People v. Carroll

• Decision Date: 31 January 1936
• Docket Number: No. 130.,130.
• Citation: 264 N.W. 861,274 Mich. 451
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CARROLL.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

274 Mich. 451

264 N.W. 861

PEOPLE

v.CARROLL.

No. 130.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 31, 1936.

John D. Carroll was convicted of being a partner in the operation of a dental parlor without being licensed as a dentist, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court of Grand Rapids; Thaddeus B. Taylor, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Dunham & Sherk, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Harry S. Toy, Atty. Gen., Bartel J. Jonkman, Pros. Atty., and Fred N. Searl, Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Grand Rapids, for the People.

EDWARD M. SHARPE, Justice.

Respondent was informed against for violation of Act No. 235, Pub. Acts 1933, § 15; and was charged with being a partner in the operation of a dental parlor contrary to the above statute. He was tried and convicted. The record shows that respondent is not a licensed dentist, but has for more than 20 years been operating a dental parlor in Michigan under the name ‘New System Dentists' where all dental work was done by regularly licensed dentists; and at the time of the acts complained of he had three licensed dentists in his employ.

In his appeal respondent contends:

‘1. That the Act is unconstitutional and void in that it takes away from the respondent vested rights under Act No. 183 P.A. 1913, in that the respondent did, prior to the effective date of said Act, manage and have a financial interest in a dental parlor in Grand Rapids and has at all times thereafter continued to manage and operate said dental parlor.

‘2. That Act No. 235 P.A. 1933, violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitution, Sec. 16 of Article 2, State Constitution, Sec. 1, 14th Amendment, Federal Constitution, in that it deprives the respondent of his property right to manage a dental parlor and have a property interest therein, where all dental work is done by reputable licensed dentists, and that the prohibition of said statute does not even remotely promote the public health and welfare.

‘3. That the title to said Act violates Sec. 21, Art. 5, State Constitution in that the Act contains more than one object, and the purpose of the Act is not embraced in the title.’

Regulation of the practice of medicine and dentistry is within the police power of the state. We said in People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N.W. 888, 897: ‘It must be conceded, from cases cited, that the legislature has power to define the qualifications of those who shall be licensed to practice those callings or professions the exercise of which may affect the public health or safety, and that this law would be entirely constitutional in that view if it stopped short with prohibiting all except medical graduates from practicing.’

See, also, People v. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87, 86 N.W. 396;Locke v. Ionia Circuit Judge, 184 Mich. 535, 151 N.W. 623;People v. Blair, 192 Mich. 183, 158 N.W. 889;Graves v. State of Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 47 S.Ct. 122, 71 L.Ed. 331;Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623;Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 47 S.Ct. 210, 71 L.Ed. 422, 49 A.L.R. 575.

In People v. Moorman, 86 Mich. 433, 49 N.W. 263, this court held that the regulation of the practice of pharmacy was within the scope of the police power of the state.

In People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 P. 928, 930, the court said in reference to the practice of dentistry: ‘We are not concerned now with an ordinary trade or calling. Law, medicine, and dentistry are generally considered as learned professions. Neither is an ordinary trade or calling which all citizens alike may pursue. The state in its sovereign capacity is vested with the indefinable police power, which includes the power to conserve and protect the public health. Only those who are qualified by statute and experience to practice dentistry may do so, if the Legislature sees fit so to ordain.’

The next question that presents itself to us is the validity of a regulation requiring the owner or operator of a dental parlor to be a licensed practitioner. In Winslow v. Kansas State Board of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 223 P. 308, 309, the court said:

‘Dentistry is a profession having to do with public health, and so is subject to regulation by the state. The purpose of regulation is to protect the public from ignorance, unskillfulness, unscrupulousness, deception, and fraud. To that end the state requires that the relation of the dental practitioner to his patients and patrons must be personal.

‘It has been recognized by the professions, by statutes and by decisions that a corporation offering professional services is not placed beyond legislative control by the fact that all the services in question are rendered by qualified members of the profession. See People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666;Tucker v. New York State Board of Pharmacy, 127 Misc. 538, 217 N.Y.S. 217, 220;Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 55, 139 Am.St.Rep. 839, 19 Ann.Cas. 879;People v. Merchants' Protective Corporation, 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363;New Jersey Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, 95 N.J.Eq. 12, 122 A. 307;Hodgen v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 722 .’ From the dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 115, 49 S.Ct. 57, 60, 73 L.Ed. 204.

See, also, State Board v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.(2d) 693, 82 A.L.R. 1176; Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.(2d) 67;State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa, 781, 234 N.W. 260.

Counsel for respondent cites Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 106, 49 S.Ct. 57, 59, 73 L.Ed. 204, where the court held that a Pennsylvania statute requiring stockholders in corporations operating drug stores to be licensed pharmacists to be unconstitutional on the ground that: ‘Mere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substantial relation to the public health; and that the act in question creates an unreasonable and unnecessary restriction upon private business.’

Respondent relies upon the case of State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 P. 635,68 L.R.A. 889, 107 Am.St.Rep. 798, which holds that the state could not require the owner of a dental office to be a licensed dentist. This case was decided in 1905, but in 1919 this same court held in State v. Merchants' Protective Corporation, 105 Wash. 12, 177 P....