People v. Ceja
| Citation | 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 47,10 Cal.App.4th 334 |
| Decision Date | 05 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A051133,A051133 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 10 Cal.App.4th 334 10 Cal.App.4th 334, 4 Cal.App.4th 223 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Enrique Chavez CEJA, Defendant and Appellant. |
Fern M. Laethem, State Public Defender, Jeanne Wolfe, Deputy State Public Defender, Office of the State Public Defender, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, State Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Sharon G. Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of the State Attorney General, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
Enrique Chavez Ceja appeals his conviction by jury trial of first degree murder. (Pen.Code, § 187.) 1 Allegations of firearm use (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)) and infliction of great bodily injury (§ 1203.075) were found true. He contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on first degree murder by means of lying in wait. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
On September 7, 1988, appellant shot and killed Diana Hernandez (Diana) in the front yard of her brother's home. During the summer of 1988, Diana and appellant were Two or three days prior to the shooting, Diana, Hermenegildo, Ortega, Edwin, and Diana's niece, Patricia, drove to a laundromat. As they were driving they noticed appellant following them in his car, and when they arrived at the laundromat appellant attempted to speak with Diana, but she refused. She did, however, let him play with Edwin outside the laundromat, and appellant appeared happy as he did so. He then left to buy a pizza, and thereafter appeared at Hermenegildo's house with a pizza and spoke with Diana.
living together with their infant son, Edwin. Their relationship was marked by appellant's extreme jealousy, frequent (and often physical) quarrels, and episodic separations. Approximately 10 days prior to her death Diana left appellant and moved with Edwin into the home of her brother, Hermenegildo, and his wife, Maria Ortega (Ortega), saying she was angry with appellant and did not want to continue to live with him. About four days before the shooting, Lupe Roque (Roque), who also lived at Hermenegildo's house, heard appellant talking to Diana through a window. Appellant told Diana to return everything he had given her, including her jewelry and clothes. Diana removed her shoes and threw them and her clothes out the window.
Later that evening Hermenegildo saw appellant, in an intoxicated condition, at a bar. Appellant told him he loved Diana very much and could not understand why she did not want to live with him. He gave Hermenegildo a gold chain to give to Diana, but when Hermenegildo gave Diana the chain she told him to return it to appellant. On the night before the shooting Hermenegildo returned the chain to appellant, and appellant said he would kill himself if Diana did not return to live with him.
At about 10:00 a.m. on the day of the shooting, appellant's father's pickup truck was seen parked next to Hermenegildo's house. Sometime between noon and 12:30 p.m., Department of Social Services worker Amada Bruce arrived at Hermenegildo's house and spoke with Diana, Ortega, and Roque in the living room. Patricia was in a back bedroom watching television. Diana told Bruce she was not living with appellant, whom she referred to as "Chico." Shortly thereafter, appellant knocked on the front door. Diana answered the door and appellant gave her a bag of clothes. Appellant asked Roque if he could speak with Diana in the back yard. Roque told him he would have to speak with her in the front yard, whereupon appellant and Diana sat on a sofa in the front yard. After appellant told Diana he wanted to see Edwin, she went back inside and got him, and the three of them then visited together.
According to Patricia, after going outside appellant and Diana talked for about 15 minutes before their voices got louder. After a period of loud talking, Diana started screaming, "No, Chico, no." She then yelled for Ortega and Roque. Patricia looked out the window and saw appellant pointing a gun at Diana, who was screaming. Appellant grabbed Diana by the hair or neck and shot her three times.
Ortega testified that about 15 minutes after appellant and Diana went outside, she heard Diana yelling. She ran outside and saw appellant holding her by the hair. Appellant had one knee on the armrest of the sofa and Diana was sitting on it. After Ortega said "something nasty" to appellant and told him to release Diana, appellant took out a gun and pointed it at Ortega, who hid behind a tree. Ortega then ran to pick up Edwin, who had fallen between Diana's legs and was lying on the ground crying. Appellant struggled with Diana and then shot her.
Roque stated that when appellant knocked at the door looking for Diana, he did not appear to be angry. After Roque heard Diana screaming, she went outside and saw appellant and Diana struggling, both with their hands up in the air. After Ortega grabbed Edwin, appellant laid Diana's head on the sofa and fired three shots. He then jumped over a fence and ran. Roque saw a truck parked outside the house after the shooting, which someone said belonged to appellant's father.
Bruce testified she called 911 after she heard someone say, "[H]e's hurting her."
While on the phone she heard someone say, "[H]e's going to kill her," and, "[H]e has a gun." She then heard two shots and stayed on the phone until the police arrived. Hermenegildo was in the back yard when he heard Diana screaming, "No Chico, no Chico, no Chico." As he walked toward the house he heard three shots. When he went out front, Roque told him appellant killed Diana, and Diana was lying on the ground
At the time of the shooting Stacey Ashford was standing across the street and heard a man and woman arguing in Spanish, but did not understand what was said. He saw them "grabbing and pulling" and saw the man strike the woman numerous times while yelling at her, and saw him knock her to the ground. He then heard three or four shots, after which the man jumped a fence, walked about halfway up the block past Ashford holding a revolver, and started running. Ashford identified appellant as the man who passed him and did the shooting. He saw appellant tuck the gun under his armpit before he began running.
Appellant was arrested in March 1990 in Merced. He denied he was Enrique Ceja, identifying himself instead as Jacinto Garcia. However, documents in his possession included a driver's license in the name of Enrique Ceja. In appellant's tape-recorded statement to the police, which was played for the jury, he stated that he drove his father's pickup truck to Hermenegildo's house on the morning of the shooting and visited briefly with Diana. He said he left the truck at the house because it would not start. He denied killing Diana. Appellant did not testify, but presented an alibi defense which was, obviously, unpersuasive.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of murder. His sole contention is that the court erred in instructing the jury on murder by means of lying in wait because the evidence was insufficient to support that theory, and the error is prejudicial because it allowed the jury to find first degree murder without considering whether the elements of premeditation and deliberation were sufficiently proven.
Murder is classified by section 189 as either first or second degree, depending on the means by which it is committed. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 464-465, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) Section 189 states, in relevant part: "All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... lying in wait, ..., or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, ..., is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree...." "The statute assumes that if the means of the murder are by lying in wait, those means adequately establish the murder as the equivalent of a [deliberate and] premeditated murder without any additional evidence of the defendant's mental state." (People v. Hyde (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 463, 475, 212 Cal.Rptr. 440; see People v. Ward (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 218, 226, 103 Cal.Rptr. 671.)
Section 189 is founded upon section 21 of the Crimes and Punishments Act. (Stats. 1856, ch. 139, § 2, p. 219.) 2 In People v. Sanchez (1864) 24 Cal. 17, 29, our Supreme Court discussed the statutory division of the two degrees of murder as follows: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Ceja
...evidence of lying in wait and, if not, whether reversal is required in light of the remaining valid theory of first degree murder. 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 47. (Cf. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 with Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.......
-
People v. Ceja
...Respondent, v. Enrique Chavez CEJA, Appellant. No. SO26136. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. May 21, 1992. Prior report: Cal.App., 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 47. Respondent's petition for review LUCAS, C.J., and PANELLI, KENNARD, BAXTER and GEORGE, JJ., concur. ...