People v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 23 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1–11–2926.,1–11–2926.
• Citation: 8 N.E.3d 1229,380 Ill.Dec. 687,2014 IL App (1st) 112926
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Vincent CAMPBELL, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2014 IL App (1st) 112926

8 N.E.3d 1229

380 Ill.Dec. 687

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Vincent CAMPBELL, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–11–2926.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

April 23, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, Robert N. Markfield, State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Amy M. Watroba, Noah Montague, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Vincent Campbell asked to speak with an attorney before being transported to the police station, where he confessed without counsel present. His trial counsel filed, and later withdrew, a motion to suppress the confession. Campbell accuses his trial counsel of ineffective assistance. We reject Campbell's contention. The motion to suppress had no reasonable probability of success—it was based entirely on his testimony that he anticipatorily invoked his right to counsel, an act with no legal significance, and which does not present a legal bar to later custodial interrogations. And, his trial counsel's actions did not result in prejudice given the overwhelming evidence against him.

¶ 2 After a bench trial, the trial court found Campbell guilty of five counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a) (West 2008)), and one count of violating section 24–1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961, the armed habitual criminal (AHC) statute (720 ILCS 5/24–1.7(a) (West 2008)), after police seized guns and ammunition at Campbell's home during the execution of a search warrant.

¶ 3 In addition, Campbell argues: (i) both the UUWF and the AHC statutes violate his second amendment right to bear arms by criminalizing a felon's possession of a firearm for purposes of self-defense in his or her own home; (ii) the court relied on incorrect information in declining to sentence him to the minimum available term; and (iii) his UUWF conviction should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime principle because neither the indictment nor the record of proceedings indicates that the UUWF charge was based on an act of possession separate from the act alleged in charging him with violating the AHC statute. We reject these contentions as well.

¶ 4 Campbell relies on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), cases in which the United States Supreme Court recognized an individual's second amendment right to bear arms, to argue both statutes infringe on that right either facially or as applied to him. But those very decisions recognize that the second amendment guarantees “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (Emphasis added.) Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 3047 (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill’, * * *. [Citation.] We repeat those assurances here.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783)).

¶ 5 In upholding Campbell's convictions, we find the AHC statute and the UUWF statute do not violate the second amendment's right to bear arms either facially or as applied to Campbell, a convicted felon. After Heller, federal circuits facing felon-in-possession statutes have all rejected blanket constitutional challenges to the laws. See United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir.2011); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 170–75 (3d Cir.2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 691–94 (7th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 805, 178 L.Ed.2d 532 (2010); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir.2010), cert. denied,560 U.S. 958, 130 S.Ct. 3399, 177 L.Ed.2d 313 (2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 294, 178 L.Ed.2d 193 (2010); United States v. Khami, 362 Fed.Appx. 501, 507 (6th Cir.2010), cert. denied,560 U.S. 934, 130 S.Ct. 3345, 176 L.Ed.2d 1238 (2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied,559 U.S. 970, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 179 (2010); United States v. Stuckey, 317 Fed.Appx. 48, 50 (2d Cir.2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 n. 6 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied,557 U.S. 913, 129 S.Ct. 2814, 174 L.Ed.2d 308 (2009).

¶ 6 We also affirm defendant's sentence. Campbell forfeited review of his claimed error; however, addressing the merits, we hold the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Campbell to two years above the minimum. We find no error, much less plain error, in the court's recitation of misinformation concerning defendant's longest previous sentence, where the court explicitly rejected the earlier sentence as a basis for the present sentence.

¶ 7 Finally, with regard to the one-act, one-crime doctrine, we hold the record supports Campbell's AHC conviction for possession of one firearm, as well as UUWF, based on possession of another firearm.

¶ 8 BACKGROUND

¶ 9 On January 5, 2009, about 7:25 p.m., Chicago police sergeant John Hroma, a member of the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, along with several other team members, arrived at 1822 South Avers Avenue, Chicago, to execute a search warrant.

