People v. Coleman

Decision Date23 September 2020
Docket NumberA154631
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOUIS RAY COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-170819-7)

Defendant Louis Ray Coleman appeals a judgment sentencing him to prison for life without the possibility of parole based on his conviction on 25 criminal counts related to his kidnap and sexual assault of two victims. He asserts numerous arguments challenging, among other things, the denial of his motion to represent himself at trial, the court's instructions to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions on certain counts. We find no prejudicial error and shall affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was charged by amended information with committing 25 criminal offenses against two victims. With respect to Jane Doe 1, defendant was charged as follows: human trafficking of a minor for a sex act (count 1; Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)(2));1 aggravated sexual assault/rape of a child(counts 2, 4, 13; § 269, subd. (a)(1)); forcible lewd act upon a child (counts 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16; § 288, subd. (b)(1)); aggravated sexual assault/oral copulation of a child (counts 5, 14; § 269, subd. (a)(4)); aggravated sexual assault/penetration of a child (count 6; § 269, subd. (a)(5)); kidnapping to commit sex offenses (count 12; § 209, subd. (b)(1)); and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (count 17; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The eight counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child included "One Strike" allegations under section 667.61.

With respect to Jane Doe 2, defendant was charged as follows: human trafficking to commit another crime (count 18; § 236.1, subd. (b)); forcible rape (counts 19, 25; § 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible sodomy (count 21; § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)); forcible oral copulation (counts 22, 23, 24, § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A)); and kidnapping to commit rape and oral copulation (count 20, § 209, subd. (b)(1)). Personal firearm use enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and "One Strike" allegations (§ 667.61) were alleged as to many of the offenses. A prior Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) conviction was alleged under section 666.5 and two section 667.5 prior convictions were also alleged.

At trial, Jane Doe 1 testified that she was 12 years old when she met defendant near the Richmond BART station after asking him for directions. Defendant led her to an abandoned house and offered her methamphetamine. She went with him behind the house because she thought he was going to help her, but once behind the house she felt like she could not leave because she was afraid defendant would hurt her. She explained that she smoked the methamphetamine defendant offered because she was starting to feel like something bad might happen and was thinking that the drug might change the way she was feeling. Over the course of three days, defendant repeatedlygave her drugs and sexually and physically assaulted her. She escaped when defendant left her unattended in the back of a van at the Greyhound bus station. During the course of the offenses, defendant told her that he wanted her to be a prostitute for him.

Jane Doe 2 testified that she met defendant near the Richmond BART station when she asked for directions to a nearby bank. Defendant led her to an abandoned house and over a period of three days tricked her into smoking methamphetamine, moved her from place to place against her will, and repeatedly sexually and physically assaulted her. She was able to escape when defendant took her to a store near the Richmond BART station. Doe 2 testified that during the course of the offenses, defendant told a man they ran into that he was training Doe 2 to be a prostitute.

Two additional witnesses testified regarding prior uncharged sexual assaults perpetrated against them by defendant. The first victim testified that in June 1995, when she was 12 years old, defendant used a gun to force her into a car. He brought her to an apartment where he held her against her will and sexually assaulted her. When she escaped, she called the police, told them the perpetrator's name and later identified defendant. She testified that defendant was prosecuted for the crimes he committed against her. The second victim testified that in 2000, when she was 13 years old, she met defendant at the McArthur BART station after running away from home. For five years, defendant held her against her will, sexually and physically abused her, and forced her to work as a prostitute.

Defendant denied engaging in any criminal conduct. He testified that he met Jane Doe 1 at the Richmond BART station when she asked for directions to Los Angeles. They ended up hanging out together for three days before he left her at the West Oakland Greyhound station. They usedmethamphetamine together and engaged in consensual sex. She told him she was 18, but later said that she was turning 17. He testified that after meeting Jane Doe 2 at the BART station they also hung out together for a few days, used methamphetamine together and engaged in consensual sex. He denied physically or sexually assaulting her. With respect to the first victim of the uncharged conduct, defendant claimed that he believed she was at least 22 years old when they engaged in consensual sex. After his arrest, he learned that she was actually 12 years old, so he pled guilty to sexual battery. With respect to the second victim of the uncharged conduct, defendant denied that he acted as her pimp and claimed that any sexual contact was consensual.

The jury found defendant guilty of each of the charged offenses and found the firearm and "One Strike" allegations true. After finding the prior conviction enhancement allegations true, the court sentenced defendant to multiple consecutive terms of life without possible parole (LWOP) plus additional terms totaling 301 years 9 months to life in prison.

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

Discussion
1. Defendant's Faretta Motion for Self-representation

" 'A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself at trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.] A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial.' " (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 931-932. citing Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-835 (Faretta).)

The erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se. (People v. Carlisle (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1390.) We review de novo whether the defendant's invocation of the right to self-representation and waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. (People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 756.) A ruling denying a Faretta motion as untimely is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426.)

The initial complaint against defendant was filed on June 15, 2016. Following numerous pretrial proceedings at all of which defendant was represented by counsel, on September 26, 2017, the day before the jury trial was set to begin, he first informed the court that he wanted to represent himself. The court advised defendant that it was about to rule on a number of motions filed by defendant's attorney and that the jury trial was going to start the following day. The court questioned whether defendant would be able to represent himself on the motions and prepare for trial given the timing and legal complexity of some of the motions. Ultimately, the court said, "today, like right now, we're going to do some motions that were filed by your attorney. And I think if you listen to what he has filed and is arguing, you will see he's taking care of business as he's supposed to. I don't think you will have any issue like that. Okay?" The defendant responded "Uh-huh" and then "Okay. Okay." The motions were ruled on that day and jury selection began the next day.2

Defendant contends his convictions should be reversed because "the court violated Faretta when it failed to (1) comply with Faretta procedural'admonishment' requirements, (2) exceeded its authority in attempting to persuade defendant to not exercise his right to self-representation, and (3) used improper factors to deny defendant his right to self-representation." The Attorney general contends the court properly denied defendant's motion as untimely.

Although both parties' arguments are based on the premise that the court denied defendant's motion, the record does not reflect a final ruling. Defendant made an unequivocal request, but then acquiesced to the court's suggestion that he listen to the proceedings on the pending pre-trial motions before making any decision regarding self-representation. While the court might have denied the motion as untimely, it does not appear that it did. (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 [Although the courts have not "fixed any definitive time before trial at which a motion for self-representation is considered untimely," the California Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that "Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely."]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102 [Faretta request made "moments before jury selection" untimely]; People v. Horton (1995...

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