juvenile court proceedings, "emphasiz[es] the protection and safety of the public, and recogniz[es] punishment as a form of guidance that holds the minor accountable for his or her behavior." (In re Christopher B. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1563, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 253.) Nevertheless, "the Legislature has not abandoned the traditional purpose of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders," and "[j]uvenile proceedings continue to be primarily rehabilitative." (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 496, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 213 P.3d 125.) Thus, "[o]ne of the primary objectives of juvenile court law is rehabilitation, and the statutory scheme contemplates a progressively more restrictive and punitive series of dispositions starting with home placement under supervision, and progressing to foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility, and finally placement at the [DJF]. [Citation.] Although the [DJF] is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a [DJF] commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have...