People v. Castillo
| Citation | 510 P.3d 561,2022 COA 20 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA0754 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hector Manuel CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robin M. Lerg, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
ORDER AFFIRMED
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
¶ 1 On November 30, 2005, Hector Manuel Castillo, who was then eighteen and a half years old, drove a car in a gang-related drive-by shooting. Castillo's passenger, Alberto Valles, who was then two days shy of his eighteenth birthday, fired several shots from a rifle at another car, killing one of the passengers.
¶ 2 Castillo and Valles were both convicted of first degree extreme indifference murder. Because he was eighteen at the time of the offense, Castillo was sentenced to the statutory minimum of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Because Valles was under eighteen at the time of the offense, however, he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole (LWPP) after forty years.
¶ 3 In a postconviction motion, Castillo raised several challenges to his conviction and sentence, including a claim that his sentence violated his right to equal protection because he and Valles — just six months apart in age — were similarly situated and yet he was required to be sentenced more harshly for the same conduct. The postconviction court denied the motion and Castillo appeals.
¶ 4 Although we conclude that Castillo and Valles were similarly situated for equal protection purposes, we also conclude that Castillo's sentence does not violate his right to equal protection. Because we reject his other appellate contentions as well, we affirm.
¶ 5 A jury found Castillo guilty of first degree extreme indifference murder, five counts of attempted first degree extreme indifference murder, and one count each of accessory to attempted extreme indifference murder and reckless endangerment. The court sentenced Castillo to LWOP, which was the statutorily mandated minimum sentence for a class 1 felony at the time under section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. 2006. At sentencing, the court explained that its "hands ... are pretty well tied" because "the legislature ... has deemed it appropriate to take from the [c]ourt all discretion in regards to sentencing when an individual is found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree."
¶ 6 In 2007, Castillo appealed his conviction, contending, among other things, that the trial court gave an erroneous complicity instruction and violated his due process rights by referring the jury to the erroneous complicity instruction in response to a jury inquiry. A division of this court affirmed Castillo's conviction. See People v. Castillo , (Colo. App. No. 07CA1884, Aug. 6, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ) (Castillo I ).
¶ 7 In 2011, Castillo filed his first postconviction motion under Crim. P. 35(c). As relevant here, Castillo asserted that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to explain the plea bargaining process to him and by failing to object to the complicity jury instruction at trial. He also asserted that the trial court gave an erroneous complicity jury instruction. The district court denied the petition without a hearing, concluding that Castillo failed to state a claim for relief. A division of this court affirmed. See People v. Castillo , (Colo. App. No. 11CA2284, Apr. 3, 2014), 2014 WL 1325737 () ( Castillo II ).
¶ 8 Meanwhile, although Valles was a juvenile at the time of the offense, he was tried and convicted as an adult of one count of first degree extreme indifference murder and four counts of attempted extreme indifference murder. He was also sentenced to mandatory LWOP. People v. Valles , 2013 COA 84, ¶ 4, 412 P.3d 537, cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded , No. 13SC551, 2015 WL 4999239 (Colo. Aug. 24, 2015) (unpublished order).
¶ 9 While Valles’ case was pending on direct appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court announced Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that sentencing a juvenile to mandatory LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. On appeal, Valles argued that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller . Valles , ¶ 68. A division of this court agreed and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at ¶¶ 74-75. In May 2018, Valles was resentenced to LWPP after forty years.
¶ 10 On December 4, 2018, Castillo filed a second motion for postconviction relief, purportedly pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), which is the subject of this appeal. Prompted by Valles’ resentencing, Castillo contended that (1) because he was a less culpable complicitor who was subjected to a harsher penalty than the more culpable principal, the statutory sentencing scheme violates his rights to equal protection; and (2) his sentence to LWOP violates his rights to equal protection because there is no meaningful difference between an offender who is eighteen years and six months old and an offender who is two days shy of his eighteenth birthday. Due to the "complexity of the issues raised," Castillo requested appointment of counsel.
¶ 11 The postconviction court declined to appoint Castillo counsel and denied his motion without a hearing. It first determined, given the nature of the claims raised, that the motion was cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c). It then concluded that Castillo failed to demonstrate that he was similarly situated to Valles, thus failing to meet the threshold requirement for an equal protection claim.
¶ 12 In his opening brief on appeal, Castillo contended that the postconviction court erred by (1) failing to conduct a proportionality review of his sentence; (2) not liberally construing his postconviction motion as asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) not reversing his conviction based on the complicity jury instruction given by the trial court. Although Castillo framed his first claim as challenging the postconviction court's denial of his request for a proportionality review, the substance of his argument challenged the postconviction court's ruling on his equal protection claim. Because Castillo filed his appeal pro se, and because the People did not address the equal protection issue in their answer brief, we appointed Castillo counsel and ordered supplemental briefing from both sides on a single issue: Did the postconviction court err by denying Castillo's claim that his sentence violates his right to equal protection under the United States and Colorado Constitutions?
¶ 13 Having reviewed the supplemental briefs, we first conclude that Castillo's equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. We then address and reject each of his remaining appellate contentions. Consequently, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of his postconviction motion.
¶ 14 A court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing if (1) "the motion, files, and record in the case clearly establish that the allegations presented in the defendant's motion are without merit and do not warrant postconviction relief," Ardolino v. People , 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) ; (2) "the claims raise only an issue of law, or if the allegations, even if true, do not provide a basis for relief," People v. Venzor , 121 P.3d 260, 262 (Colo. App. 2005) ; or (3) the allegations are "merely conclusory, vague, or lacking in detail," People v. Osorio , 170 P.3d 796, 799 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 15 We review a postconviction court's summary denial of a motion for postconviction relief de novo. People v. Gardner , 250 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 16 We must first determine whether, as applied, the sentencing statute requiring that Castillo be sentenced to LWOP, section 18-1.3-401, violates his constitutional right to equal protection. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Dean v. People , 2016 CO 14, ¶ 11, 366 P.3d 593. "A statute is presumed to be constitutional; the challenging party bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at ¶ 8.
¶ 17 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Colorado Constitution does not contain an identical provision, the due process clause of the Colorado Constitution implies a similar guarantee. Dean , ¶ 11.
¶ 18 Buckley Powder Co. v. State , 70 P.3d 547, 562 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 19 Where a party raises an equal protection challenge, the level of judicial scrutiny depends on the type of classification used and the nature of the right affected. Dean , ¶ 12. We apply rational basis review when the challenged law does not impact a traditionally suspect class or implicate a fundamental right. Id. Under rational basis review, "the challenging party must prove that the statute's classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose or government objective, or that the classification is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Id.
¶ 20 Castillo contends that his sentence violates equal protection because he is similarly...
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