People v. Chacon

• Decision Date: 26 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. F038393.,F038393.
• Citation: 109 Cal.App.4th 1537,1 Cal.Rptr.3d 223
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Matthew CHACON, Defendant and Appellant.

1 Cal.Rptr.3d 223

109 Cal.App.4th 1537

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Matthew CHACON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F038393.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

June 26, 2003.

Review Granted October 1, 2003.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Coleen W. Ryan and Clarence Westra, Jr., Judges.^*

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey Firestone, Louis M. Vasquez and Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

GOMES, J.

The issue on appeal is whether a court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition after a jury finds a 17-year-old minor with no known prior criminal history guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (assault by means) on a "discretionary direct file" for which Proposition 21 authorizes, but does not mandate, a criminal trial instead of a juvenile hearing.¹ (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The minor, Matthew Chacon, objected to the discretionary direct file charging him with, inter alia, assault by means. After the prosecutor opposed, and the court overruled, his objections, the court imposed a state prison sentence.

Before adjudicating the issue on appeal, we must address two foundational questions: Is Proposition 21 constitutional? Does the statutory requirement that a prosecutor consent before a court can order a juvenile disposition on a discretionary direct file violate the state Constitution's separation of powers doctrine?² We will answer both questions in the affirmative.

On the facts and law here, we will hold that a court has express statutory discretion to order a juvenile disposition other than a Youth Authority commitment or to impose an adult sentence instead. The record shows no awareness by the court of that discretion, however, so we will affirm the judgment, order the state prison sentence stricken from the judgment, and remand the matter for an exercise of informed judicial discretion.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutionality of Proposition 21

Chacon argues that Proposition 21 violates the single-subject initiative rule (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d)) and that the discretionary direct file authority enacted into Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) by Proposition 21 violates state constitutional guarantees of separation of powers (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3), equal protection of the laws (id., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)), uniform operation of laws (id., art. IV, § 16), and due process of law (id., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15).

After briefing was complete here, the Supreme Court adjudicated challenges like Chacon's. The court held that Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject initiative rule (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d)), that the grant of discretion to the prosecutor by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) to file criminal charges against certain minors without a judicial fitness hearing does not violate the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3), that the elimination of a judicial fitness hearing by that statute does not violate due process of law (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 15), and that the grant of discretion to the prosecutor by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) to file criminal charges against some minors but not others does not violate equal protection of the laws (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) or the uniform operation of the laws doctrine (id., art. IV, § 16). (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 550-562, 117 Cal.Rptr .2d 168, 41 P.3d 3.)

II. Constitutionality of Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a)(4)

Chacon argues that a court has discretion to order a juvenile disposition on a discretionary direct file. The Attorney General argues the contrary. At the heart of the issue is a statute requiring a court to secure a prosecutor's consent to order a juvenile disposition on a discretionary direct file:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the following shall apply to a person sentenced pursuant to Section 1170.17.[¶] ... [¶] (4) Subject to the knowing and intelligent consent of both the prosecution and the person being sentenced pursuant to this section, the court may order a juvenile disposition under the juvenile court law, in lieu of a sentence under this code, upon a finding that such an order would serve the best interests of justice, protection of the community, and the person being sentenced. Prior to ordering a juvenile disposition, the court shall cause to be received into evidence a social study by the probation officer, prepared pursuant to Section 706 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and shall state that the social study made by the probation officer has been read and considered by the court." (Pen.Code, § 1170.19, subd. (a)(4), italics added.)

On the threshold question of whether requiring a prosecutor's consent violates the state Constitution's separation of powers doctrine, we examine relevant case law. (See Cal. Const, art. Ill, § 3.³)

In the seminal case of People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 91-95, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993 (Tenorio), the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a court to secure a prosecutor's consent to dismiss an allegation of a prior conviction violates the state Constitution's separation of powers doctrine by improperly invading the constitutional province of the judiciary:

"When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Just as the fact of prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply prosecutorial discretion to convict without a judicial determination of guilt, discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied are within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment. The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise." (Id. at p. 94, 89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.)

In the years after Tenorio, the Supreme Court applied the rationale of that case to several analogous situations. In Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 122, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140, the court held that a statute requiring a magistrate to secure a prosecutor's consent to determine that a wobbler is a misdemeanor rather than a felony violates the separation of powers doctrine (see Pen.Code, § 17, subd. b)):

"Since the exercise of a judicial power may not be conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government, requiring the district attorney's consent in determining the charge on which a defendant shall be held to answer violates the doctrine of separation of powers." (Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 127, 95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140.)

In People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 258-260, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481, the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a court to secure a prosecutor's consent to order a posttrial commitment to a narcotic detention, treatment, and rehabilitation facility violates the separation of powers doctrine:

"The imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion are fundamentally and inherently judicial functions. [Citation.] ... [¶] ... [¶] `It bears reiteration that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the district attorney.'" (Id. at pp. 258-259, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481, fns. omitted.)

In People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 61, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405, the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a court to secure a prosecutor's consent to order pretrial diversion to a narcotic treatment and rehabilitation program violates the separation of powers doctrine:

"[W]hen the jurisdiction of a court has been properly invoked by the filing of a criminal charge, the disposition of that charge becomes a judicial responsibility.... With the development of more sophisticated responses to the wide range of antisocial behavior traditionally subsumed under the heading of `crime,' alternative means of disposition have been confided to the judiciary." (Id, at p. 66, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405.)

In Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 69-72, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300, 757 P.2d 11, the court held that a local rule on wobblers precluding diversion to those whom a prosecutor charges with felonies while permitting diversion to those whom a prosecutor charges with misdemeanors does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The local rule granted discretion that a prosecutor could exercise before the filing of a criminal charge, but the challenged statutes at issue in Tenorio and progeny "purported to give a prosecutor the right to veto a decision made by a court after criminal charges had already been filed. None of the cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." (Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 82, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300, 757 P.2d 11.)...