People v. Christian

• Decision Date: 31 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80SA403,80SA403
• Citation: 632 P.2d 1031
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Darryl CHRISTIAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1031

632 P.2d 1031

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Darryl CHRISTIAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80SA403.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Aug. 31, 1981.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Morgan Rumler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Dick Gottsegen, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellant.

QUINN, Justice.

Darryl Christian (defendant) was convicted of the crimes of child abuse, section 18-6-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), a class three felony, and reckless manslaughter, section 18-3-104(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), a class four felony. In this appeal he contends that the disparity in the statutory penalties for the two offenses violates equal protection of the laws, that the court erred in its rulings on numerous evidential matters during the trial, and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for child abuse. ¹ We affirm.

I. Trial Proceedings

The indictment charged the defendant in one count with felony child abuse on April 27, 1979, and in another count with reckless manslaughter on the same date. The defendant, an enlisted man in the army, was stationed at Fort Carson and lived off-base in Colorado Springs with his wife, Lynette, and their three and one-half month old daughter, Eileen. The charges arose out of the death of the daughter and the cause of her death was the primary issue contested during trial. The prosecution's case was complicated by the recalcitrance of the defendant's wife to testify in accordance with her prior statements to the police and her grand jury testimony regarding the defendant's conduct toward the child.

During the late afternoon of April 27, 1979, the defendant had exclusive custody of the child while his wife went shopping. The child recently had been treated for a cold and a loss of appetite but, except for some intermittent crying, appeared to be in reasonably good condition when the wife left the apartment. Upon the wife's return from the shopping trip about 90 minutes later, the defendant was outside their apartment in an agitated state and told her that the child was "stiff." Although he had no explanation for the child's condition, it was apparent to both parents that the child's limbs had begun to rigidify. They took her to the emergency room at Fort Carson Hospital at 7:30 p. m. The medical examination of the child revealed that she was unresponsive to stimuli and that her skull was abnormally hard from pressure inside the skull cavity. In response to questioning by medical attendants, the defendant, denying any history of trauma, stated that the child had been hospitalized a few weeks earlier for a similar problem. Upon further questioning he explained that the child sat up in the crib and tumbled over, striking her head against the side rails. When a physician's assistant challenged his statement about a child of such tender age sitting up, the defendant stated that the child had become agitated and struck her head in thrashing about the crib. The defendant's explanation of a bruise on the child's nose was that she bumped against his thumb while he had been holding her. The wife, who heard the defendant's explanation of the child's injuries, said in an agitated state that she was leaving and going back to Chicago as soon as the incident was over.

Because the child needed neurological facilities not available at Fort Carson, she was taken to Penrose Hospital in Colorado Springs. Her condition deteriorated rapidly and at 11:20 p. m., after the collapse of her respiratory and circulatory systems, she died. An autopsy disclosed that the cause of death was cranial cerebral trauma which included three fractures in the parietal region of the skull. In the opinion of the pathologist who conducted the post-mortem examination, the fractures were not accidentally caused and probably were inflicted with a blunt object. Over the defendant's objection, photographs of the child taken before and during the autopsy were admitted in order to depict the nature of the injuries and to demonstrate the precise medical cause of death.

The child suffered similar injuries on March 19, 1979. On that evening the defendant and his wife brought the child to Fort Carson Hospital in an acute condition with obvious facial contusions and abrasions, including fingernail imprints on the temple region. The defendant stated to the emergency room attendants that he suddenly stopped his automobile to avoid a collision and that the child, who was seated with him and his wife in the vehicle, fell forward and struck her head against an ashtray. The wife had a swollen lip and told the attendants that it also had been caused in the near collision. The child's condition was diagnosed as a subdural hematoma in the left posterior region of the skull. ² The child was transferred to Penrose Hospital for treatment and was released on March 26.

Prior to the prosecution's calling the defendant's wife as a witness, the court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury and overruled the defendant's objection to evidence relating to two recent domestic quarrels on March 19 and April 19, 1979, which resulted in injuries to the child. ³ Although the wife previously had given a statement to the police and testified before the grand jury about the defendant's abusive conduct resulting in injuries to the child on these dates, the district attorney advised the court that, when called as a prosecution witness, she intended either to deny making the statements or to assert their falsity. The court ruled that the prosecution would be permitted to impeach her with her prior statements and, upon proper foundation, the statements could be admitted pursuant to section 16-10-201, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), ⁴ as substantive evidence of the facts contained therein.

When called as a prosecution witness, the wife denied any prior acts of child abuse by the defendant and repudiated her prior inconsistent statements. According to her prior statements, the contents of which were duly established, the following events took place on March 19 and April 19, 1979. On March 19 she and the defendant had a domestic quarrel during which she left the apartment to avoid a beating. The defendant later took the child with him and drove around looking for her. Upon his wife's return several hours later, the defendant struck her on the mouth. The child at this time was in the apartment but was unresponsive and the child's eyes were blackened. The defendant and his wife took the child to Fort Carson Hospital, agreeing on the way to fabricate the story about the child striking its head against the ashtray in the vehicle. On April 19 the defendant became upset while feeding the child and inflicted bruises on her arms. His wife at this time went to the landlady's apartment above her own to telephone her mother. In the presence of the landlady, she told her mother over the telephone that she was coming home "because Darryl was downstairs beating on her and smacking on the baby."

The prosecution also presented evidence showing that on March 22, 1979, a police officer interviewed the defendant and his wife at their apartment. The wife told the officer that her child was in the hospital as a result of her husband being in a near car wreck a few days earlier but that she didn't believe the "car wreck story." She also admitted to the officer that she had lied to the doctors about being in the car at the time of the injury in order to avoid telling them about her own beating at the hands of the defendant. Over the defendant's objection on grounds of relevancy, the prosecution offered evidence showing that the defendant told the officer about the near car wreck and the child's injury on March 19 but added that only he and the child were in the vehicle on that occasion. ⁵

Another prosecution witness, an acquaintance of the defendant's wife, described her observations of bruises on the arms and legs of the child prior to March 19. She testified that the wife tried to persuade her to change her testimony about seeing the bruises before the occurrence of the alleged car injury to the child. She also related the wife's description to her of other efforts which the wife made to change the testimony of the landlady concerning the April 19 incident.

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The defendant testified as a witness and denied any acts of child abuse. He described the child's generally deteriorating condition for the two days before her death, including her inability to eat and constant vomiting. A neurosurgeon testified for the defense that in his opinion the child died of dehydration which could have developed as a result of a head injury but any such injury would have occurred several days prior to April 27.

At the conclusion of the evidence the court submitted general verdicts of guilty and not guilty to the crimes of child abuse and reckless manslaughter. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. The court sentenced the defendant to a term of five to fifteen years for child abuse and a concurrent indeterminate term not to exceed ten years for manslaughter. This appeal followed.

II. The Constitutionality of 18-6-401

We first consider the defendant's claim that section 18-6-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), violates equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 25, because it proscribes identical conduct encompassed by reckless manslaughter, section 18-3-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), but authorizes the imposition of a greater penalty than reckless manslaughter.

On the date of the offenses, April 27, 1979, the crime of child abuse as charged in the indictment was defined in section 18-6-401 as "knowingly, intentionally, or...