People v. Clark

Decision Date16 July 1968
Docket NumberCr. 13196
Citation70 Cal.Rptr. 324,264 Cal.App.2d 44
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Harold Richard CLARK and Douglas James Stoker, Defendants and Appellants.

Ivan E. Lawrence, Sherman Oaks and Sherman Lee Lister, Woodland Hills, for appellants.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rose-Marie Gruenwald, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

FLEMING, Associate Justice.

Appellants were convicted of attempted grand theft and of forgery (three counts), and given misdemeanor sentences. They contend they have been twice put in jeopardy.

In May 1966 a complaint charged Stoker with attempted grand theft and forgery, and Clark with attempted grand theft, grand theft, and forgery. Prior to appellants' arraignment in municipal court the district attorney told defense counsel that on a plea of guilty to one count of forgery, he would move to dismiss the remaining counts of the complaint. Thereafter each appellant pleaded guilty to one count of forgery. The court asked each appellant if he understood the charge against him; if he had discussed his plea with his attorney; if his plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily made without inducements or promises; and if he were pleading guilty because in truth and in fact he was guilty and for no other reason. After receiving affirmative answers to these questions, the court dismissed the remaining counts and certified the case to the superior court for probation and sentence.

At appellants' first appearance in superior court on 31 May, Judge Alarcon expressed concern about statements of appellants in the probation reports which 'cast(s) some shadow as to whether they had the intent to enter a plea of guilty.' The matter was continued to 16 June. On that date the court asked each appellant if, in performing the act which formed the basis for the charge to which he had pleaded guilty, he had intended to cheat anybody. Each appellant replied he had not. Judge Alarcon then declared, 'I can't accept this, Counsel. Defendants indicate to me they are innocent.' Judge Alarcon referred the case back to the municipal court and suggested that defense counsel withdraw the pleas of guilty, 'or if you refuse to enter such a motion, then I think in the interests of Justice I would have to do so.'

On 22 June, a second complaint, substantially identical with the first, was filed in municipal court, and on the following day the first complaint was dismissed. A preliminary hearing was held 12 and 13 July, and thereafter an information was filed and appellants were arraigned in superior court before Judge Alarcon. Appellants pleaded not guilty to all counts. In September appellants stood trial before Judge Roberts on their pleas of not guilty, and at the conclusion of a three-day trial they were convicted on four counts, one of attempted grand theft and three of forgery.

Appellants contend that a plea of guilty, once accepted and entered on a court's records, bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Respondent argues that the superior court's action in refusing to accept the original pleas was properly taken in the interest of justice and was authorized by statute.

It is, of course, true that a guilty plea is equivalent to a conviction, and, if allowed to stand, bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. (Pen.Code, § 1023; People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432.) But appellants' argument of double jeopardy has no relevance to Counts I, III, and IV, which contain the charges dismissed by the municipal court on the initial entry of pleas to the charge in Count II. Section 1387, Penal Code, provides that dismissal of a felony action is no bar to reprosecution for the same offense. The charges dismissed in the first complaint were felonies, and to these charges appellants never pleaded. On the refiling of these charges appellants pleaded not guilty. No element of double jeopardy was involved in their subsequent trial and conviction. (See Pen.Code, § 954; People v. Tideman, 57 Cal.2d 574, 581--583, 21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007.)

To the offense charged in Count II appellants originally entered pleas of guilty in the municipal court, but on their subsequent appearance in the superior court their pleas were in effect vacated by Judge Alarcon. Appellants contend that, absent motions from them for a substitution of pleas, Judge Alarcon lacked authority to set aside their pleas on his own motion. We reject this argument for two reasons:

Every court has inherent power to prevent abuse of...

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19 cases
  • People v. Allgood
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 January 1976
    ...to do so under an 'inherent power . . . to conform its procedures to the fundamentals of due process.' (See People v. Clark (1968), 264 Cal.App.2d 44, 46, 70 Cal.Rptr. 324, 325.) He asserts that a review of the order of the juvenile court is no different from a permitted request for reconsi......
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    ... ...         Officers Pearson and Morlock took defendant to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, where he was interviewed, shortly before midnight, by San Francisco Police Inspectors Frank Falzon and Herman Clark. Inspector Falzon advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and asked if he wanted to make a statement. Defendant replied that he wanted some time to think it over. Half an hour later, he agreed to speak to the officers ... ...
  • Gonzalez v. Municipal Court
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 31 May 1973
    ...if allowed to stand, it bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and a plea of former conviction is good (People v. Clark, 264 Cal.App.2d 44, 46, 70 Cal.Rptr. 324; People v. Thompson, 10 Cal.App.3d 129, 137, 88 Cal.Rptr. 753; People v. Mims, supra, 136 Cal.App.2d p. 831, 289 P.2d......
  • Righetti v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State
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    ...1029, 1029 (1979) (recognizing a court's power to revoke its improper acceptance of a plea before sentencing); People v. Clark, 264 Cal.App.2d 44, 70 Cal.Rptr. 324, 326 (1968) (same); see also United States v. Britt, 917 F.2d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that manifest necessity may......
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