People v. Clark

Decision Date12 December 2000
Docket NumberDocket No. 116029.
Citation463 Mich. 459,619 N.W.2d 538
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rajahaan Faruq CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Jennifer Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Jeffrey L. Sauter, Prosecuting Attorney, and William M. Worden, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Charlotte, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Gary L. Rogers) Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was convicted of a great number of weapon offenses, including two counts of felony-firearm. We affirm his convictions, but remand this case to the circuit court to correct the judgment of sentence with regard to the felony-firearm convictions.

I

At about 3:45 a.m. on a morning in August 1995, the State Police stopped a van that was being driven erratically on a Lansing street. On the basis of what they learned after making the stop, the troopers searched the van. Inside, they found a supply of weapons.

The defendant, a passenger in the van, was charged with fifteen weapon-related offenses.1 Among those charges were two counts of felony-firearm2 and two counts of possessing a bomb with unlawful intent.3 The information and amended information further alleged that the felony-firearm offenses occurred in connection with the bomb possession.4

Near the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed in this fashion:

[T]he defendant is charged with the crime of possessing a firearm at the time he committed the crime of possession of a bomb with unlawful intent. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, that the defendant committed the crime of possession of a bomb with unlawful intent, which has been defined for you. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant be convicted of that crime.
Second, that at the time the defendant committed that crime, he knowingly carried or possessed a firearm. It does not matter whether or not the gun was loaded.

At the conclusion of its deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of all the charged offenses,5 including the two counts of felony-firearm and the two counts of possessing a bomb with unlawful intent.

The circuit court imposed enhanced sentences on the defendant, who was an habitual offender. For each count of possessing a bomb with unlawful intent, the court sentenced the defendant to serve four to seven and a half years in prison. Various sentences were imposed for the other offenses, the longest minimum sentences being eight years for placing a pipe bomb near a building and for conspiracy to commit murder. The court directed that the defendant serve two years for each count of felony-firearm.

The court's written judgment listed the sentences imposed for each of the fifteen counts. It further provided that the felony-firearm sentences were to be consecutive to all thirteen of the other charges.6

The defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions.7 He now has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

II

The defendant raises several issues, but we will address only one. He says that his two felony-firearm sentences should be consecutive only to the two convictions for possessing a bomb with unlawful intent, not to the remaining convictions.8 We agree, and remand this case for correction of the judgment of sentence.

From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute,9 it is evident that the Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.10 Subsection 2 clearly states that the felony-firearm sentence "shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony." It is evident that the emphasized language refers back to the predicate offense discussed in subsection 1, i.e., the offense during which the defendant possessed a firearm. No language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense.

In this instance, the jury found that the defendant possessed a firearm while he possessed two bombs with unlawful intent. While it might appear obvious that the defendant also possessed a firearm while committing the other crimes of which he was convicted, neither a trial court nor an appellate court can supply its own findings with regard to the factual elements that have not been found by a jury.11

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the prosecution has offered a textual analysis to support its view. To the contrary, they identify a supposed statutory purpose that compels a favored result independent of any textual analysis. As we explained in People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 155-156, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999), however, the clear language of the statute is to be applied as written.12

For these reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but we modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the circuit court for correction of the judgment of sentence.13 Each felony-firearm sentence is consecutive only to the corresponding conviction for possession of a bomb with unlawful intent.14 MCR 7.302(F)(1).

WEAVER, C.J., and MARILYN J. KELLY, TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.

1. The fifteen counts were: (1) possession of a bomb, with unlawful intent, M.C.L. § 750.210; MSA 28.407; (2) possession of a bomb, with unlawful intent; (3) felony-firearm, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2); (4) felony-firearm; (5) carrying a concealed weapon, M.C.L. § 750.227; MSA 28.424; (6) CCW; (7) CCW; (8) CCW; (9) possession of a shortbarreled shotgun, M.C.L. § 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2); (10) possession of a short-barreled shotgun; (11) possession of a "Ground Burst Simulator," M.C.L. § 750.210; MSA 28.407; (12) possession of a "hand grenade simulator;" (13) placement of a pipe bomb near a building, M.C.L. § 750.208; MSA 28.405; (14) conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.157a, 750.316; MSA 28.354(1), 28.548; (15) felon in possession of a firearm, M.C.L. § 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6). In addition, the prosecutor gave notice that the defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence as an habitual (second) offender, M.C.L. § 769.10; MSA 28.1082.

2. In pertinent part, the statute provides:

(1) A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years.

....

(2) A term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony. [MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).]

In Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374, 389-391, 280 N.W.2d 793 (1979), we explained that felony-firearm is a separate felony offense, not a sentence enhancement measure.

3. In 1995, the statute read:

Any person who carries or possesses a bomb or bombshell or any article containing an explosive or combustible substance or foul, offensive or injurious substance or compound, with intent to use the same unlawfully against the person or property of other [sic], shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two nor more than five years. [MCL 750.210; 28.407, as enacted in 1927 PA 119.]

The statute was substantially revised by 1998 PA 208.

4. The information and amended information alleged that the defendant

did carry or have in his/her possession a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, at the time he/she committed or attempted to commit a felony, to-wit: Possession of a Bomb with Unlawful Intent; contrary to M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

5. Actually, the jury returned guilty verdicts on fourteen of the fifteen counts. The fifteenth count—felon in possession—had been separated to avoid prejudice...

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