People v. Ciechanowski
| Decision Date | 13 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-06-0868.,1-06-0868. |
| Citation | 379 Ill.App.3d 506,884 N.E.2d 714 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wlodzimierz CIECHANOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Sherwin H. Zaban, Northbrook, IL, for Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State's Attorney, Mary P. Needham, Assistant State's Attorney, Ljubica D. Popovic, Assistant State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Appellee.
Following a bench trial, defendant, Wlodzimierz Ciechanowski, was found guilty of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) based on driving under the influence during a period in which his driving privileges had been suspended for refusing to submit to a sobriety test after a prior arrest for suspected DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(c-1)(1) (West 2004)). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 10 days of imprisonment in the Cook County Department of Corrections and 30 months of probation, and was ordered to pay a total of $2,950 in fines and costs. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) he could not have been convicted of aggravated DUI as a matter of law because the suspension for the prior DUI arrest was rescinded, which rendered that suspension void ab initio; and (2) the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI following a May 9, 2005, accident that occurred in the 4800 block of Nagle Avenue in Harwood Heights, Illinois.1 At that time, defendant's driving privileges were suspended as a result of his failure to submit to sobriety tests during a previous DUI arrest on March 3, 2005.
However, on June 20, 2005, the court granted a petition filed by defendant to rescind the suspension resulting from the March 3 arrest. Specifically, the court found that the arresting officer had failed to give defendant the proper warnings before defendant refused to submit to sobriety testing.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated DUI indictment which is the subject of the present case. In that motion, he claimed that the rescission of his first suspension due to the officer's failure to properly warn him rendered that suspension void ab initio. Therefore, he maintained, he could not be charged with aggravated DUI for driving under the influence while his driving privileges were suspended. The court denied this motion.
The following evidence was then adduced at defendant's trial. Carlos Moya testified that shortly before 5 p.m. on the date in question, he was driving on Nagle Avenue toward Foster Avenue when he observed defendant driving very fast. Defendant then struck a silver car and kept going. Moya slowed to see if the driver of the silver car was all right, and after observing that he was, Moya followed defendant in order to get his license plate number. As Moya was doing so, he observed defendant strike two more vehicles while traveling at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour.
One of these vehicles was a white Cadillac driven by off-duty Chicago police officer Raymond Cowin. Officer Cowin also testified that he observed defendant driving "extremely fast" and erratically. Specifically, Officer Cowin explained that defendant was traveling north in the southbound lane and weaving between the lanes of traffic. As defendant was weaving from the southbound lane into the far right northbound lane, he "side-swiped" Officer Cowin's Cadillac. Defendant then drove in front of Officer Cowin and rear-ended a vehicle that was stopped at the traffic light.
That vehicle was driven by Jeffrey Mattison, who testified that he first observed defendant in his rearview mirror as defendant "sideswiped" Officer Cowin's white Cadillac. Mattison also observed defendant "weave in and out all over the road" before entering Mattison's lane and rearending his car. Mattison explained that the impact of defendant rear-ending his car sent it "flying through the intersection." Officer Cowin observed that defendant's brake lights did not illuminate before defendant struck Mattison's car. In addition, defendant did not stop after striking Mattison's car once but, rather, proceeded to strike it two or three more times. Officer Cowin parked his vehicle behind defendant's and got out to investigate.
According to Moya, who had stopped at the light next to Mattison in the right northbound lane, defendant began driving back and forth between Mattison's and Officer Cowin's cars, striking each, vehicle twice more. Moya became worried that defendant was trying to flee the scene and that defendant would turn right and strike his car.
When Officer Cowin looked into defendant's car, defendant still had the car in drive and was pushing the gas pedal to the floor. Officer Cowin also observed that defendant's nose was bloody and that he smelled strongly of alcohol. Defendant was also continuously muttering, "what I do, what I do." Officer Cowin reached through the window of defendant's car to try to put it into park because defendant's car was still pushing Mattison's car farther and farther into the intersection. However, defendant began struggling with Officer Cowin, even after Officer Cowin identified himself as a police officer.
At this point, Mattison exited his vehicle to help Officer Cowin. While Officer Cowin struggled with defendant, Mattison was able to reach into defendant's car and turn off the ignition. In doing so, Mattison also noticed that defendant smelled strongly of alcohol. In addition, Mattison noticed that defendant's nose was bloody and the car's air bag had deployed.
