People v. Codarre

• Decision Date: 08 February 1963
• Citation: 237 N.Y.S.2d 389,38 Misc.2d 445
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Edwin CODARRE, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 389

237 N.Y.S.2d 389

38 Misc.2d 445

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Edwin CODARRE, Defendant.

Dutchess County Court.

Feb. 8, 1963.

O. John Rogge, New York City, for appellant.

Raymond C. Baratta, Dist. Atty., of Dutches County, Poughkeepsie, for respondent.

W. VINCENT GRADY, Judge.

This is petitioner's third application for coram nobis relief. In his two prior applications he claimed: (1) that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, at the time of the plea of guilty and at the time of sentencing; (2) that he was not adequately represented by counsel; and (3) that by reason of his illness--epilepsy--and his extreme youth he was incompetent to plead guilty. Both applications were denied without a hearing by this court and each denial was affirmed by the Appellate Division from whose determinations no appeal was taken. (People v. Codarre, 206 Misc. 950, 138 N.Y.S.2d 18, affd. 285 App.Div. 1087, 140 N.Y.S.2d 289; 8 Misc.2d 145, 167 N.Y.S.2d 443, affd. 5 App.Div.2d 1016, 174 N.Y.S.2d 123).

Commenting upon petitioner's claim of insanity the Appellate Division stated (285 App.Div. 1087, 140 N.Y.S.2d 289):

'In our opinion, under the facts presented by this record, the remedy of coram nobis is unavailable to raise the question of defendant's insanity at the time of his plea and sentence. The question of sanity was before the court during the trial and at the time the plea was accepted and it could have been raised upon his arraignment for judgment Code Crim.Proc. § 481. The writ of error coram nobis may not be invoked under such circumstances. Cf. People v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 73-74, 89 N.E.2d 188, 189; People v. Palumbo, 282 App.Div. 1059, 126 N.Y.S.2d 381; Flora v. People, 281 App.Div. 946, 119 N.Y.S.2d 434, affirmed 306 N.Y. 615, 116 N.E.2d 79; and Blodgett v. State, Mo., 245 S.W.2d 839.'

Under the present application, the petitioner seeks under coram nobis an order granting him a hearing on the question of whether 'a state procedure which permits a plea of guilty to murder in any degree by an epileptic 13-year-old violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution'. The People through the District Attorney of Dutchess County oppose the application on the ground that defendant was not deprived of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

The incumbent Dutchess County Judge John R. Schwartz disqualified himself by reason of the fact that he was District Attorney of Dutchess County during the prosecution of defendant and certified this matter to the Surrogate pursuant to Section 73-a of the Civil Practice Act and Section 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now authorized by Appellate Division Order under Court Reorganization).

This court on September 30, 1960, (24 Misc.2d 902, 205 N.Y.S.2d 523) denied appellant's petition in all respects based on the previous ruling of the Appellate Division on the unavailability of the question of mental and emotional capacity in a coram nobis proceeding.

After the lower Court's decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division (13 App.Div.2d 684, 215 N.Y.S.2d 731) the matter was then taken to the New York State Court of Appeals and the order of the County Court was reversed and the matter remitted to it for a trial of the allegations of the petition. See 10 N.Y.2d 361, on page 363, 223 N.Y.S.2d 457, on page 458, 179 N.E.2d 475, on page 476, wherein Chief Judge Desmond speaking for the majority of the Court of Appeals stated:

'The first question for us is as to whether the allegations of this petition state a case for coram nobis relief, at least to the extent of requiring a hearing. We think they do. Ordinarily coram nobis procedures cannot be used to correct errors appearing on the face of a record (See People v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188). However, there is an exception where there is a showing 'of a denial of due process requiring corrective judicial process'. In such cases the scope will be expanded where the allegations of 'injury done to the defendant would deprive him of due process of law' (People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 202-203, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13, 144 N.E.2d 10, 12; and see People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77, 176 N.E.2d 90).'

