People v. Christian

Decision Date04 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1–14–0030.,1–14–0030.
Citation50 N.E.3d 1157,401 Ill.Dec. 675
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Darryl CHRISTIAN, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Joel A. Brodsky, of Chicago, for appellant.

Stuart A. Nudelman, Special State's Attorney, of Chicago (Myles P. O'Rourke and Rafael A. Bombino, Assistant Special State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The instant appeal arises from a postconviction proceeding pursuant to the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act (Act) ( 775 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2010)). In 2011, defendant Darryl Christian filed a petition before the Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (Commission), claiming that he had been tortured into confessing to the murder of his stepmother in 1989, a crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to 55 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), even though he claimed he was innocent. After reviewing defendant's petition, the Commission determined that sufficient evidence existed to warrant judicial review pursuant to the Act. Defendant's petition was assigned to a judge in the circuit court of Cook County, where an evidentiary hearing occurred. After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that there was no credible evidence that defendant was entitled to any relief on his torture claim and, accordingly, denied defendant's petition. Defendant appeals, raising an issue of first impression in this court, namely, whether the findings of the Commission are entitled to any preclusive effect before the circuit court. Alternatively, defendant argues that the circuit court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The instant appeal concerns a question of law about the effect of the Commission's findings, as well as review of the circuit court's finding that there was no credible evidence to support defendant's torture claim. The evidence before the circuit court included all of the prior court proceedings in defendant's case, so we set them forth here in order to properly analyze whether the circuit court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We provide only the detail that is necessary for resolution of the instant appeal.

¶ 4 In summary, in 1989, defendant was charged with first degree murder in connection with the death of his stepmother. After being arrested, defendant allegedly made a statement to a police detective and an assistant State's Attorney confessing to the crime. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement, claiming that the detectives interrogating him had struck him in the jaw and threatened to further abuse him if he did not confess. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied, and defendant was ultimately convicted of the murder and sentenced to 55 years in the IDOC. Defendant unsuccessfully filed a direct appeal, two postconviction petitions, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the federal district court. In 2011, defendant filed a claim of torture before the Commission. After conducting a formal inquiry, the Commission concluded that there was sufficient evidence to merit judicial review and referred the claim to the circuit court for further consideration. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing, after which it concluded that defendant was not entitled to any relief under the Act.

¶ 5 I. Defendant's Arrest and Trial

¶ 6 On July 20, 1989, defendant was indicted for first degree murder in connection with the death of his stepmother on June 24, 1989. According to the police report,1 Officer Roland Hunter was called to the scene by the Chicago fire department and, upon his arrival, was met by defendant. Defendant informed Hunter that he had left for work at 10 p.m. on June 23, 1989, and had returned home at approximately 10 a.m. and discovered his stepmother dead in the living room. Detective Michael Cummings also interviewed defendant, who told Cummings that he had been at a neighbor's house all night watching television with friends, arriving there between 10 and 11 p.m. on June 23 and leaving at 8 a.m. on June 24 to exercise in a nearby park, returning home at 10 a.m. and discovering his stepmother's body. Cummings interviewed the neighbors, one of whom stated that defendant came to his home between 10 and 11 p.m. and smoked cocaine with the neighbor and the neighbor's sister until 2 to 2:30 a.m., at which point defendant left.

¶ 7 According to the police report, defendant agreed to accompany Cummings to Area 2 Violent Crimes headquarters to be questioned further. Cummings read defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ), which defendant said he understood. Defendant chose to speak with Cummings and confessed to Cummings that he had killed his stepmother during an argument. Defendant told Cummings that he and his stepmother had argued because she wanted him to move out because he was not doing any chores around the house. Defendant stated that he was not leaving and his stepmother said that she would force him out, going to the kitchen and obtaining a large kitchen knife. Defendant grabbed her wrist and removed the knife from her hand, then began stabbing her. He pushed her away and she fell to the floor. Defendant dropped the knife and left. Defendant later returned to the house and retrieved the knife and also kicked out the basement window to make it look like someone had broken into the house. Defendant drove away and threw the knife into some bushes while he was driving, then drove back home and called the police. Before the police arrived, he removed his bloodied gym shoes and hid them under the rear porch.2

¶ 8 According to the police report, after giving that account, defendant was placed under arrest and the felony review unit of the State's Attorney's office was notified. Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Dave Fischer interviewed defendant, who gave him a written statement.

