People v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 17 December 1912
• Citation: 100 N.E. 194,256 Ill. 558
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

256 Ill. 558

100 N.E. 194

PEOPLE

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 17, 1912.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; William N. Gemmill, Judge.

The City of Chicago was convicted for violations of the Woman's Ten-Hour Law as amended, and brings error. Affirmed.William H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (Henry A. Berger, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., John E. W. Wayman, State's Atty., of Chicago, Fred H. Hand, of Springfield, and Charles J. Herman, of Chicago, for the People.

FARMER, J.

The people of the state of Illinois instituted two prosecutions against the city of Chicago, by information in the name of the people, for violation of the Woman's Ten-Hour Law as amended in 1911. One information charged the city of Chicago, a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, with having in its employ Julia Klein, a female, and suffering and permitting her to work more than 10 hours on a certain day in a public institution owned and operated by the city of Chicago, which public institution is known as the Isolation Hospital and is located in said city. The other information charged the city with violating the law by employing Edna B. Kuhnan, a female, in the same institution more than 10 hours a day. Julia Klein was employed as a cook and Edna B. Kuhnan as a nurse. A jury was waived and the cases tried by the court. The city was found guilty in both cases, fined $25 and costs in each case, and has sued out a writ of error in each of said cases. By agreement the cases have been consolidated in this court and will be disposed of in one opinion. It is not questioned that the females named worked more than 10 hours a day.

[1][2] It is first contended the amendatory act of 1911, under which the prosecution was carried on, is unconstitutional and void, as being in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title.’ The original act was adopted in 1909, with the title, ‘An act to regulate and limit the hours of employment of females in any mechanical establishment or factory or laundry in order to safeguard the health of such employés; to provide for its enforcement and a penalty for its violation.’ Laws of 1909, p. 212. It will be seen the subject of the title was not a general one relating to the employment of females, but was restricted to the employment of them in mechanical establishments, factories, and laundries. The addition of other lines of employment required a more comprehensive title. The title of the amendatory act reads, ‘An act to amend sections 1 and 2 of an act entitled [reciting the title of the original ace], and to add an additional section thereto to be known as section 5, and to amend the title of said act.’ Laws of 1911, p. 328. The first two sections of the amendatory act are numbered 1. The first section numbered 1 reads: ‘Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That sections[256 Ill. 561]1 and 2 of an act entitled, ‘An act to regulate and limit the hours of employment of females in any mechanical establishment or factory or laundry in order to safeguard the health of such employés; to provide for its enforcement and a penalty for its violation,’ be and the same are hereby amended, and an additional section to be known as section 5 be added thereto, and the title of said act shall be amended and the same shall read as follows.'

The second section numbered 1 reads: ‘Sec. 1. That no female shall be employed in any mechanical or mercantile establishment, or factory, or laundry, or hotel, or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone establishment or office thereof, or in any place of amusement or by any person, firm or corporation engaged in any express or transportation or public utility business, or by any common carrier, or in any public institution, incorporated or unincorporated in this state, more than ten hours during any one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as to permit the employment of females at any time so that they shall not work more than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any day.’

The section purporting to amend the title is numbered 2, and reads: ‘Sec. 2. The title of said act shall be amended to read as follows: ‘An act to regulate and limit the hours of employment of females in any mechanical or mercantile establishment, or factory, or laundry, hotel or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone establishment or office thereof, or in any place of amusement, or by any express or transportation or public utility business, or by any common carrier or in any public institution, incorporated or unincorporated, in this state, in order to safeguard the health of such employés; to provide for its enforcement and a penalty for its violation.’'

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that an act shall embrace but one subject and that shall be expressed in the title is to prevent matters being inserted in a bill which have no relation to the title, by means of which the members of the Legislature might be deceived, and the public also. The Constitution requires that the title of an act shall give notice of what the act relates to, and its purpose. Milne v. People, 224 Ill. 125, 79 N. E. 631;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994. While it may be the title could have been amended in a different manner, the method here adopted has been frequently employed, and we cannot see why it does not accomplish the purpose intended by the Constitution.

Other objections to the constitutionality of the act have been decided adversely to the contentions of plaintiff in error in People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982, since the brief of plaintiff in error was filed, and are now withdrawn.

[3] It is further contended by plaintiff in error that the city of Chicago, as a municipal corporation, cannot be guilty of a criminal offense, and that an indictment or information will not lie against it for a violation of this statute. The argument in support of this contention proceeds upon the theory that the municipality is a public political...