People v. Childress

• Decision Date: 23 February 1993
• Citation: 81 N.Y.2d 263,614 N.E.2d 709,598 N.Y.S.2d 146
• Parties: , 614 N.E.2d 709 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Craig CHILDRESS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 146

598 N.Y.S.2d 146

81 N.Y.2d 263, 614 N.E.2d 709

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Craig CHILDRESS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 23, 1993.

[81 N.Y.2d 264] [614 N.E.2d 710] Alfred O'Connor, Matthew Muraskin and Kent V. Moston, Hempstead, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty. of Nassau County, Mineola (Peter A. Weinstein, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

This appeal involving the application of (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) concerns the minimum showing that must be made to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Also at issue is whether the minutes of the voir dire must be furnished in order to obtain relief on appeal under Batson v. Kentucky (supra).

Defendant, an African-American, was charged with burglarizing an apartment in Freeport, Long Island. During the selection of the jury preceding his trial, defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges to exclude African-American jurors. The following colloquy ensued:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would like to raise an objection at this point. The district attorney has excluded black jurors on the panel. I feel that their questioning was proper. They indicated no reason why they could not serve fairly on this jury. I think that there must be some motivation for that challenging. And I would ask the Court to exclude those challenges.

"THE COURT: I am old fashioned. I think the word peremptorily means exactly what it says. However, aside from that, I don't notice anything. Of course, you have your exception.

"[PROSECUTOR]: If I could just make a record?

"THE COURT: Go ahead.

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: There were three black jurors on this particular panel, and I accepted one black juror. And it is not as if I was excluding black jurors because of their race.

"THE COURT: Okay. You have an exception."

A panel of 12 jurors was ultimately seated. Defendant was tried and convicted of burglary in the second degree and possession of burglar's tools.

On his appeal from the judgment of conviction, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred in refusing to require the prosecutor to furnish a race-neutral explanation for his use of peremptories to exclude African-American jurors. The Appellate Division rejected this argument, holding that defendant had "failed to substantiate his claim * * * since the voir dire proceedings have not been made available as part of the record on appeal" (177 A.D.2d 498, 499, 575 N.Y.S.2d 1018, citing People v. Campanella, 176 A.D.2d 813, 575 N.Y.S.2d 137). Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court by permission of one of its Judges. We now affirm the order of the Appellate Division, but on a somewhat different analysis.

Initially, to the extent that the trial court based its ruling on any purported right of the prosecutor to make peremptory challenges regardless of their racial basis, the court clearly misstated the law. The Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Batson v. Kentucky (supra) definitively foreclosed any such arguments and articulated a new standard for establishing a claim of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Since Batson was decided, this Court, as well as the Supreme Court, have elaborated upon that new standard (see, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649; People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235; People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47). As we noted in People v. Jenkins, supra, at 555, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 554 N.E.2d 47, it is "no longer open to question" that "the racially motivated exercise of peremptory challenges * * * violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The time is long since past for questioning the basic premises underlying Batson and its progeny.

The standard mandated by Batson is a relatively straightforward one. First, a defendant asserting a claim under the Batson formula must present a prima facie case by showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 555-556, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47, supra; see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, supra ). Once that prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts and the prosecution must come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its challenged peremptory choices (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).

The first element of a prima facie case--demonstrating that members of a cognizable racial group have been excluded--is seldom problematic. The more difficult aspect of the prima facie case delineated in Batson is the second element--a showing of "facts and other relevant circumstances" that would support an inference of impermissible discrimination. That is the element that concerns us here.

"There are no fixed rules for determining what evidence will give rise to an inference sufficient to establish a prima facie case" (People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 323-324, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136, supra ). A pattern of strikes or questions and statements made during the voir dire may be sufficient in a particular case (see, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; see also, People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 556, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47, supra ). Additionally, this element may be established by a showing that members of the cognizable group were excluded while others with the same relevant characteristics were not ( see, People v. Bolling, supra, 79 N.Y.2d at 324, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136). Another legally significant circumstance may exist where the prosecution has stricken members of this group who, because of their background and experience, might otherwise be expected to be favorably disposed to the prosecution ( see, People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 516 N.E.2d 1208). The court should also take into consideration the fact that the mere existence of a system of peremptory challenges may serve as a vehicle for discrimination by those with racially motivated inclinations ( see, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).

Further, although rarely dispositive, the fact that a disproportionate number of strikes have been used against members of a particular racial or ethnic group may be indicative of an impermissible discriminatory motive (see, People v. Jenkins, supra, 75 N.Y.2d at 556, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47). Conversely, "[t]he mere...