Officer Cowin then removed defendant from his car and attempted to get defendant down onto the ground. Defendant continued to resist, still muttering, "what I do, what I do." Officer Cowin added that defendant appeared incoherent. Officer Cowin testified that he never struck defendant, and Mattison and Moya also testified that they never saw Officer Cowin strike defendant.
Officer Cowin has been a police officer for 27 years, has observed thousands of people under the influence of alcohol, and has written approximately 30 DUI citations. Based on defendant's driving, his strong smell of alcohol, and his demeanor in general, Officer Cowin believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and that defendant's driving had been impaired by the amount of alcohol that he had consumed. Mattison also believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and that defendant was attempting to flee the scene after the accident.
Shortly thereafter, Harwood Heights police arrived at the scene. Officer Steve Biagi asked defendant if he had been involved in an accident. Defendant replied that he had and explained that he hit a vehicle that stopped suddenly in front of him Officer Biagi noticed that defendant emitted a strong smell of alcohol.
Defendant was then transported to the hospital. Officer Biagi spoke with defendant there approximately 30 minutes later. At that time, Officer Biagi still smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant was also walking around and swaying from side to side as he did. In addition, defendant was slurring his speech, and his eyes appeared glassy and bloodshot. Officer Biagi added that during his six-year career as a police officer, he has observed hundreds of people under the influence of alcohol. Based on his observations of defendant, he believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
Officer Biagi asked defendant if he had been injured, and defendant indicated that he had not. Officer Biagi also asked defendant if he had been drinking, which defendant denied. Officer Biagi then asked defendant if he would take sobriety tests, and defendant responded that he could not because he could not get another DUI. Officer Biagi then advised defendant that he would be charged with DUI and wrote out defendant's traffic citations. In total, Officer Biagi was with defendant at the hospital for about an hour, and during that time, defendant continued to appear to be under the influence of alcohol.
After defendant signed a refusal of medical treatment, Officer Biagi transported him to the police station. Even after defendant had been "booked" and placed in the lockup, which was nearly two hours after the accident, he continued to smell strongly of alcohol and continued to appear intoxicated to Officer Biagi.
The parties subsequently stipulated to the admission of a certified copy of a driving abstract of defendant.2 They also stipulated to a June 14, 2005, court order rescinding the summary suspension of defendant's driving privileges resulting from his March 2005 DUI arrest. The order indicated that the rescission was warranted because the officer failed to give defendant the appropriate warnings prior to his refusal to submit to sobriety testing. The parties further agreed that the order was admitted solely for the purpose of establishing the DUI as an aggravated DUI and not as a defense to driving while defendant's driving privileges were suspended.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI. The court noted that although no sobriety tests were administered to defendant, his intoxication was "obvious" based on the cumulative testimony of the witnesses, who all testified that defendant was driving erratically and smelled strongly of alcohol. The court also noted that defendant struck multiple vehicles and continued to strike Mattison's vehicle without even knowing what he was doing. After finding defendant guilty, the trial court sentenced him to 10 days of imprisonment in the Cook County Department of Corrections and 30 months of probation, and ordered him to pay a total of $2,950 in fines and costs.
Defendant filed a posttrial motion contending, inter alia, that his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dale v. Knopp
...of the word, as set forth supra. See People v. Elliott, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742 (App.2012); People v. Ciechanowski, 379 Ill.App.3d 506, 318 Ill.Dec. 746, 884 N.E.2d 714 (2008); People v. Focia, 287 Ill.App.3d 767, 223 Ill.Dec. 177, 679 N.E.2d 121 (1997); State v. Stone, 764 N.W.2d ......
-
People v. Elliott
...conflict with other districts. People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 768, 679 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1997) ; People v. Ciechanowski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510, 884 N.E.2d 714, 718 (2008). Focia , and arguably Ciechanowski , indicates that a conviction for driving with a suspended license may ......
-
People v. Elliott
...492 [978 N.E.2d 747]People v. Focia, 287 Ill.App.3d 767, 768, 223 Ill.Dec. 177, 679 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1997); People v. Ciechanowski, 379 Ill.App.3d 506, 510, 318 Ill.Dec. 746, 884 N.E.2d 714, 718 (2008). Focia, and arguably Ciechanowski, indicates that a conviction for driving with a suspend......
-
People v. Corral
...People v. Espenscheid, 109 Ill. App. 2d 107, 111 (1969); People v. Manikas, 106 Ill. App. 2d 315, 329 (1969); People v. Ciechanowski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511 (2008) ("Driving on a suspended or revoked license is also a strict liability offense."). A "defendant's intent, knowledge, moral t......