People v. Carpenter

• Decision Date: 13 April 1886
• Citation: 102 N.Y. 238,6 N.E. 584
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CARPENTER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

102 N.Y. 238

6 N.E. 584

PEOPLE

v.CARPENTER.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 13, 1886.

Appeal from general term supreme court, First department, reversing judgment of court of general sessions convicting defendant of murder in the first degree.

S. S. Blake and Adolphus D. Pape, for appellant.

De Lancey Nicoll, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the People.

RUGER, C. J.

Upon the trial of the defendant for murder in the first degree the uncontradicted evidence established that on May 26, 1884, he fatally stabbed one Mary Carpenter, his wife, with a knife, by repeated stabs upon her neck, body, and breast, in the presence of a number of people, in the open street, in broad daylight. He had become embittered against her for several reasons, prominent among which was an effort on her part to procure a decree of divorce, and for which purpose she had caused papers to be served upon him while he was imprisoned at Sing Sing upon a former conviction for crime. After this time, and while still imprisoned, in speaking of her action in respect thereto, he on two or three occasions expressed his intention to kill her. Upon being released from prison in April, 1884, he attempted to discover her place of residence, and, having found it, frequented its vicinity for some weeks previous to the homicide. On the day in question he waited near the corner of Third avenue and Twenty-sixth street for several hours, armed with a weapon, resembling a shoe-maker's knife, until his wife, accompanied by an unmarried sister, appeared in the street near him. As they approached he attacked both ladies with his knife, cutting them, and continuing to strike his wife, following her into an adjoining building, where she fled for refuge, until, from his repeated blows, she sank to the ground and expired.

The only defense attempted on the trial was an effort to establish the insanity of the defendant. This was the sole issue before the jury, and considerable evidence was taken both for and against the theory of the defense. No evidence offered by the defendant upon this issue was excluded, and the case was submitted to the jury under instructions evincing the tenderest regard for his rights, and no exceptions were taken thereto, save in respect to one unimportant particular. The trial judge seems to have conducted the trial with great care, and a determination that no material error should occur in his rulings which would operate to the defendant's disadvantage. The jury found the defendant guilty of the crime charged, and the judgment of the court, rendered on the verdict, has been approved by the general term, and must be affirmed here unless we find that some error was committed during the trial which prejudiced the rights of the defendant.

After a careful examination of the case we are constrained to say that no such error was committed. The exceptions presented for our consideration relate to these subjects only, viz.: The charge of the court, the admission of alleged incompetent evidence against the prisoner, and errors claimed to have occurred in the course of the selection of the jury. They may all be characterized as of trivial importance.

We will first consider those relating to the formation of the jury. The individuals who were finally selected to hear and determine the case were free from any objections, and were voluntarily accepted by the defendant, after ample opportunity afforded him to raise any objection he desired to as to their competency, or to procure their exclusion by way of peremptory challenge. When the panel was completed, the defendant had remaining the right to make 14 peremptory challenges, and the power of excluding any and all of the persons sitting on the jury if he desired to do so, and had at the proper time chosen to exercise his right of peremptory challenge. The jury, as selected, must therefore be considered as being free from any reasonable objection which could have been made against them by the defendant, and to have been competent in all respects to hear and determine the case.

It is, however, urged that White and Lehmaier, two of the jurymen called, against whom the defendant exercised the right of peremptory challenge, should have been rejected for cause, and thus have saved to him two of the challenges to which he was by law entitled. The fact that the right to make 14 peremptory challenges was allowed to lapse for want of occasion to use them demonstrates that the defendant could not have been injured by the decision of the trial court in respect to the jurymen named, however erroneous it might have been. People v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115;State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166. But we are of the opinion that the incompetency of these men to sit as jurymen was not successfully established by the evidence. It is unquestionably the right of a person on trial for an alleged crime to have the issue made, tried, and determined by a fair, competent, and disinterested jury, standing impartially between himself and his accusers. But this right does not extend so far as to enable him to exclude from such jury persons holding abstract opinions, not affecting their capacity to decide impartially the particular case upon the evidence produced. The objection in this case was attempted to be shown by examining the jurymen as to the opinions entertained by them upon the subject of insanity as a defense to criminal prosecutions. White testified, among other things, that ‘my mind is practically clear and unbiased as between the people and this prisoner.’ ‘I have no opinion now as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.’ ‘If the defense of insanity was interposed,’ ‘I would have a prejudice against it.’ ‘My answer only implies that I believe the defense of insanity has been misused and abused, and I am not prejudiced against a person who is insane.’ ‘It is a prejudice against sham defenses.’ ‘I don't think that feeling would control or influence my judgment against the defense of insanity.’ Lehmaier testified substantially as follows: ‘I have no prejudice or bias against the defense except when misused, and I can't tell until I hear the evidence whether it is misused.’ ‘I would go into the jury-box with a bias against that defense.’ In answer to the question, ‘Notwithstanding what you have read, if accepted as a juror, can you so divest your mind of the opinion as to receive the evidence, or consider it without any bias or prejudice against this prisoner?’ he said, ‘I am sorry to say I think I can. I have an opinion against the misuse of insanity.’

Upon this evidence the trial judge held both of the jurymen competent, and we think correctly so decided. Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 160;Com. Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 160;Com. here related to the condition of the juror's mind, as affected by the knowledge and information acquired by him as to criminal trials which had theretofore come within the range of his observation and experience, and his answer was in effect simply that he thought the defense of insanity had frequently been used in cases where it had no foundation in fact. Can it be reasonably said that this opinion furnishes any ground for saying that such a person is incompetent to hear and determine any case where the defense of insanity is honestly interposed? We do not think that the existence of an abstract opinion on the part of an individual as to the propriety or impropriety of certain defenses in cases theretofore coming to his knowledge necessarily disqualifies him from sitting as a juror in other cases, even where such defenses are intended to be made. If the proof had demonstrated that the proposed juryman did not believe in the existence of a state of mental derangement, or that such a condition did not constitute a defense to a criminal prosecution, quite a different question would have been presented. But a belief derived from observation and experience, that men have theretofore interposed a defense which did not in fact exist to prosecutions for crime, does not in itself furnish any evidence or presumption that the person holding such a belief had any prejudice or bias against such a defense when honestly interposed. As well might it be said that a person who has sat upon a jury where fraud or alibi or incendiarism was the subject of the issue tried, would thereafter be incompetent to sit on juries where similar subjects were again to be investigated.

It is impossible for individuals to divest themselves of the effect which knowledge, information, and observation impresses upon their minds, and, unless the impressions produce such an effect as renders the individual incapable of acting impartially in determining the particular issue to be tried, they constitute no valid objection to his competency. The issue in this case was whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time he committed the homicide, and the fact that the jurymen were of the opinion that other men were not insane at the time of the commission of alleged crimes did not render them incompetent to pass upon other cases of alleged insanity. Each one of the proposed jurors testified, substantially,...