People v. Carskaddon
| Decision Date | 19 November 1957 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 6140 |
| Citation | 318 P.2d 4,49 Cal.2d 423 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leroy CARSKADDON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Robert O. Fort, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier and J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for violation of section 647a, subdivision (1), of the Penal Code. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. The evidence is uncontradicted and although we have viewed it in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v. Moore, 137 Cal.App.2d 197, 200, 290 P.2d 40), we have nevertheless concluded that defendant's contention must be sustained.
On April 19, 1956, at Southside Park in Sacramento, Anthony Bakazan stopped his automobile at a street curb to eat lunch in his car. He saw defendant take a little girl, aged six, and a little boy, aged four, underneath a large tree about thirty feet inside the park. They sat there a short time; then Bakazan saw the boy leave while the girl remained. As Bakazan walked back and forth a few times, watching defendant, the latter would sometimes so move that the tree briefly obscured Bakazan's view. However, Bakazan managed to keep ten to thirty feet distant from defendant and the girl, and he had a full view of defendant for all but about a minute of the ten minutes that they stayed under the tree. Bakazan did not see defendant touch the girl.
After some ten minutes under the tree, defendant and the girl walked to a concession stand where defendant bought the girl an ice-cream bar. Bakazan followed keeping the two under observation at all times. He never spoke to defendant. Defendant and the girl proceeded up the street in a direction away from the park and toward the Sacramento River. Bakazan continued to follow and to watch, until a motorcycle officer came along. Bakazan called the officer's attention to defendant and the girl. The officer turned his motorcycle and approached defendant. Defendant saw the officer and started to walk ahead of the girl when the officer stopped him. In response to the officer's queries, defendant stated that the girl was not his but that she was lost and he was taking her home, after which he intended boarding a bus to another part of the city. In defendant's presence, the officer then asked the girl if defendant was taking her home. The officer testified that she replied, 'No, he was taking her down the river to show her ' The officer's testimony was interrupted at this point, and he did not complete his recital of the girl's statement. The officer did not see defendant make any motions with his arms or any other part of his body toward the girl but only observed them 'walking side by side down the street.'
Section 647a, subdivision (1), of the Penal Code provides, as here pertinent: 'Every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18 is a vagrant and is punishable * * *.' Penal provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice. Pen.Code, § 4; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 142, 169 P.2d 1; Ex parte Galivan, 162 Cal. 331, 333, 122 P. 961; Downing v. Municipal Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 345, 349-350, 198 P.2d 923.
The primary purpose of the above statute is the 'protection of children from interference by sexual offenders, and the apprehension, segregation and punishment of the latter.' People v. Moore, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d 197, 199, 290 P.2d 40, 41; People v. Pallares, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 900, 246 P.2d 173. The words 'annoy' and 'molest' are synonymously used (Vol. 27, Words and Phuases, Molest, p. 430); they generally refer to conduct designed 'to disturb or irritate, esp. by continued or repeated acts' or 'to offend' (Webster's Bew Inter. Dict., 2d ed.); and as used in this statute, they ordinarily relate to 'offenses against children, (with) a connotation of abnormal sexual motivation on the part of the offender.' People v. Pallares, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. at page 901, 246 P.2d at page 177. Ordinarily, the annoyance or molestation which is forbidden is 'not concerned with the state of mind of the child' but it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mandel v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., Alameda County
...and punishment of the latter.' (People v. Pallares (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 900, 246 P.2d 173, 176; People v. Carskaddon, (49 Cal.2d 423, 318 P.2d 4) supra; People v. Moore (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 197, 199, 290 P.2d 40; People v. Thompson (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 727, 733, 335 P.2d 249.)......
-
People v. Greene
...by section 647a can be committed by 'a lewd and obscene act either in front of the child or with the child.' (See People v. Carskaddon, supra, 49 Cal.2d 423, 426, 318 P.2d 4, 6.) Simple assault in violation of section 240 of the Penal Code is therefore not a lesser included offense of the c......
-
Gladys R., In re
...interest or intent with respect to children.' Several Courts of Appeal have cited and followed Pallares. (E.g., People v. Carskaddon (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 45, 47, 338 P.2d 201; People v. Thompson (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 727, 733, 335 P.2d 249; People v. Moore (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 197, 200, 2......
-
People v. Clotfelter
...job" was "unmistakably lewd and obscene"].)Our Supreme Court's decision reversing a molestation conviction in People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 318 P.2d 4 ( Carskaddon ) is instructive. There, the defendant was convicted of child molestation under the predecessor statute to section......