People v. Carneglia
| Decision Date | 29 May 1978 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Charles CARNEGLIA, a/k/a Charles Corneglia, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Lyon & Erlbaum, Kew Gardens (Charles Wender and Edward Jurith, Kew Gardens, on brief), for appellant.
John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Aley Z. Alexander, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent.
Before MOLLEN, P. J., and HOPKINS, TITONE and SHAPIRO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered June 1, 1977, convicting him of resisting arrest, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial ordered.
As a result of an altercation in a Queens diner at 3 A.M. on February 10, 1975 between defendant and Albert Gelb, a court officer, the former was indicted for the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law, § 265.02, subd. (4)), and resisting arrest (Penal Law, § 205.30). Gelb was not in uniform at the time of the altercation. The defendant was acquitted of the possession charge but convicted of resisting arrest.
The statute under which defendant was convicted (Penal Law, § 205.30), entitled "Resisting arrest", provides as follows:
"A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person." (Emphasis supplied.)
During its deliberations the jury requested the Trial Judge for a definition of "resisting arrest". After giving a supplemental charge as requested, the Trial Judge, sua sponte, recalled the jury and erroneously read to it the provisions of section 35.27 of the Penal Law, which is entitled "Justification; use of physical force in resisting arrest prohibited" (euphemistically labeled "the no-sock law"), to wit:
"A person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a peace officer." (Emphasis supplied.)
Since it is manifest that the substantive crime of resisting arrest clearly requires that the arrest be authorized, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to invoke the provisions of the "no-sock law" for purposes of defining the term "resisting arrest". Such law merely inhibits a defendant from invoking the defense of justification in the...
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Jackson v. City of N.Y.
...not criminal and could not create probable cause to justify his malicious prosecution); see also People v. Carneglia, 63 A.D.2d 734, 735, 405 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (N.Y.App.Div. 2d Dep't 1978) (holding that “reasonable acts of self-defense” are justifiable in response to “an unprovoked police a......
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State v. Privitera, 2003
...prosecution for resisting arrest, any applicability of its counterpart to General Statutes § 53a-23. See, e.g., People v. Carneglia, 63 App.Div.2d 734, 405 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1978). We note, however, that the substantive crime of resisting arrest under the New York Penal Law requires that the ar......
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People v. Estrada
...However, defendant did not present a justification defense (cf. People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 112–113 [1972] ; People v. Carneglia, 63 A.D.2d 734, 735 [1978] ). Consequently, we find that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 6......
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Jackson v. City of N.Y.
...not criminal and could not create probable cause to justify his malicious prosecution); see also People v. Carneglia, 63 A.D.2d 734, 735, 405 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978) (holding that "reasonable acts of self-defense" are justifiable in response to "an unprovoked police......