People v. Chatman

• Decision Date: 26 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-172,76-172
• Citation: 52 Ill.App.3d 631,10 Ill.Dec. 441,367 N.E.2d 1050
• Parties: , 10 Ill.Dec. 441 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald CHATMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1050

367 N.E.2d 1050

52 Ill.App.3d 631, 10 Ill.Dec. 441

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald CHATMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76-172.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Sept. 26, 1977.

John T. Maher, James Geis, Deputy State App. Defender, Chicago, Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State App. Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.

Michael M. Mihm, State's Atty., Peoria, James E. Hinterlong, Principal Atty., Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.

STOUDER, Justice:

This appeal is from the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County finding defendant, Gerald Chatman, guilty of rape and deviate sexual assault and sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of not less than 50 years nor more than 100 years to the Department of Corrections.

There are two issues on this appeal, namely: one, whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant an opportunity to present testimony on the issue of extraneous prejudicial information being transmitted to the jury; and two, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion in limine regarding the use of evidence of his prior convictions for rape.

Defendant-appellant was charged with rape and deviate sexual assault, the offenses having occurred on September 22, 1975. The prosecutrix testified defendant forced his way into her apartment and forced her to submit to sexual intercourse and deviate sexual assault. Her sister testified she arrived in the apartment soon after the time of the rape, but did not see the assailant. She found her sister hysterical and barely able to speak. On direct examination defendant described meeting the prosecutrix near a car dealership where he had gone to buy a used car. He started a conversation with her and suggested she have a date with him. This conversation took place about five days prior to the rape. Defendant denied ever having raped prosecutrix or having oral sex by force. On the contrary, he stated he offered her forty dollars to have intercourse with him which she accepted on September 22, 1975. The subsequent acts were the result of this agreement for forty dollars. He also testified he had two convictions for rape in 1958. On rebuttal the prosecutrix denied ever having been near the car dealership five days prior to the rape and denied having any kind of arrangement with defendant. After ten hours of deliberation the jury found defendant guilty on both counts.

The first issue on this appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant an opportunity to present testimony on the issue of extraneous prejudicial information being transmitted to the jury. Defendant made this allegation in his post trial motion and in his separate motion for mistrial. He also made an oral motion to have an evidentiary hearing on the question of the extraneous prejudicial information. His motions were all denied.

During the course of the trial the court periodically admonished and questioned the jury regarding out of court contact about the case. Just prior to one such questioning the prosecutrix had been sworn as a rebuttal witness. The court, while the witness was on the stand and the jury present, questioned the jurors about out of court contact. The court asked if any member of the jury had anything to report. The court was advised that some member of the jury possibly had seen the prosecutrix the night before. The court was further advised that there had been no discussion about the case and was advised by the prosecutrix that she had seen one of the jurors at her place of employment, a store, the night before. The juror testified she not remember the encounter. Both counsel were asked if they had any questions and they both replied in the negative.

After the trial, the defense learned from two jurors that there had been a discussion during deliberations of the chance meeting between another juror and the prosecutrix. At the request of defense counsel these two jurors executed affidavits which were attached to and became the basis of a post trial motion seeking either a further hearing or a vacation of the verdict. The motion and brief of the defendant characterized these affidavits as evidence of improper communications between a witness and a member of the jury. The event described in the affidavits was the same one which had been described previously in open court. It should be noted that neither from the colloquy in open court nor from the affidavits, is it shown there were any conversations between the prosecutrix and the juror.

People v. Tobe, 49 Ill.2d 538, 276 N.E.2d 294 sets forth the well established rule in Illinois that a jury verdict will not be set aside where it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury either by the court or by third persons outside the presence of the defendant. It also states the rule that jurors will not be permitted to impeach their verdict. We note that said rule is not without exception, but that the exception necessarily encompasses the elements of injury or prejudice. (People v. Tobe, 49 Ill.2d 538, 276 N.E.2d 294; People v. Mills, 40 Ill.2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697; and People v. Simms, 38 Ill.App.3d 703, 348 N.E.2d 478.) In People v. Pozzi, 42 Ill.App.3d 537, 356 N.E.2d 186, the court in commenting on the soundness of the rule preventing a juror from impeaching his verdict observed: "The rule is a sound one, designed to secure the finality of a verdict and set the matter at rest without further wrangling, second guessing or change of heart resulting from influence brought to bear after the verdict." (42 Ill.App.3d at 543, 356 N.E.2d at 190, 191.) We find defenda...