People v. Chapman, Cr. 13769

• Decision Date: 25 June 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 13769
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 485 P.2d 1149 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Niles Lucky CHAPMAN, Defendant and Petitioner.

Page 533

95 Cal.Rptr. 533

5 Cal.3d 218, 485 P.2d 1149

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Niles Lucky CHAPMAN, Defendant and Petitioner.

Cr. 13769.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

June 25, 1971.

Niles Lucky Chapman, in pro. per.; Alan Brodovsky, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., and A. Wells Petersen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BY THE COURT

Petitioner seeks an order permitting him to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court. We have concluded that he is not entitled to the requested relief.

Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in Sacramento Superior Court of attempted burglary. (Pen.Code, §§ 459, 664.) He was sentenced to state prison on January 2, 1969. On May 21, 1969, almost five months after sentencing, he petitioned the Court of Appeal for rule 31(a) relief.

Petitioner made the following allegations in his petition: Upon hearing the judgment of the trial court, he stated in open court that he wished to appeal, at which point the public defender representing him directed him to keep his voice down because court was still in session. He was 'positive' that the judge and the district attorney heard his statement. He saw his attorney make a note on one of the papers he had before him, and believed that the attorney was making a note of his request. After waiting what he thought was a 'reasonable' time (four months and five days) he wrote the clerk of the Court of Appeal asking when his case would be heard and was informed by letter (attached to his petition and dated May 12) that no appeal was pending. He immediately sent a notice of appeal to the superior court but was informed by letter dated May 15 and attached to his petition that it would not be filed. He then sent a motion dated May 19, 1969, to the Court of Appeal for relief from default under rule 31(a).

We appointed the Honorable John G. Hauck, Judge of the Superior Court of Sutter County, as referee for this court and directed him to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts.

The following evidence was adduced at the hearing: Petitioner testified that he was sentenced in a large courtroom with 50 or 60 people present. He stated that there 'was a little noise' in the room. He thought people were talking and a few people were crying. As he was standing next to his attorney after sentencing, he asked, 'in my normal tone of voice,' whether he could appeal. His attorney told him to keep his voice down because court was still in session. The attorney made a note on a paper in front of him on the desk which petitioner could not see, but assumed was a notation about his appeal.

Petitioner testified that later, as he was being returned to the holding cell, he asked his attorney 'whether he would take care of this,' and the attorney said he would. He also testified that he had asked his attorney to come see him but could not remember whether the attorney said he would come.

Petitioner testified he had three visitors while he was held in the county jail after sentencing, his mother, Doris Blunk and Sheila Mortham. He told Doris Blunk and Sheila Mortham that he was going to 'fight' his conviction. He did not recall whether he told his mother he was going to appeal.

Because he knew 'the due process of law takes quite a lot of time' (he was in the county jail three and a half or four months before his trial), he testified that he did not become concerned about his appeal for four or five months. Then he wrote a letter to the clerk of the Court of Appeal, a copy of which was introduced into evidence, inquiring when his appeal was 'coming up.' He testified that he did not write his attorney because he forgot his name. He wrote the clerk because the addresses of all the courts were kept in the prison library. The reply, dated May 12, 1969, and informing petitioner that no appeal was pending, was also introduced into evidence.

Petitioner testified that he sought the advice of the immate-clerk of the prison legal library because he 'didn(t) know much about the law.' Both the notice of appeal and the petition for 31(a) relief were prepared by the immate-clerk. Petitioner testified as to the 31(a) petition that 'I talked to the clerk and told him in my words what I felt, or how I felt about this case, and he wrote it up.'

When questioned about the discrepancy between his petition, which stated that he had asked for an appeal 'in open court,' and his testimony, in which he stated that he stated his desire to appeal 'in a normal voice' as he stood beside his attorney just after sentencing, he stated: '* * * (R)eading this now, and taking word for word and phrase for phrase, which I was negligent as far as doing this when he had typed it up, and I read it, and the main gist of it was--it sounded all right to me at the time. But reading it word for word, in taking it in that respect, there are a few things that--I wouldn't say that they were lies, but I would say they probably could have been worded a little differently.'

