People v. Castleberry
| Decision Date | 29 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-11-1791,1-11-1791 |
| Citation | 2013 IL App (1st) 111791 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN CASTLEBERRY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Cook County.
¶ 1 HELD: Circuit court did not commit error in denying motion to dismiss juror for cause and defendant was not prejudiced where prospective juror hesitated and expressed concern during voir dire about the nature of the charges against defendant for aggravated criminal sexual assault because he was married and held women close to his heart, but was rehabilitated by the court and repeatedly reaffirmed that he could decide the case based only on the facts presented and would give both parties a fair trial. Following the holding in People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, the General Assembly revived the aggravated criminal sexual assault sentencing enhancement for commission of the offense armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(1) (West 2010)) and circuit court did not err in imposing an additional 15 years' imprisonment pursuant to that provision, but did err in failing to impose the add-on for both of defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentence must be vacated as void and the matter remanded forresentencing.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Steven Castleberry was convicted on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(8) (West 2008)) based on oral and vaginal contact with the victim. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 9 years for the convictions, with an additional 15 years' imprisonment under the statutory enhancement for the use of a firearm in committing aggravated criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(1) (West 2008). Defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. New counsel was appointed and following the filing of an amended motion and hearing, the motion was denied.
¶ 3 On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the circuit court failed to strike two allegedly biased prospective jurors for cause, leaving defendant without a peremptory challenge to strike the last prospective juror who demonstrated bias but was empaneled over defendant's objection. Defendant also argues that the matter must be remanded for resentencing because the 15-year firearm enhancement was declared unconstitutional. The State argues that the enhancement was revived by the Legislature and asserts that remand for resentencing is required to apply the enhancement to defendant's second conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, vacate defendant's sentence and remand the matter for resentencing to comply with the mandatory sentencing enhancement.
¶ 5 Defendant was charged with six counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon related to a June 22, 2009, incident involving the victim, C.A. The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 25, 2010, on two counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault. During the jury selection process both parties made several motions to exclude certain prospective jurors both for cause and with their peremptory challenges. On appeal, defendant raises issues with three prospective jurors, Marcus Baker, Cozetta Coleman, and John Prihodka. Defendant moved to have all three prospective jurors excused for cause, but the court denied his motions. Defendant utilized his final two peremptory challenges on Baker and Coleman, and was unable to strike Prihodka who was empaneled on the jury.
¶ 6 Baker indicated that he was the dean of students at EPIC Academy High School in Chicago, Illinois, and had previously served as assistant principal. Baker reported that he was the victim of an unsolved armed robbery when he was in high school, but stated that would not prevent him from being fair and impartial. He also stated that his mother had been the victim of an unsolved robbery and assault when he was in high school. In response to the question of whether this would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Baker responded that, because of his mother's experience, when the judge was giving an introduction to the case, Baker "found myself being judgmental already, so I would say yes."
¶ 7 The court questioned Baker on his role as a disciplinarian at the high school and Baker agreed that he listened to both sides in a dispute and, despite seeing the same allegations and scenarios over and over, he was not unfair because each case was distinct. The voir dire examination of Baker concluded with the following exchange:
¶ 8 Coleman stated that she was the victim of an armed robbery in 1990, but nobody was apprehended. However, when she was later called for jury duty, her attacker was on trial for robbing and killing two people. When the assistant State's Attorney asked Coleman if this experience would prevent Coleman from being fair and impartial as a juror in the instant matter, Coleman responded Nonetheless, Coleman affirmed that she could follow the law as given by the court and enter a finding of guilty or not guilty depending on whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 9 The parties and the court discussed the first panels of prospective jurors in sidebar. Several prospective jurors were removed for cause and by the parties' use of peremptory challenges. Defendant moved to strike Baker and Coleman for cause, arguing that Baker indicated he was judgmental of defendant already and that Coleman would not be fair because she was robbed at gunpoint. The court denied the motions, stating that each prospective juror indicated they could be fair. The court advised defense counsel to hold her peremptory challenges until the State tendered the panel.
¶ 10 During the voir dire of Prihodka, he stated that he had been the victim of Prihodka responded that these events would not prevent him from being fair and impartial as a juror. He also stated that his wife and sister-in-law were both mugged, in separate incidents, while waiting at a bus station roughly 30 years ago and that nobody was prosecuted for those crimes, but that those experiences would not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror in the instant case. However, under further questioning, the following colloquy occurred:
¶ 11 During the second sidebar discussions on the prospective jurors, defense counsel stated Counsel then moved to strike Prihodka...
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