People v. Clark
| Decision Date | 06 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 122891 |
| Citation | 434 Ill.Dec. 137,135 N.E.3d 21,2019 IL 122891 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Elizabeth M. CLARK, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
¶ 1 Defendant, Elizabeth M. Clark, pled guilty to charges of burglary and unlawful use of a credit card and was released on bond pending the imposition of sentence. While awaiting sentencing, defendant was found guilty by the circuit court of violating section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014)) for knowingly failing to report to the Whiteside County Jail, as required by her bail bond.
¶ 2 The appellate court found that defendant's failure to report did not constitute an escape because she was not in custody while on bond awaiting sentencing. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶ 11, 418 Ill.Dec. 316, 90 N.E.3d 474. The appellate court reversed the circuit court, and we granted the State's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 4 The record contains the following uncontested facts. On October 31, 2012, defendant, who has a history of alcohol and substance abuse, pled guilty in the circuit court of Whiteside County to one count each of burglary and unlawful use of a debit card. While awaiting sentencing, defendant was released on bond so she could seek and receive substance abuse treatment. Defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail, with credit for time served, followed by a term of 30 months' probation. As conditions of her probation, defendant was ordered to satisfactorily complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment, refrain from possessing or consuming alcohol or other prohibited substances, submit to periodic urine tests, and pay certain fees and fines.
¶ 5 In January 2013, the State filed a petition alleging violation of probation. Defendant was taken into custody, and the court found that defendant violated the terms of her probation. In February 2013 she was released on a $ 50,000 recognizance bond to receive treatment. On April 19, 2013, defendant's probation was revoked, and she was resentenced to 74 days in jail, time served, and a new probation term of 30 months.
¶ 6 In July 2013, the State filed another petition alleging violation of probation, and in September 2013, the court found that defendant violated the terms of her probation. In December 2013, defendant was taken into custody. On January 9, 2014, the circuit court released defendant on a temporary recognizance bond of $ 50,000. The court released defendant into the custody of her father for transportation directly to the White Oaks treatment center for inpatient substance abuse treatment.
¶ 7 Defendant successfully completed inpatient treatment at White Oaks, and thereafter, on February 25, 2014, the circuit court entered an order modifying the conditions of her bond. Defendant's bond was modified to require her to directly enter into the Margaret Stutsman Lodge, which is a halfway house featuring an extended residential care program for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction
. Defendant was allowed to leave the halfway house for purposes of employment, medical needs, and 12-step program meetings. The modified bond condition also required that upon her release or discharge from the lodge, "for whatever reason (including but not limited to withdrawal, discharge, or successful completion of treatment), the Defendant must immediately return to the custody of Whiteside County Jail using the most direct route of travel and without delay or departure therefrom."
¶ 8 On June 5, 2014, defendant left the halfway house but failed to report to the Whiteside County Jail. That same day, the State filed an application to increase defendant's bond, and the circuit court issued an arrest warrant. On June 17, 2014, at the close of a hearing, defendant's April 2013 sentence of probation was revoked, and she was resentenced on her original offenses. On the burglary conviction, defendant was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with 281 days' credit and two years of mandatory supervised release. On the debit card conviction, she was concurrently sentenced to one year of imprisonment with 281 days' credit and one year of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 9 On the day defendant failed to report to the county jail, the State also filed an information charging defendant with the offense of escape in violation of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code, which is divided into two independent clauses: one clause containing an escape from custody provision and the other clause containing a knowing failure to report provision. 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). The State charged that "defendant, having been convicted of the felony offense of Burglary and Unlawful Use of Debit Card, knowingly failed to report to the Whiteside County Jail as required on June 6, 2014, in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Temporary Recognizance Bond." Defendant surrendered herself to the Whiteside County Jail on June 14, 2014.
¶ 10 The circuit court conducted a stipulated bench trial on September 23, 2014, in which the court accepted the above-recited stipulated facts. In the stipulation, defendant admitted that after she left the Margaret Stutsman Lodge she did not report directly to the county jail and acknowledged that the conditions of her bond required her to do so.
¶ 11 Seeking acquittal, defense counsel argued, inter alia , that because defendant was out on bond and was not serving a prison sentence at the time she failed to report to the county jail, this failure amounted to a violation of her bond, rather than an escape. Counsel asserted that escape is the unauthorized departure from custody and, since a defendant who is free on bond is not in custody, there is no custody from which to escape.
¶ 12 The prosecutor argued that the plain language of the knowing failure to report provision does not require that a defendant be "in custody." According to the prosecutor, a convicted felon who knowingly fails to report to a penal institution has committed the offense. The prosecutor further argued that, because both of those elements were satisfied in defendant's case, she was guilty of violating section 31-6(a) despite the fact that she had been released on bond.
¶ 13 The circuit court found defendant guilty of escape. In so doing, the court noted that defendant had been convicted of two felony charges and was awaiting sentencing for those convictions. Further, the court observed that the terms of her recognizance bond required her to return immediately to the Whiteside County Jail after her discharge from the halfway house. The circuit court determined that defendant's knowing failure to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway house constituted a violation of section 31-6(a). Accordingly, the court found that the State had satisfied its evidentiary burden, and the court convicted defendant of the offense of escape. After denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 30 months' probation, to be served consecutively to the prison term she received for her original convictions of burglary and unlawful use of a debit card.
¶ 14 On direct review, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction for escape. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶¶ 16-19, 418 Ill.Dec. 316, 90 N.E.3d 474. Relying on this court's holding in People v. Campa , 217 Ill. 2d 243, 259, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005), the appellate court determined that, in order for a convicted felon to commit the offense of escape, he or she must first be in custody. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶ 11, 418 Ill.Dec. 316, 90 N.E.3d 474. The appellate court drew a distinction between bail and custody and focused its analysis on whether defendant was in custody when she failed to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway house. The court stated that a "defendant released on bail or a recognizance bond is not considered to be in ‘custody’ per the Corrections Code." Id.
¶ 15 The appellate court determined that defendant was not in "custody" for purposes of the escape statute at the time she violated the terms of her bond by failing to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway house. The court observed that, during the time defendant was out on bail, she was no longer under the authority of the sheriff or the Illinois Department of Corrections but rather was under the authority of the circuit court. The appellate court also observed that there was no requirement that personnel from either the county jail or the circuit court transport her to the county jail. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. The appellate court held: "Because the State could not establish that [defendant] was in custody, a requirement inherent in the offense of escape, it could not prove she was guilty of escape beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. ¶ 16. The State appeals.
¶ 17 The issue presented in this case is whether the State is required to show that a convicted felon was in "custody" in order to prove that he or she violated the failure to report provision in the second clause of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code. 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). Resolution of this issue involves statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review. People v. Smith , 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 15, 412 Ill.Dec. 793, 76 N.E.3d 1251. For the following reasons, we hold that the statute does not require the State to make such a showing.
¶ 18 The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. All other canons and rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. People v. Jamison , 229 Ill....
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