¶ 9 Defendant's statement stated, in relevant part:

“Darryl said that he'd been down the block watching TV with his friends when he decided to go home. He went to his home and got into an argument with his mother; [3] she wanted him to leave because he did not do housework that she thought he should do. Darryl said that he refused to leave, and the argument continued. His mother went into the kitchen and got a large knife; she then came back to where they'd been arguing. Darryl took the knife from his mother, stabbed her once with it, and pushed her away. She fell to the floor, and the knife was dropped beside her.
Darryl said that he then left the house, returned for a while to his friend's house down the street, and then went walking. He returned to the house he'd shared with his mother around 9:30 and took her car for a ride, throwing the knife he'd stabbed her with into weeds at 76th St. and South Chicago. Darryl also broke a window at the house and then called the Chicago police.
Darryl is 33 years old and received his G.E.D. in the United States Army. He reads, writes, and speaks English. Darryl has been well treated while in police custody. Det. Cummings has given him cigarettes and lunch and coffee. No one has threatened Darryl nor promised him anything in return for this statement. Darryl appears and sounds free from alcohol and drugs and tells us that he is in fact sober and in control of his thoughts at this time. Darryl has told us that he is sorry about what happened between himself and his mother last night.”

¶ 10 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he had allegedly made confessing to the crime, claiming, inter alia, that “the statements sought to be suppressed were obtained as a result of physical coercion illegally directed against the defendant and that such statements were, therefore, involuntary in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Specifically, the motion claimed that [defendant] was hit by one of the * * * Detectives.”

¶ 11 At the suppression hearing, ASA Fischer testified that on June 24, 1989, he was working in the felony review unit at the State's Attorney's office and was called to Area 2 to speak with Detective Cummings. After he spoke with Cummings, he reviewed paperwork and then had a conversation with defendant in an interview room. Fischer entered the room with Cummings and observed defendant sitting on a bench in the interview room. Fischer introduced himself, explaining that he was an attorney with the State's Attorney's office and did not represent defendant. He then advised defendant of his Miranda rights, which defendant stated he understood. Defendant then spoke to Fischer about the crime for approximately 15 minutes. At the end of that conversation, Fischer asked defendant whether he wished to have a court reporter take his statement or if he would rather have a summarized statement written by Fischer. Defendant chose the written statement, so Fischer and Cummings left the interview room and Fischer drafted a three-page summary of defendant's confession.

¶ 12 After he had drafted the statement, Fischer and Cummings returned to the interview room, where Fischer showed the draft to defendant. While Fisher had previously established that defendant had obtained a GED, he nevertheless asked defendant to read the beginning of the document out loud, which defendant did. Defendant then signed the written Miranda warnings at the beginning of the document and was asked to read the rest of the statement silently. On the second page, defendant pointed out that there was an incorrect time written in the summary, so Fischer corrected the time and Fischer, Cummings, and defendant initialed the correction. After defendant had finished reviewing the statement, Fischer, Cummings, and defendant signed each...

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4 cases
  • People v. Wilson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 10, 2019
    ...finding that there is sufficient evidence to proceed to the circuit court. People v. Christian , 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶ 79, 401 Ill.Dec. 675, 50 N.E.3d 1157 ; see also 2 Ill. Adm. Code 3500.385(b)(1) (2014) (stating that the Commission need not find it more likely than not that torture......
  • People v. Gibson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 22, 2018
    ...stage of a postconviction proceeding, which is also civil in nature. See People v. Christian , 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶ 78, 401 Ill.Dec. 675, 50 N.E.3d 1157 ; People v. Whirl , 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 106, 395 Ill.Dec. 647, 39 N.E.3d 114. In a civil action, the Fifth Amendment does n......
  • People v. Owens
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 23, 2018
    ...the collateral estoppel doctrine is a question of law reviewed de novo . People v. Christian , 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶ 80, 401 Ill.Dec. 675, 50 N.E.3d 1157.¶ 26 Simply put, the issue decided in defendant's conviction for criminal sexual assault is not identical to the issue of whether h......
  • People v. Allen
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 25, 2016
    ...claims of torture. 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2012) ; see also generally People v. Christian, 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶¶ 65–74, 401 Ill.Dec. 675, 50 N.E.3d 1157 (setting forth an exhaustive description of the Commission's function and procedures).¶ 5 Pursuant to the Act, the Commission entered ......

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