The learned Court further stated on page 365, 223 N.Y.S.2d on pages 459-460, 179 N.E.2d on pages 476-477:

'On a trial of the allegations of this petition, it might be found as fact that this defendant had such a defense and that insufficient consideration was given to it. Since that is so, there must be a hearing on those allegations (People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 97 N.E.2d 908; and People v. Langan, 303 N.Y. 474, 104 N.E.2d 861). The order should be reversed and the matter remitted to the County Court of Dutchess County for a trial of the allegations of the petition.'

Following this decision the defendant Edwin Codarre, was brought before the Dutchess County Court, at Poughkeepsie, New York, and a hearing was held and proof was submitted by the Appellant and by the People-Respondent covering the allegations of defendant's petition.

Case History--It appears that the defendant, a 13-year-old boy, was indicted on August 26, 1943, charged with the crime of murder in the first degree in that he assaulted and killed a ten year old girl. Thereafter he pleaded not guilty and was assigned two defense counsel by the court. He proceeded to trial on November 15, 1943, and on November 23, 1943, after seven days of trial, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree. On December 6, 1943, he was sentenced to State's prison by the late Hon. J. Gordon Flannery, then County Judge, to an indeterminate term of thirty years to life. The mental condition of defendant was described to the court at a conference in chambers on November 22, 1943 prior to the acceptance of a plea. The minutes of the conference disclose that four psychiatrists examined defendant. Two were retained by the People and two were appointed by order of the court on defendant's application pursuant to Section 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The mental condition of defendant was discussed by the four psychiatrists with the court in the presence of defense counsel but in the absence of defendant. Three psychiatrists agreed defendant was legally sane and one of those appointed for defendant claimed that he was suffering a form of epilepsy and not legally sane. No formal adjudication was had under Section 658 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Following the conference, the court accepted defendant's plea to murder in the second degree with the approval of the District Attorney and defense attorneys.

Testifying at the present hearing before the court were Edwin J. Codarre, defendant-appellant, his mother, Irene Bishop, Robert W. Laidlaw, M.D. and Ralph S. Banay, M.D., two of defendant-appellant's original psychiatrists at his trial, and Milton M. Grover, M.D., one of the People's original psychiatrists. It appears that Clarence O. Cheney, M.D., a psychiatrists for the People, is now deceased; but his question and answer report dated August 15, 1943 was admitted in evidence.

From the testimony presented, there seems to be no dispute that the defendant-appellant is presently suffering from epilepsy and has been suffering from this condition for many years while in prison. He is presently under medication by prescription for 'Dilantin' which he is required to take four times a day. The question is whether Codarre was suffering epilepsy on the date of the commission of the crime for which he was charged and whether he was in an epileptic furor, episode or equivalent at the time of the commission of the crime?

Dr. Robert Laidlaw testified that he gave Edwin Codarre a Neurological examination on October 19, 1943 at the Neurological Institute in New York. Later Dr. Laidlaw said that he saw Edwin Codarre in Dutchess County Court and was present at the conference held by the late County Judge Flannery, in chambers on November 22, 1943. At that time, he testified that Dr. Clarence O. Cheney and Dr. Milton M. Grover, two psychiatrists retained by the People, made available to him the examinations they had made of the defendant two days after his arrest. Following a discussion with these two doctors, Dr. Laidlaw stated that he agreed with them that the defendant Codarre knew the nature and qualify of his act and that he knew the act was wrong. Dr. Laidlaw testified that he had read over the 1943 conference minutes (People Ex 7) and still agrees with his statement made at that time, which was:

'I would like to say I concur with Dr. Cheney and Dr. Grover in feeling the full retention of this crime in the boy's memory, and his factual and logical explanation of the progressive steps, rules out the epileptic equivalent occurring at the time of the crime.'

Dr. Laidlaw further testified that clinical experience with epileptic equivalents shows that invariably acts committed during the period of such a change are characterized by very real clouding of consciousness, and at the cessation of this attack or episode, the patient has no memory of what occurred during the episode itself. (Note: from Codarre's statement of the facts surrounding the crime, there appears...