People v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85SA251,85SA251
• Citation: 742 P.2d 302
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl William CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 302

742 P.2d 302

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Earl William CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85SA251.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Stuart A. VanMeveren, Dist. Atty., Loren B. Schall, Asst. Dist. Atty., Clifford E. Riedel, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., and Laurie K. Rottersman, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fort Collins, for plaintiff-appellant.

Miller, Hale & Harrison, Daniel C. Hale, Boulder, for defendant-appellee.

LOHR, Justice.

The People appeal from a judgment of the Larimer County District Court dismissing charges of aggravated robbery and crime of violence against the defendant, Earl William Campbell. The district court dismissed the charges on the basis of a finding and conclusion that the defendant had not been brought to trial within ninety days of receipt of his request for final disposition of the charges, in violation of his rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, § 16-14-101 to -108, 8A C.R.S. (1986) (the Uniform Act). We affirm.

I.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In September of 1982, the defendant was arrested for activities not at issue in the present case and was confined in the El Paso County jail. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was on parole stemming from a sentence imposed in Colorado. The department of corrections placed a "parole hold" on the defendant, and that "hold" remained in effect during all times relevant to this proceeding until the defendant's parole was revoked on May 16, 1985.

The Larimer County charges at issue in the present case arose from events that occurred on or about June 22, 1982, before the defendant was incarcerated in El Paso County. On June 15, 1983, a direct criminal information based upon those events was filed in Larimer County District Court charging the defendant with aggravated robbery, § 18-4-302(1)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1978), and crime of violence, § 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1978). On June 22, 1983, an arrest warrant relating to the Larimer County charges was served upon the defendant in the El Paso County jail, and a "hold" was placed on the defendant with respect to those charges.

The defendant sent a letter dated July 14, 1983, to the chief judge of the Larimer County District Court stating that he had recently been notified "that the Larimer County Sheriff had placed a 'hold' on me under the authority of an arrest warrant" relating to the Larimer County charges. The defendant requested a speedy trial, among other things, but made no mention of the Uniform Act. The letter bears a notation that a copy was sent to the district attorney on August 8, 1983.

On April 27, 1984, the defendant was convicted on criminal charges filed in El Paso County and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was transported to a department of corrections facility on June 19, 1984, to begin serving that life sentence.

On July 19, 1984, the defendant again wrote a letter to the chief judge of the Larimer County District Court, this time specifically requesting dismissal of the Larimer County charges for violation of the Uniform Act. The court received the letter on July 23, and a copy was received by the district attorney on that same day. No action was taken to bring the matter to trial.

The defendant moved for a new trial on the charges that had resulted in his life sentence, and on July 23 or 24, 1984, he was returned to the El Paso County jail to await proceedings on that motion. In September or October 1984, the El Paso County District Court granted the motion for a new trial and vacated the defendant's judgment of conviction.

The defendant made his first appearance before the Larimer County District Court on December 18, 1984. At that time he was advised of his rights and of the charges against him, and counsel was appointed to represent him.

On May 20, 1985, counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Larimer County charges for violation of the Uniform Act. ¹ The motion averred that the defendant had requested final disposition of the Larimer County charges by his letter of July 19, 1984, and that he had not been brought to trial within ninety days of receipt of that letter by the court and prosecuting official, as required by section 16-14-104 of the Uniform Act.

A hearing on all pending motions was set for June 3, 1985. On that date, the court heard argument on the motion to dismiss for violation of the Uniform Act and on June 17 ruled that the defendant's rights under the Uniform Act had been violated and that the Larimer County charges must be dismissed. Specifically, the court concluded that the defendant had been in the legal custody of the department of corrections as a parolee since September 1982, that under the Uniform Act the defendant should have been tried within ninety days of the receipt of his July 19, 1984, letter by the court and the district attorney, and that because the defendant had not been tried within that time dismissal was required. ² The People appealed from the judgment of dismissal.

On appeal, the People assert that (1) the Uniform Act is inapplicable because a detainer was not filed with the department of corrections based on the Larimer County charges; (2) the ninety day period within which a defendant must be brought to trial after requesting final disposition of charges had not expired because the Uniform Act requires that the defendant be in the custody of the department of corrections under sentence during the entire ninety days, and the defendant was not; and (3) the district court erred in holding that the defendant's July 19, 1984, letter triggered the ninety day provision of the Uniform Act because the letter failed to meet the minimum requirements of the Uniform Act.

On September 15, 1986, we announced an opinion rejecting the People's arguments and affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing the charges. Shortly thereafter, within the time provided for filing petitions for rehearing, we withdrew our opinion on our own motion and ordered the parties to file additional briefs on the issue of the applicability of the Uniform Act "in light of recent decisions of this Court, including People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d 306 (Colo.1985), People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo.1986), People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002 (Colo.1986), and People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo.1986)." Thereafter, the parties filed briefs and presented oral argument.

Since the parties are in disagreement and the record is unsatisfactory as to whether a detainer was properly filed on the basis of the Larimer County charges, we first address the question of whether the Uniform Act has any applicability in the absence of the filing of a detainer. We conclude that, under the Uniform Act, the right of a person in the custody of the department of corrections to request final disposition of criminal charges and thereby to obtain a right to trial within ninety days on those charges is not dependent upon the filing of a detainer. We then consider whether the defendant was "in the custody of the department of institutions" and therefore entitled to rights under the Uniform Act while incarcerated in county jail and whether he adequately asserted the right to request final disposition of the pending Larimer County charges in this case.

II.

The record does not contain any document filed with the sheriff of El Paso County as a detainer in this case and does not permit a definitive determination of whether a detainer was filed within the meaning of the Uniform Act. The initial inquiry, therefore, is whether the Uniform Act has any applicability in the absence of the filing of a detainer. We hold that notwithstanding the absence of a detainer, a person in the custody of the department of corrections has the right under the Uniform Act to request final disposition of untried indictments, informations or criminal complaints pending against that prisoner in Colorado. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to determine whether a detainer was filed with respect to the Larimer County charges.

On several occasions we have described a detainer as "a notification filed with the institution in which a person is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction," the description first set forth in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1846, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo.1986); People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002, 1002 n. 2 (Colo.1986); People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d 306, 311 (Colo.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S.Ct. 603, 88 L.Ed.2d 582; People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 693 n. 2 (Colo.1984). We have also noted that the Council of State Governments has defined a detainer as " 'a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the detainer.' Suggested State Legislation for 1959, p. 167." People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004, 1006; People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002, 1002 n. 2; People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d 306, 311.

In People v. Lewis, 680 P.2d 226, 230 (Colo.1984), People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d at 311-12, and again in People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 996-98 (Colo.1986), we discussed the policy concerns created by the existence of outstanding detainers. We noted that "[p]rison authorities often accorded detainers considerable weight in making decisions with respect to the terms and conditions of the prisoner's incarceration and release on parole[,]" and that "[d]espite these serious consequences, virtually any law enforcement officer--prosecutor, policeman, or judge--could file a detainer without any procedural prerequisites." People v. Lewis, 680 P.2d at 230 (quoting United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir.1977), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978)); People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d at 311-12 (same); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d at...