People v. Claire
Decision Date | 23 April 1991 |
Docket Number | No. A049704,A049704 |
Citation | 280 Cal.Rptr. 269,229 Cal.App.3d 647 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Kevin CLAIRE, Defendant/Appellant. |
Patricia L. Watkins, San Mateo, for defendant/appellant Kevin Claire.
Daniel E. Lungren, California Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan M. Helfman, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Violet M. Lee, Deputy Atty. Gen., Attorney General's Office, San Francisco, for plaintiff/respondent People.
Appellant contends two of his four prior convictions were improperly used to increase his sentence for drunk driving, because the prosecutor failed during prior plea proceedings to state facts indicating appellant's intoxication on previous occasions. We reject this contention and affirm.
Appellant was charged with drunk driving, and with having recently suffered three or more prior convictions for similar conduct. (VEH.CODE, §§ 231521, subd. (a); 23175, subd. (a).) It was also alleged that appellant had refused to submit to testing for alcohol intoxication, and had been driving while his license had been suspended and revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Appellant ultimately entered a plea of guilty, and did not dispute the prosecution's position that two of the prior convictions could properly be used to increase his sentence. He also admitted he suffered two other priors, but reserved his right to challenge their use for these purposes, on the grounds that the prosecutor at the time of appellant's guilty pleas to those charges did not state facts for the record indicating appellant had been abusing alcohol at the time of the offense.
The trial court ruled the two priors in question could properly be used to increase the sentence. Appellant timely appealed.
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled the two challenged prior convictions for reckless driving could properly be used to increase the sentence. We affirm the ruling of the trial court since appellant was specifically warned at the time of the prior plea proceedings that the convictions would be so used.
The governing statute here is section 23103.5. This section governs attempts to plea-bargain a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of section 23152, into a simple reckless driving charge under section 23103. Section 23103.5 provides, in pertinent part:
Thus, section 23103.5, enacted in 1981 as part of a comprehensive strengthening of the penalties for drunk driving, closes a former loophole which had allowed repeat drunk drivers to avoid the increased penalties for recidivism by pleading guilty to reckless driving rather than drunk driving. When a drunk driving charge is reduced to a " 'wet reckless' " driving charge under section 23103.5, the resulting conviction is the same as one of drunk driving for purposes of the penalties imposed upon recidivists. 2
Appellant admits the two convictions in issue here were wet reckless pleas, in the sense that he pleaded guilty to reckless driving after the prosecutor reduced drunk driving charges to reckless driving charges pursuant to section 23103.5. However, raising an inventive if hypertechnical issue of apparent first impression, he contends the prosecutor's failure at the time of the plea to orally state the facts tending to prove intoxication means that this particular type of wet reckless conviction cannot be used to increase his sentence. We disagree.
Where as here the defendant is properly advised of the consequences of a plea to a wet reckless charge, the resulting conviction may be used for the purpose of enhancing subsequent penalties for recidivism, despite the prosecutor's failure to orate such words as "breath test," "objective symptoms," or "odor of alcohol" in the factual statement which section 23103.5 specifies.
In Pollack v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 38 Cal.3d 367, 374, 211 Cal.Rptr. 748, 696 P.2d 141, our Supreme Court aptly analyzed the statutory scheme in issue here as follows:
In accord with this general plan, section 23103.5 makes it more difficult to avoid a drunk driving charge by pleading to reckless driving; for purposes of the punishment for recidivists, a wet reckless conviction under section 23103.5 is equivalent to a conviction for drunk driving under section 23152. (See, e.g., Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1306, fn. 8, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292 []; Pitman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1041, fn. 2, 243 Cal.Rptr. 306; cf. People v. Wohl (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 270, 276 Cal.Rptr. 35.)
The trial court ruled that the prosecutor's failure to orally state facts showing intoxication in the two plea proceedings in question did not preclude the use of those convictions as priors, since in fact appellant received the full benefit of his plea bargain; further, he was explicitly warned in writing that the convictions would be used as priors upon subsequent conviction:
The legislative history of section 23103.5 supports the trial court's ruling. 3 The relevant Conference Committee Report contains a legislative analysis which aptly summarizes the purpose of the statute: (Conf.Com.Rep. on Assem.Bill No. 348, No. 019894 (1981-1982 Reg.Sess.) p. 3.)
Thus, the purpose of the statute is to ensure that a conviction of reckless driving under ...
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...(§§ 23103 [misdemeanor reckless driving], 23103.5 [prosecutorial statement that alcohol was involved]; see People v. Claire (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 647, 650 & fn. 2, 280 Cal.Rptr. 269 ), but requested a hearing before the DMV to challenge her license suspension (§ 13558).At the ensuing admini......
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