People v. Charles

Decision Date01 August 1963
Docket NumberCr. 1852
Citation218 Cal.App.2d 812,32 Cal.Rptr. 653
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rence CHARLES and Louis Charles, Defendants and Appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

COUGHLIN, Justice.

By Count One in an information, the defendants Charles, and a third person named Mary Swann, were charged with an attempt to commit the crime of pandering, i. e., an attempted violation of § 266i of the Penal Code; by Count Two therein, were charged with conspiracy to commit the crime of pandering, i. e., a violation of § 182 of that code; and by separate allegations therein, the defendant Louis Charles also was charged with a prior felony conviction. What disposition was made of the charges against Mary Swann does not appear. The defendant Louis Charles admitted the prior conviction, but both he and defendant Renee Charles pleaded not guilty to the charges contained in Counts One and Two; were tried by a jury, which found them guilty of each offense as charged; were sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison; and appeal from the judgment entered.

The defendants seek a reversal on the ground that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict finding them guilty of offenses charged in Count One; (2) the court erred in failing to give an instruction that they were presumed to be husband and wife; and (3) that an accumulation of errors in sustaining objections to the admission of evidence, the denying of motions to strike, and the rejection of requested instructions, was prejudicial.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE RE COUNT ONE

The material allegations of the information in Count One charged the defendants with the 'crime of Pandering (PC 266i(f) committed as follows: The said LOUIS CHARLES, RENEE CHARLES and MARY SWANN * * * did attempt to procure a female person to become an inmate in a house of ill-fame within the State of California * * *.' Section 266i of the Penal Code defines 'Any person who: (a) procures a female inmate for a house of prostitution; or (b) by promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades or encourages a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution; * * * or (f) receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, any female person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame * * * is guilty of pandering, * * *.'

the offense of pandering and, in part, declares that:

The commission of any one of the acts described in the foregoing code section constitutes the offense of pandering; may involve the commission of other acts separately described therein; and, for this reason, a description of the one act may include the others. (People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal.App.2: 1, 23-26, 117 P.2d 437.) The terms 'house of prostitution' and 'house of ill-fame' are used synonymously. The statute endeavors 'to cover all the various ramifications of the social evil of pandering and include them all in the definition of the crime, with a view of effectively combatting the evil sought to be condemned.' (People v. Montgomery, supra, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 24, 117 P.2d 437, 451.) The charge in the subject information that the defendants 'did attempt to procure a female person to become an inmate in a house of ill-fame' clearly alleges an attempt to commit an offense defined by the statute; is included within the conduct of a person who '(a) procures a female inmate for a house of prostitution; or (b) by promises * * * or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades or encourages a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution' (People v. Montgomery, supra, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 9, 12, 117 P.2d 437; People v. Wright, 26 Cal.App.2d 197, 201, 79 P.2d 102); and is adequately supported by the evidence hereinafter noted.

On the night of January 2, 1962, two cocktail waitresses attending upon a bar were offered a ride home by the defendants Charles; accepted the offer; while enroute were engaged in conversation respecting their income, as to whether they made any money off of the boys, to which they replied: 'No, just what we made in tips at the bar,' and as to whether they 'did anything on the side,' which also brought a negative reply; and were told by the defendant Louis: 'Well, we have a proposition for you. Maybe you will be interested in it * * * Maybe you will invite Renee into your house for a cup of coffee and you can discuss it, and then maybe you three can make arrangements and I could come down and pick you up and show you the setup.' As requested, the two girls invited the defendants into their apartment and there were told that the defendant Renee Charles had a call house in Los Angeles County; that she needed call girls; that 'it was a pretty good setup'; that if the girls lived in the house they would get a fifty-fifty split and if they lived out it would be forty-sixty; that they would meet, entertain and have intercourse with the trade at the house; that they could come and try it out and if they didn't make out too well in thf first week they would be guaranteed $50 'for spending money.' The defendants gave the girls a phone number; asked them to call if they were interested; and left. Thereafter, either or both of the defendants telephoned and talked to one or the other of the two girls on five different occasions during which the latter were urged to come and 'try it'; were guaranteed '$50.00 a week, anyway'; one was told by the defendant Louis Charles that he would come down and pick her up at any time of the day or night; and, on the last two calls, made arrangements for a meeting with both girls at their apartment. In the meantime the two girls had contacted the police, who arranged to be and were present at this meeting; were concealed from view; and heard what transpired. The three defendants The evidence establishing the foregoing facts, although contradicted, fully supports the finding that the defendants attempted to procure the two waitresses as inmates of a house of prostitution. However, the defendants Charles contend that because, in accusing them of the crime of 'pandering' the information included in parenthesis the designation 'PC 266i(f)', the allegations of Count One are limited to the acts described in clause (f) of Section 266i; that, as applied to this case, these acts relate only to the conduct of a proprietor of a house of ill-fame who agrees to pay another for 'procuring, or attempting to procure' a female person to become an inmate of such a house; and that the evidence in the instant case does not establish the commission of such acts. The prosecution contends that the conduct described in clause (f) includes the making of an agreement to give a female person money for the purpose of procuring her or attempting to procure her to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame; and that the defendants were guilty of such conduct. This interpretation of the statute is without merit. Pertinent portions thereof declare that any person who 'receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, any female person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame * * * is guilty of pandering.' These provisions of the statute are directed to the receipt or payment of, or agreement to receive or pay, money for 'procuring' or 'attempting to procure', and not in 'procuring' or 'attempting to procure'; are related to a transaction involving the receipt as well as the payment of money for procuring a female person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame, which is without the scope of a transaction between the procurer and the female person who is the subject of such procurement; and contemplate, in substance, the employment of a person for 'procuring' or 'attempting to procure'. Nevertheless, the contention of the defendants must be rejected because, as noted, the information adequately sets forth the charge of attempted pandering by alleging an attempt to procure a female person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame, and the reference therein to clause (f) of the subject code section did not negative that charge, and may be disregarded as immaterial. (In re Culver, 187 Cal. 437, 440, 202 P. 661; People v. Eppinger, 105 Cal. 36, 38, 38 P. 538; People v. Aresen, 91 Cal.App.2d 26, 36, 204 P.2d 389, 957.) The defendants did not demur to the information, or otherwise attack its sufficiency. Any defect therein attributable to ambiguity or uncertainty was waived and, in any event, did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Cimar, 127 Cal.App. 9, 15, 15 P.2d 166, 16 P.2d 139.)

arrived at the apartment premises by automobile driven by the defendant Louis Charles, who remained in the car, while the defendants Renee Charles and Mary Swann came inside. At this time the defendant Renee told about her place; about the kind of 'dates' that the girls would be expected to accept; of her desire to get fresh faces for 'the men'; about many intimate details associated with such an operation; and about the amount of money they would make. The interview ended when the police appeared and arrested the two women defendants. The man defendant was arrested later.

The defendants further contend that the evidence is not sufficient to prove an attempt to commit the offense of pandering; shows only intention and preparation; does not show the existence of a house of prostitution and placement of the female therein, which, they claim, are necessary factors in proof of the offense charged; and, for this reason, the verdict is without support. Proof of the existence of a house of prostitution in which the subject female person is to become an inmate,...

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