People v. Causeway Const. Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1996
• Citation: 169 Misc.2d 70,649 N.Y.S.2d 630
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. CAUSEWAY CONSTRUCTION CORP., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

Page 630

649 N.Y.S.2d 630

169 Misc.2d 70

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. CAUSEWAY CONSTRUCTION CORP., Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

June 26, 1996.

Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Pamela Seider Dolgow and John Hogrogian, of counsel), for appellant.

Ilene H. Cohen, Roslyn, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Order dated February 23, 1995 (Irving Rosen, J.) insofar as appealed from, reversed, on the law, the sentence vacated, and the sentence rendered on July 20, 1990 (Nicholas J. Iacovetta, J.) is reinstated.

In this misdemeanor prosecution for violations of the Transportation Code (Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 19-105, 19-157), a plea of guilty was entered against the corporate defendant in July 1990 based upon its nonappearance (see, CPL 600.20), and fines totalling $14,000 were imposed in accordance with the corporate sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 80.10(1). On its December 1994 motion to set aside the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, defendant challenged the propriety of the service of the underlying summonses and the bona fides of the substantive charges, but advanced no claim that the amounts of the fines were excessive or that the sentence was otherwise improper. While rejecting the points raised by defendant, Criminal Court, sua sponte, vacated the sentence originally imposed based upon its own conclusion that the fines were illegal. We disagree, and thus reverse the order issued below to the extent now challenged on the People's appeal.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Criminal Court had authority to vacate the original sentence in the context of the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without a specific defense request to do so (compare, People v. Minaya, 54 N.Y.2d 360, 445 N.Y.S.2d 690, 429 N.E.2d 1161, cert. den. 455 U.S. 1024, 102 S.Ct. 1725, 72 L.Ed.2d 144, with Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865, 456 N.E.2d 806; see also, People v. Riggins, 164 A.D.2d 797, 559 N.Y.S.2d 535; People v. Gifford, 2 A.D.2d 642, 151 N.Y.S.2d 982), the court incorrectly concluded that the fines initially set were unauthorized. The sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 80.10(1), permitting a $2,000 maximum fine for each unclassified misdemeanor charged herein, are expressly made applicable to corporate offenses defined outside the Penal Law where the statute or ordinance specifies "no special corporate fine". Significantly, neither of the Administrative Code provisions here violated provides for any special corporate fine. Each merely authorizes a specified maximum fine payable by "[a]ny...