People v. Castillo
| Decision Date | 13 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | 351841 |
| Citation | 337 Mich.App. 298,975 N.W.2d 94 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Heather Lynn CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, D. J. Hilson, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles F. Justian, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Muskegon County Public Defender (by Thomas G. Oatmen) for defendant.
Before: Murray, C.J., and Fort Hood and Gleicher, JJ.
Gleicher, J. Heather Castillo pleaded no contest to a moving violation causing death, MCL 257.601d(1), after she turned left at an intersection and struck Todd Beebe, a motorcyclist. The prosecution sought restitution on behalf of Beebe's estate. Beebe's operation of his motorcycle without an endorsement barred a restitution award, the district court found. The circuit court ruled that the prosecution had waived its restitution claim.
On leave granted, the prosecution again seeks restitution. Waiver bars this appeal, Castillo claims. She additionally contends that the misdemeanor restitution statute authorizes restitution only for "serious misdemeanors," a category that does not include her offense. See MCL 780.811(a). And Castillo takes this argument one step further, arguing that the relevant section of the misdemeanor restitution statute, MCL 780.826, irreconcilably conflicts with and supersedes the general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a, precluding any restitution award.
We hold that the prosecution did not waive its restitution claim, but that only the general restitution statute applies. We reverse the circuit court's contrary judgment and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On a June evening in 2018, Castillo made a left turn without yielding the right-of-way to Beebe. Her Ford Fusion collided with Beebe's Harley Davidson motorcycle. The Michigan State Police incident report indicated that Beebe had a valid driver's license but lacked a motorcycle endorsement or insurance. Beebe died the day after the collision. He is survived by his wife and adult children. Castillo pleaded no contest to a moving violation causing death in violation of MCL 257.601d(1). The district court ordered Castillo to pay a $400 fine and $350 in costs.
The prosecution then sought restitution. At a district court hearing, the prosecution argued that restitution was warranted under both the general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a, and the misdemeanor restitution statute, MCL 780.826, of the Crime Victim's Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.751 et seq. The prosecutor contended that the misdemeanor restitution statute authorizes treble damages and requested $1,412,411.34 in trebled damages as compensation for property damage, medical and funeral expenses, and wage loss.1
Castillo responded that the CVRA did not entitle family members to a deceased victim's future lost wages because the deceased could not suffer income loss after passing away, and she further argued that liability for medical expenses should flow through the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. , not the restitution statutes. Castillo characterized this case as "a tragedy," but "also an accident." And treble damages were an excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Castillo urged.
Relying on MCL 780.752(3), the court inquired whether restitution for lost wages would have been warranted if Beebe had not died, but had instead suffered severe injuries.2 The following exchange between the district court and the prosecutor underlies Castillo's waiver argument:
The district court determined that a moving violation causing death under MCL 257.601d(1) was a civil infraction, not a crime or misdemeanor. Relying on that conclusion and referencing the definition of a "victim" under MCL 769.1a and MCL 780.766,3 the district court found that Beebe did not "come[ ] within the definition of victim" because he "suffered those physical, financial, and emotional harm[s] as a result of the commission of a civil infraction," not as the result of a felony, a misdemeanor, or an ordinance violation. Although the prosecutor interjected to alert the district court that a moving violation causing death was a misdemeanor and not a civil infraction, the district court indicated its "ruling remain[ed] the same," noting that MCL 257.601d "refers to a person committing a moving violation," which was "not covered by the definition of [a] victim ....". And in any event, the district court concluded, the estate was "precluded from pursuing restitution under the [CVRA] because of [MCL] 780.752 [(3)]." The district court reasoned it was "pretty apparent that the intent of" MCL 780.752(3) (the criminal-activity exception) was "to preclude [restitution under the CVRA] when the victim of a crime or otherwise victim of the crime is committing criminal offenses him or herself."
On appeal to the circuit court, the prosecution argued that the district court had relied on the wrong provision of the CVRA. The prosecutor pointed out that MCL 780.766, the statute referenced by the district court, is found in Article 1 of the CVRA and only applies to felonies. MCL 780.826, found in Article 3 of the CVRA, governs restitution for victims of misdemeanors, the prosecution explained, as does the general restitution statute. A moving violation causing death under MCL 257.601d(1) is a misdemeanor, the prosecutor summarized, triggering the restitution provisions of both the CVRA and the general restitution statute.
The prosecution also argued that the district court erred in concluding that restitution was barred because Beebe had operated his motorcycle without an endorsement. Even if Beebe had survived and been charged with failing to obtain a motorcycle endorsement, the prosecution contended, he would not have been barred from receiving restitution under MCL 780.811(3).
Castillo again maintained that her conduct constituted a civil infraction, not a crime, and emphasized the district court's determination that Beebe's failure to secure a motorcycle endorsement would have barred his right to restitution had he lived. The prosecution waived its argument that the failure to obtain a motorcycle endorsement did not bar restitution, Castillo added, because at the restitution hearing the prosecutor had "endorsed" that position.
The prosecution insisted that it had not waived any arguments in favor of restitution, but had simply acknowledged that if the felony restitution were in play, restitution would have been barred. Castillo retorted that the prosecution had "agreed with" the district court that Beebe would not have been entitled to restitution given his lack of a motorcycle endorsement and this rendered the issue "done." She requested that the circuit court affirm the district court's decision, noting this situation is "why we have a robust civil statute and no-fault insurance in order for them ... to make claims there."4
The circuit court affirmed the district court's denial of restitution on waiver grounds, rejecting the district court's conclusion that a moving violation causing death was a civil infraction barring restitution. Rather, the circuit court noted that a moving violation causing death was a misdemeanor, and the circuit court "was required to order restitution under both the [general restitution statute] and [CVRA]." Nevertheless, by "expressly agree[ing] to the district court's interpretation" of MCL 257.312a () and MCL 780.752 (the criminal-activity exception), the circuit court concluded that the prosecution had waived its restitution claim.
We initially denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to us for review as on leave granted. People v. Castillo , 505 Mich. 1132, 944 N.W.2d 715 (2020). The prosecution continues to argue that the district court misinterpreted the statute under which Castillo was convicted and improperly applied the criminal-activity exception to the restitution statute. And no waiver occurred, the prosecution insists.
Castillo again advances waiver on appeal, but also raises a new argument. She contends that the misdemeanor restitution statute authorizes restitution only when a defendant is charged with or convicted of a "serious misdemeanor" and characterizes her conviction as a nonserious misdemeanor. Because the misdemeanor restitution statute conflicts with and is more specific than the general restitution statute, Castillo posits that it supersedes the general restitution statute and precludes restitution. Although unpreserved, we will consider this argument in addition to Castillo's waiver claim.5
The circuit court erroneously concluded that the prosecution had waived its restitution claim.
"[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
People v. Bragg , 296 Mich. App. 433, 465, 824 N.W.2d 170 (2012) (cleaned up). Waiver precludes appellate review of an asserted deprivation of a right because the waiver extinguishes any error. People v. Carter , 462 Mich. 206, 209, 215, 612 N.W.2d 144 (2000). The...
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...laws is to enable victims to be compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of convicted offenders." People v Castillo, 337 Mich.App. 298, 313; 975 N.W.2d 94 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In furtherance of that statutory purpose, MCL 780.826(2) provides that, upon c......