¶ 10 SWAT team officers knocked on a side door, waited 10 seconds, entered, and passed through another door before finding the actual door into the home, which was unlocked. They entered the dining area; two officers went left into the living room, Sergeant Hroma and others went right.

¶ 11 At Campbell's bench trial, Sergeant Hroma testified that once inside the home, he saw Campbell leaving a bedroom and ordered him to the ground. He then cuffed Campbell and placed him in a chair in the dining room while the search continued. In the bedroom, Officers Hroma and Roth saw a loaded .38–caliber Taurus revolver lying on the bed and found a brown paper bag filled with 9–millimeter and .380 ammunition in the nightstand. The officers recovered a loaded .380 Brico semiautomatic handgun from the rafters of the basement and an unloaded .44–caliber Desert Eagle and small container holding a live 9–millimeter round from the top of a kitchen cabinet. Officer Diblich took photographs of the guns and ammunition and the locations where they were found.

¶ 12 Officer Mette recovered mail, both opened and unopened, in a dining room cabinet and in the bedroom, addressed to Vincent Campbell and Vincent and Caroline Campbell at 1822 South Avers. Officer Diblich photographed the mail.

¶ 13 When the search concluded, Officer O'Keefe escorted Campbell from the house to a squad car. Once inside the car, Officer O'Keefe gave Campbell the Miranda warnings. Campbell indicated he understood the warnings. Officer O'Keefe did not question Campbell during the ride to the station.

¶ 14 Officer Diblich testified that once Campbell arrived at the station, he asked him routine booking questions, such as his address, which Campbell gave as 1822 South Avers. Campbell was interviewed at the station around 9:55 p.m. Before the interview began, Officer Diblich gave Campbell his Miranda warnings in the presence of Lieutenant Loughran. Campbell said he understood his rights and proceeded to answer questions.

¶ 15 During the interview, conducted by both Diblich and Loughran, Campbell was told he was being charged with UUWF. They testified Campbell admitted he knew felons could not possess firearms, but he kept the guns to protect himself. He explained that he lived in a “bad neighborhood” and had heard that people, including a friend of his, had been duct-taped and robbed. They also testified that Campbell told them “he reached for the gun until he realized that it was the police entering his residence and then he stopped.”

¶ 16 Diblich testified that he asked Campbell where he got his revolver, and Campbell replied, from a friend in 2002. Diblich then questioned Campbell about the gun recovered from in the kitchen, a “Desert Eagle,” and “not a common weapon.” Diblich informed Campbell he had worked on a burglary case in which a Desert Eagle had been stolen and wondered if Campbell had stolen the gun. Campbell replied that he bought, not stole, the gun. Diblich said that following this exchange, Campbell's “attitude changed towards [Officer Diblich], and he said that he knew a crack head had ratted him out and that he didn't want to talk to [the police] anymore.” Diblich stopped questioning Campbell.

¶ 17 The State introduced photographs of Campbell's home, the three guns, and the bulk ammunition. The State also introduced group exhibit number 41, which contained proof of residency documents (the recovered mail). The parties stipulated to the admission of two certified copies of conviction, one for case number 95 CR 1597801, in which Campbell was convicted of UUWF, and one for case number 95 CR 2999201, in which Campbell was convicted of one count of UUWF and one count of possession of a controlled substance.

¶ 18 During cross-examination, Sergeant Hroma admitted that the home's outer door was opened with a pry bar, an inner door was opened with a ram, and a third door that led to the home's interior was unlocked. Hroma agreed that a report, which he did not write, but reviewed, stated that all “occupants” of the residence were secured. On redirect examination, Hroma testified that the report's use of the plural “occupants” was a typographical error.

¶ 19 Diblich testified during cross-examination that Campbell's statement was memorialized in an incident report prepared by Officer Goines at Diblich's direction.

¶ 20 The State rested, and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict,...