People v. Castro

• Decision Date: 30 December 1966
• Citation: 224 N.E.2d 80,277 N.Y.S.2d 644,19 N.Y.2d 14
• Parties: , 224 N.E.2d 80 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Miguel CASTRO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 644

277 N.Y.S.2d 644

19 N.Y.2d 14, 224 N.E.2d 80

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Miguel CASTRO, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 30, 1966.

William P. Callahan and Anthony F. Marra, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Milton M. Stein and Michael Juviler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

BERGAN, Judge.

Respondent was convicted at General Sessions in New York County of murder in the second degree and was sentenced June 22, 1960 to 25 years to life. The homicide grew out of a youthful gang fight. Defendant was then 17 years old.

Proof of his stabbing a member of another gang, Julio Rosario, who died from the wounds, is established both by an eyewitness, who testified she saw defendant stab the deceased twice in the back with a knife, and by admissions to the police and an assistant district attorney, and the sufficiency of the proof of guilt is not disputed on this appeal. Defendant seeks a 'remand for a hearing on whether appellant's confession was voluntary'.

The problem is whether the rule laid down in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 applies. There are in this record some things which do and some things which do not meet the criteria stated in Huntley as to 'trials already concluded'. It was there laid down (at p. 77, 255 N.Y.S.2d at p. 843, 204 N.E.2d at p. 183): 'No Jackson-Denno hearing will be necessary in cases where a confession was admitted without any objection by the defendant or any assertion by him or his witnesses as to voluntariness. Even in these cases, however, if the trial court has charged the jury on voluntariness the issue was in the case and a new hearing is indicated.'

Defendant objected to the admission of the statements given to police on the grounds of coercion, intimidation and involuntariness. Prosecution witnesses were vigorously cross-examined by defendant on the circumstances under which the admissions were taken. Motions were made to strike out the testimony of such admissions and for an instruction to the jury at that stage of the trial to disregard the testimony. These motions were denied.

Although it would normally be expected in the light of these motions that it would be submitted to the jury with instructions to pass on the question of the voluntary nature of the statements, the Judge, out of the presence of the jury, himself introduced this subject by saying: 'In reviewing the record, gentlemen, I find nothing in it to suggest any bona-fide issue relating to the voluntariness of the statements made to Detective MacFarlane or to the answers given to Mr. Reynolds later that morning so as to require the Court to charge the provisions of Section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.'

Then the Judge asked one of defendant's lawyers this question: 'What is your desire in this matter, Mr. Kestnbaum?' There followed this colloquy:

'MR. KESTNBAUM: Your Honor, the defendant does not contend that the statements made to police officers or to the District Attorney were coerced, were involuntary.

'THE COURT: Am I to infer from that, sir, that you are not requesting any charge along those lines?

'MR. KESTNBAUM: That is correct.'

In the appeal before the Appellate Division defendant moved for a hearing in the trial court, prior to the argument of the appeal, and in support of this motion submitted an affidavit by Mr. Kestnbaum, one of trial counsel, which is reproduced in the appendix to appellant's brief. Among other things he said this: '5. Although I was advised by defendant Castro, my client, that his confessions were in fact coerced, I considered that his case would be prejudiced more than enhanced by his taking the witness stand. It was my experience that a jury very seldom held for a defendant on the basis of coercion of a confession where police or prosecutor testified to a lack of coercion, irrespective of whether the defendant testified. On the other hand, the wide latitude given the District Attorney by way of collateral attack during a cross-examination of defendant Castro in the presence of the Jury, could have,...