People v. Large
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 357479 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEE THOMAS LARGE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Otsego Circuit Court LC No. 21-018485-AR.
Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and Garrett, JJ.
Defendant Lee Thomas Large crashed his car into the victims' home while driving under the influence of alcohol, extensively damaging the home and necessitating a complete rebuild. As part of his sentence following a guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), MCL 257.625(1), the district court ordered that Large pay $105,808.50 in restitution. Large challenges several of the district court's factual findings and legal determinations on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the district court's restitution order and remand this matter for a new hearing to allow the court to properly calculate the amount of restitution under MCL 780.826(3)(b), and to determine whether restitution should be awarded for any additional losses the victims incurred under MCL 780.826(2).
On June 1, 2020, Large, while under the influence of alcohol, crashed his pickup truck into the victims' home, causing severe damage. The victims' insurance company informed them that it would be less expensive to tear down and replace the home than to repair it. The victims' insurance company gave them $268,752 to demolish and rebuild their home, but the actual cost to do so fell between $373,648 and $375,348. Thus, the difference between the actual cost to demolish and rebuild the home and the amount of money provided by the victims' insurance company was between $104,896 and $106,596.
At a restitution hearing, Large argued that the district court did not have statutory authority to award any restitution to the victims because they had already received compensation from their insurance company. The district court disagreed, concluding that the victims were entitled to full compensation and that the statute merely prohibited double compensation; here, the victims were not fully compensated by insurance, so they had a statutory right to restitution to cover the gap between the insurance proceeds and the cost of rebuilding the home.
Large also argued that the proper measure to determine a restitution award was the fair market value of the victims' home and that replacement value was the proper measure only if fair market value could not be determined. Large offered several figures to calculate the fair market value, including Internet valuations and comparable home listings. The prosecutor asserted that the fair market value could not be determined since the victims' home was destroyed and requested that the district court use the replacement value when ordering restitution. The district court ruled that replacement value was the appropriate measure of restitution in this case, finding that the home's fair market value could not be determined.
Considering the evidence presented from the victims about the costs to replace their home, the district court ordered Large to pay $105,808.50 in restitution to the victims, which represented a shortfall between the replacement costs and the insurance proceeds. The circuit court denied Large's application for leave to appeal the restitution award, but we granted his application for leave to appeal the circuit court's order.[1]
We review a trial court's decision to order restitution for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings underlying a restitution order for clear error. People v Lee, 314 Mich.App. 266, 272; 886 N.W.2d 185 (2016). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes or when the trial court commits an error of law. People v Duncan, 494 Mich. 713, 723; 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013). Clear error exists when a reviewing court "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Lee, 314 Mich.App. at 272 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "But when the question of restitution involves a matter of statutory interpretation, the issue is reviewed de novo as a question of law." People v Dimoski, 286 Mich.App. 474, 476; 780 N.W.2d 896 (2009). De novo review means that "we review the issues independently, with no required deference to the trial court." People v Beck, 504 Mich. 605, 618; 939 N.W.2d 213 (2019).
On appeal, Large argues that (1) the district court did not have the authority to award restitution in this case, and (2) even if it did have the authority to award restitution, the district court erred by failing to determine the value of the property at the time of sentencing and reducing the overall restitution award by that amount, (3) erred by finding that the fair market value of the home could not be determined, and (4) erred by rendering a decision in this case without allowing the parties to obtain an appraisal of the property. We address these issues below.
Large initially argues that the district court erred by finding that restitution was statutorily permitted. Under Large's interpretation of the restitution statute, the victims were not entitled to restitution because they had received compensation from other sources-i.e., their insurance company.
The Michigan Constitution specifically endows crime victims with a right to restitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 24. In addition, the Crime Victim's Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.751 et seq., provides crime victims with a statutory right to restitution. MCL 780.826 of the CVRA governs the awarding of restitution in cases involving certain OWI offenses. See MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xiv).[2]
The CVRA should be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial intent of the statute. People v Fawaz, 299 Mich.App. 55, 65; 829 N.W.2d 259 (2012). "The purpose of restitution laws is to enable victims to be compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of convicted offenders." People v Castillo, 337 Mich.App. 298, 313; 975 N.W.2d 94 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In furtherance of that statutory purpose, MCL 780.826(2) provides that, upon conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor offense, the sentencing court "shall order" that the defendant make "full restitution to any victim of the defendant's course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction." Our Supreme Court has explained that "the plain meaning of the word 'full'" [in the CVRA] is 'complete; entire; maximum.'" People v Garrison, 495 Mich. 362, 368; 852 N.W.2d 45 (2014) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the statutory directive for full restitution should be understood as imposing "a duty on sentencing courts to order defendants to pay restitution that is maximal and complete." Id.
The statutory requirement that sentencing courts award "full restitution" is subject to an exception in MCL 780.826(8), which provides that "[t]he court shall not order restitution be paid to a victim or victim's estate if the victim or victim's estate has received or is to receive compensation for that loss." Large insists that this language in MCL 780.826(8) precludes an order of restitution if the victim has received any compensation for the loss from some outside source. But this view is not supported by caselaw.
Although we have not directly addressed the application of the exception in MCL 780.826(8), we have addressed the application of the virtually identical exception in MCL 780.766(8). Our interpretation of MCL 780.766(8) is therefore relevant in interpreting MCL 780.826(8). See In re James, 492 Mich. 553, 561 n 13; 821 N.W.2d 144 (2012). MCL 780.766(8) has two purposes: (1) "to avoid ordering restitution which would doubly compensate a victim," and (2) "to prevent application of the 'collateral source doctrine' to crime victims' restitution situations," such that restitution is limited to only "those who have losses which are, as of the time restitution is paid, still out of pocket." Lee, 314 Mich.App. at 277 (quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, "[t]he amount of restitution to be paid by a defendant must be based on the actual loss suffered by the victim, not the amount paid by an insurer or other entity." People v Bell, 276 Mich.App. 342, 346-347; 741 N.W.2d 57 (2007). Thus, if a victim has out-of-pocket losses after receiving compensation from another source, the victim may still recover from the defendant in order to achieve "full" restitution, so long as there is no double recovery. See MCL 780.826(8); Lee, 314 Mich.App. at 277.
The district court did not err by determining that full restitution was required under MCL 780.826(8). Because the victims had out-of-pocket losses after receiving compensation from their insurance company, the statute allowed the victims to be fully compensated for their losses, provided they did not receive double compensation. Large argues that the Legislature's exclusion of the word "full" in MCL 780.826(8) indicates it intended to limit restitution to only those who received no compensation from other sources. This interpretation would defeat the CVRA's purpose of ensuring that victims are fairly compensated. People v Gubachy, 272 Mich.App. 706, 712; 728 N.W.2d 891 (2006). It is also inconsistent with the language of the CVRA that the court shall order "full" restitution. MCL 780.826(2). Further, Large's argument would lead to absurd results, which the CVRA should be construed to avoid. See People v Reed, 294 Mich.App. 78, 84; 819 N.W.2d 3 (2011).[3] Under Large's theory-as Large's counsel confirmed at the restitution hearing-if the victims had received only $1,000 from their insurance company, they would not be permitted under MCL 780.826(8) to obtain an...
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