People v. Clark

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Citation: 136 A.D.3d 1367,25 N.Y.S.3d 485
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Syroya N. CLARK, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 1367

25 N.Y.S.3d 485

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Syroya N. CLARK, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 11, 2016.

Leanne Lapp, Public Defender, Canandaigua, D.J. & J.A. Cirando, Esqs., Syracuse (Bradley E. Keem of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua (James B. Ritts of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20 ) and grand larceny in the fourth degree (§ 155.30[4] ). Defendant never requested new assigned counsel, "and thus it cannot be said that [County Court] erred in failing to conduct an inquiry to determine whether good cause was shown to substitute counsel" (People v. Singletary, 63 A.D.3d 1654, 1654, 880 N.Y.S.2d 829, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 839, 890 N.Y.S.2d 455, 918 N.E.2d 970 ).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not err in refusing to suppress defendant's oral statements to the police. Here, defendant voluntarily answered the police officer's investigatory questions, was not handcuffed, was left unsupervised in a parking lot during a break in the questioning, and "was not subjected to lengthy, coercive or accusatory questioning" (People v. Brown, 111 A.D.3d 1385, 1385, 975 N.Y.S.2d 293, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1155, 984 N.Y.S.2d 638, 7 N.E.3d 1126 ; see People v. Vargas, 109 A.D.3d 1143, 1143, 971 N.Y.S.2d 624, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1044, 981 N.Y.S.2d 378, 4 N.E.3d 390 ). "The mere fact that the police may have suspected defendant of having [been involved in a crime] prior to questioning [her] ... does not compel a finding that defendant was in custody" (People v. Smielecki, 77 A.D.3d 1420, 1421, 908 N.Y.S.2d 485, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 956, 917 N.Y.S.2d 115, 942 N.E.2d 326 ). We thus conclude that "a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not have thought he or she was in custody if placed in defendant's position" (id.; see generally People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89 ).

We reject defendant's contention that her statements should have been suppressed because the police officers' testimony did not definitively establish the circumstances under which she was read her Miranda warnings. Here, one of the officers testified at the Huntley hearing that defendant was advised of her Miranda rights after she elected to sit in the back of his air-conditioned vehicle and that she waived those rights of her own accord, without being threatened, coerced, or made any promises. Although there was a discrepancy between the testimony of the officer at the hearing and at the grand jury proceeding, the discrepancy was explored on cross-examination and created an issue of credibility for the court (see generally People v. Button, 56 A.D.3d 1043, 1045, 867 N.Y.S.2d 768, lv. dismissed 12 N.Y.3d 781, 879 N.Y.S.2d 58, 906 N.E.2d 1092 ). The court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great deference (see People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380 ),...