Viola Chapman, petitioner's mother, testified that she was present at the sentencing and that the courtroom was 'rather noisy.' She could not hear what petitioner said. Later that day she visited him at the county jail for approximately 10 minutes. She testified that they talked about family affairs, that she would not have known what he was talking about if he mentioned an appeal but that she was sure he did not mention it to her.

Sheila Mortham, a friend of petitioner's, testified that she did not attend the sentencing but that she did visit petitioner in the county jail afterward for 10 or 15 minutes. She stated that he told her he was going to fight his conviction, that he was going to file 'something,' and that he was innocent. She could not remember if he used the word 'appeal.' She testified that he said 'if he had to he would take it to the Supreme Court.'

Doris Blunk, Sheila Mortham's mother, testified that she also visited him on the day of sentencing for 10 or 15 minutes. She further testified that he told her he was fighting his conviction or appealing it 'or it was being appealed it (sic), something.'

Albert H. Mundt, superior court judge in Sacramento County, testified that he presided over the judgment and sentence of the petitioner and that he had no independent recollection of what occurred that day. He stated that his usual practice when a defendant expresses a desire that his case be appealed is to direct his attorney to file a written notice of appeal. He testified that the transcript does not reveal a request by petitioner for an appeal. He volunteered that he does not have a noisy courtroom, and that the audience seating capacity of the courtroom is 82.

J. Warren Mayes, the court reporter at petitioner's judgment and sentencing, testified that he had no independent recollection of that proceeding. He testified that his usual practice is to take down everything he hears in the courtroom, that if he heard petitioner say anything it would appear in the record, and that the transcript does not reflect a request for an appeal.

Frederick W. Stephenson, the deputy district attorney assigned to petitioner's case, testified that petitioner was one of from 10 to 30 defendants on the 9 o'clock calendar and he had no independent recollection of the proceedings. He felt he would remember if petitioner had 'made an issue' of his desire to appeal, but further stated that '(i)f (petitioner) just simply stated to his attorney in that tone of voice which was conversational in tone only and I happened to overhear it I probably would not remember it.'

He stated that on sentencing days, the courtroom is 20 to 50 percent filled but the noise of the crowd does not often interfere with his ability to hear statements made at the counsel table.

Peter Mering, the deputy public defender who represented petitioner at trial and sentencing, testified he was not certain he had an independent recollection of the judgment and sentencing proceedings. He stated that the usual practice in his office was to destroy files on which nothing further is pending, and that the file cards in his office indicated that petitioner's file was destroyed. He did not remember whether he had the file at the time he submitted his affidavit in support of the Attorney General's opposition to petitioner's petition for relief from default under rule 31(a), ¹ but he suspected that the file had been destroyed before that time because the file card indicated that it had. His statement in his affidavit that he had not made a notation about filing a notice of appeal was based on his recollection when he signed the affidavit. It was also based on his feeling that if he had made the notation the file would not have been destroyed, although he stated that he could have intended to retain the file and mislaid it. Moreover, he was not sure he would have written anything down even if petitioner had requested that he appeal, but might have just gone ahead and filed the notice. This was so because it would have been necessary for him to get petitioner's signature before he was moved out of the area.

Mr. Mering's normal practice was to inform a client when he thought there were grounds for appeal, and, even if he thought there were no grounds, to file a notice of appeal if the client requested it. He 'felt rather strongly' that if the petitioner had requested him to do something about an appeal, he would have done it, or if he had not 'it would have hung on my mind as one of the unfinished things that do sit on my desk for a while.'

He had no independent recollection as to whether he had told petitioner to remain silent because court was in session or whether he made a note on his file. He stated that he sometimes noted the disposition of the case on...