People v. Chairez

• Decision Date: 01 February 2018
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121417
• Citation: 2018 IL 121417,104 N.E.3d 1158
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Julio CHAIREZ, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2018 IL 121417

104 N.E.3d 1158

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Julio CHAIREZ, Appellee.

Docket No. 121417

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed February 1, 2018

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Erin S. Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) of the unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) statute ( 720 ILCS 5/24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) (West 2012) ), which, in pertinent part, prohibits an individual from carrying or possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a public park.

¶ 2 PRINCIPAL STATUTE INVOLVED

¶ 3 At the time of the proceedings herein, the UUW statute provided:

" § 24–1. Unlawful Use of Weapons.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

(4) Carries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person's permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm, except that this subsection (a)(4) does not apply to or affect transportation of weapons that meet one of the following conditions:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card[.] * * *

* * *

(c) Violations in specific places.

* * *

(1.5) A person who violates subsection 24–1(a)(4) * * * on any public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school, public park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development commits a Class 3 felony." 720 ILCS 5/24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) (West 2012).

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On April 24, 2013, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant Julio Chairez pled guilty in the circuit court of Kane County to possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of Virgil Gilman Trail, a park in Aurora, Illinois, in exchange for the State's agreement to file a nolle prosequi for several other charges and the recommendation that defendant receive a sentence of two years' probation.

¶ 6 On November 5, 2015, defendant filed a postconviction petition, seeking to vacate the conviction on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional under the second amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. II. The circuit court heard arguments by counsel for defendant and the State regarding defendant's petition for relief. At the hearing, defendant argued that an individual who is barred from carrying a firearm within 1000 feet of the many locations listed in section 24–1(c) (1.5) of the UUW statute is essentially barred from carrying a firearm in public. Therefore, counsel reasoned, section 24–1(c) (1.5) was more closely akin to a blanket prohibition than a restriction on carrying a gun in certain sensitive places. In response, the State argued that the firearm restriction is not a blanket prohibition because it prevents people from carrying firearms only in certain proscribed areas.

¶ 7 In its oral ruling given on July 29, 2016, the circuit court declared section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) of the UUW statute unconstitutional. In so ruling, the court found that the 1000–foot firearm restriction was not a reasonable regulation on the second amendment. On this point, the court stated:

"The effect of the thousand foot language on gun rights is a near comprehensive ban. The practical effect is that a person cannot leave his house with his licensed firearm because he would constantly be in jeopardy of accidentally and unknowingly entering within a thousand feet of a school, public park, public transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated or managed by [a] public housing agency[ ]."

¶ 8 Comparing the language of section 24–1(a)(4) to that of the offenses declared facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321, and People v. Mosley , 2015 IL 115872, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137, the circuit court found the offense established by section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) unconstitutional. The court went on to further note that the language concerning defendant's charge of possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a public park, albeit different from the facially unconstitutional statutes in Aguilar and Mosley , "does not rescue the Statute." Accordingly, the court ruled defendant's conviction void, granted his motion, and vacated his UUW conviction.

¶ 9 On September 7, 2016, the circuit court entered its written order, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 18 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), the State's appeal from the circuit court's finding of statutory unconstitutionality comes directly to this court.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 As an initial matter, we must address some discrepancies and incomplete portions of the circuit court's Rule 18 order finding section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) unconstitutional. The court's order is the latest of recent direct appeals in which we have been required to discern the scope of the written order declaring a statute to be unconstitutional. See People v. Rizzo , 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 25, 406 Ill.Dec. 488, 61 N.E.3d 92 ( Rule 18 order lacked a sufficient discussion or analysis); People v. Schweihs , 2015 IL 117789, ¶ 17, 398 Ill.Dec. 69, 43 N.E.3d 979 (same); Mosley , 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 11, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137 (discrepancy as to which section of the aggravated UUW (AUUW) statute the circuit court actually found unconstitutional). Here, we are again faced with a ruling that is conclusory and unsupported by a clear legal analysis or explanation despite Rule 18's requirement that the circuit court "clearly identif[y]" in a written or transcribed oral order what portions of the statute are being held unconstitutional and on what specific grounds. Rather, the court's single-page order simply restated the requirements set forth in the rule, and concluded that section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) was unconstitutional "for reasons previously stated of record."¹ Without a clear explanation for its ruling, this court is left with the difficult task of determining the basis of the circuit court's ruling. We reiterate, again, " ‘[w]hen a circuit court does something as serious as holding that a statute violates the constitution, then the circuit court must also be mindful to clearly state * * * the legal basis for that ruling.’ " Schweihs , 2015 IL 117789, ¶ 17, 398 Ill.Dec. 69, 43 N.E.3d 979 (quoting People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004) ).

¶ 12 Not readily apparent from the written order or the court's oral pronouncement is a clear answer to the important question of whether the statute was unconstitutional facially or as applied. From what we can construe from the record, the circuit court held that the restricted conduct under section 24–1(a)(4) within 1000 feet of schools, public parks, courthouses, public housing, and public transportation facilities was facially unconstitutional. We arrive at this conclusion based on the court's continuous reference and application of the holdings in Aguilar and Mosley . The circuit court found that the language of section 24–1(a)(4) of the UUW statute was "almost identical" to the comprehensive firearm ban on the possession of a firearm for self-defense purposes declared unconstitutional in Aguilar and Mosley . The court determined further that the 1000–foot language in section 24–1(c) (1.5) does not save the statute because the additional restriction is a "near comprehensive ban on the [d]efendant's [s]econd [a]mendment rights," by prohibiting carriage in areas where Aguilar and Mosley allow an individual to carry. Central to the court's concern was the practical inability of any individual to bypass the various areas protected under section 24–1(c) (1.5) and the lack of an exception for carrying or possessing a firearm in self-defense. The court's reasoning makes it clear the court held section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1) unconstitutional on its face as violative of the second amendment because it viewed the regulation as a comprehensive firearm restriction on all individuals. Moreover, our finding is supported by the fact that the parties have confined their contentions before this court on the basis that the circuit court made a facial unconstitutionality declaration.

¶ 13 Next, we must determine whether the circuit court touched upon legal questions not before it. Addressing this same concern, this court in Mosley reaffirmed the general rule that "courts do not rule on the constitutionality of a statute where its provisions do not affect the parties [citation], and decide constitutional questions only to the extent required by the issues in the case." Mosley , 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 11, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137. The circuit court's order conflicts with this rule by finding unconstitutional the entirety of section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5), without limitation to the single offense of which defendant was convicted under the statute. Because defendant was convicted of violating section 24–1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) by being within 1000 feet of a public park, the various other "specific places" offenses set forth in section 24–1(c) (1.5) were not before the...