People v. Coleman

Decision Date18 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 89159.,89159.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Dedrick COLEMAN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago (John E. Horn and H. Elizabeth Kelley, Tinley Park, of counsel), for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald and Celeste Stewart Stack, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Justice GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Dedrick Coleman, was convicted of the April 26, 1989, first degree murders of Lance Hale and Avis Welch. He was also convicted of armed robbery and home invasion. Defendant waived the right to be sentenced by a jury and the circuit court subsequently sentenced him to death for the murders. Defendant received prison sentences for his other convictions. This court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence on direct appeal (People v. Coleman, 158 Ill.2d 319, 198 Ill.Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654 (1994)) and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (Coleman v. Illinois, 513 U.S. 881, 115 S.Ct. 215, 130 L.Ed.2d 143 (1994)). In 1995, defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)), which the circuit court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, this court reversed that decision and remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing on certain issues raised in the petition. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the petition and this appeal followed (134 Ill.2d R. 651(a); 155 Ill.2d R. 304(b)(3)).

BACKGROUND
Trial Proceedings

The murders of Lance Hale and Avis Welch occurred in the first-floor apartment of a two-flat home in Chicago on April 26, 1989. The first-floor apartment was a known "drug house" owned and operated by Alex McCullough. Defendant knew McCullough through his employment in McCullough's drug operation. McCullough was also the boyfriend of defendant's sister. About one month before the murders, defendant and McCullough had argued about defendant's alleged theft of cocaine and $2,000.

At trial, Aldene Lockett, who lived in the second-floor apartment of the two-flat, testified that at around 5:30 a.m. on April 26, 1989, she heard voices coming from the first-floor apartment. A short while later, she heard a gunshot and something falling. Two more shots later rang out, and Lockett heard a door open. At this time, she looked out her window and saw a dark-complected young black man between 5 feet 6 inches and 5 feet 8 inches tall leave the apartment. The man was wearing all black clothing and sunglasses. Lockett later related what she had seen to police officers investigating the murders.

Eventually, police connected defendant to the drug-house murders, due, in large part, to defendant's shooting of McCullough five days later on May 1, 1989. Several persons were present at the time of the McCullough shooting, and defendant told them he wanted it said that he shot McCullough in self-defense. Nevertheless, some of these witnesses later turned themselves in to the police and informed them of defendant's true role in McCullough's shooting, as well as his involvement in the double homicide at the drug house. As a result, defendant participated in a lineup that was viewed by Aldene Lockett on May 2, 1989. At trial, Lockett testified that one of the lineup participants "looked like he fit the height and description" of the man she had seen leave the drug house. Lockett further told police that the man had been wearing sunglasses. The police then asked each of the lineup participants to put on sunglasses. All but one of the participants complied. According to Lockett, the participant who did not put on the sunglasses was the same participant who had the weight and height of the man she had seen leave the drug house. On cross-examination, Lockett stated that she did not positively identify anyone from the lineup, but merely told the police that the man who did not put on the glasses "could have been" the same man she had seen leave the murder scene because "he had the same height, and build, and color."

Chicago police detective Tony Maslanka testified that he and his partner, Detective Carroll, conducted the lineup that Lockett viewed. According to Maslanka, Lockett told him that one of the men in the lineup, identified by Maslanka as defendant, "looked like the individual she saw leave the first-floor apartment * * * in regard to height, complexion, and physical build." Maslanka stated that because Lockett had seen the suspect leave the building wearing sunglasses, each of the lineup participants was asked to put on a pair of sunglasses. All of the participants in the lineup complied, with the exception of defendant. Lockett again stated to Maslanka that the man who did not put on the sunglasses "was the individual whom she saw that day in question with regard to height, physical build, and complection [sic]." On cross-examination, Maslanka admitted that Lockett did not positively identify defendant as the man she had seen leave the scene of the murders. Rather, Maslanka characterized her identification as "tentative" because Lockett had told him that she had not been wearing her glasses when she saw the suspect leave the building and that she was nearsighted. As stated, defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murders.

Post-Conviction Proceedings

In his post-conviction petition, defendant alleged that the State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by concealing material evidence that was favorable to the defense and by using perjured testimony to obtain the convictions. In support of this claim, defendant attached to his petition the affidavit of Aldene Lockett. In this 1995 affidavit, Lockett states that she saw the gunman's face as he was leaving the first-floor apartment and that she remembers "recognizing it from the neighborhood." At a later date, Lockett saw a man "on the block" who looked like the gunman. According to the affidavit, while at the lineup, Lockett "felt that the police were trying to get [her] to single out the male who refused to put on the shades, because they went back to him in the lineup and told [her] that this was the guy [they] picked up for the murders. [She] told them that this guy was not dark enough to be the guy who had come out of the downstairs apartment." Lockett also states in her affidavit that she does not "remember seeing the guy who refused to wear the shades during the police lineup in the neighborhood before" and that she remembers "telling the States Attorney, Michael Kelly, about how this guy in the lineup didn't look like the guy [she] saw come out of the downstairs apartment, but [Kelly] would always say something to try and convince [her] that he was the right guy." Finally, Lockett states that Assistant State's Attorney Kelly and his investigators "would call me every two or three days to go over my story to make sure it didn't change." In exchange for her trial testimony, the investigators promised to move her to her home state of Alabama or to find her a new residence in Chicago. After one year had passed and Lockett was ready to move, she called the State's Attorney's office but was told that Kelly no longer worked there. Lockett's affidavit further states that no one from the defense team ever contacted her. Defendant's amended petition also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on this affidavit, in addition to counsel's failure to interview Lockett. On appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing, this court determined that, since the State had filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition, the factual allegations of Lockett's affidavit must be taken as true, and that the circuit court had failed to do so in its dismissal of the petition. Accordingly, this court remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing as to defendant's claim regarding Lockett's trial testimony and as to his claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel regarding the alleged failure to interview Lockett.

On remand, defendant's post-conviction counsel filed a motion for discovery, requesting that the State turn over (1) its file on the case, (2) any and all exculpatory evidence in the State's possession, and (3) the personnel files of John Hynes and Michael Kelly, the assistant State's Attorneys who prosecuted defendant. The circuit court granted the motion as to (1) and (2), but denied it as to (3). Defendant's counsel also issued subpoenas to the Office of Professional Conduct (OPS) for its files on Maslanka. The City's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. At a hearing on the motion, the City's counsel revealed that the subpoenaed records contained eight complaints against Maslanka, five of which were not sustained and three of which were completely unfounded. The circuit court granted counsel's motion to quash, finding no basis for reviewing Maslanka's file. The court also denied post-conviction counsel's request to take the depositions of Maslanka, Hynes, Kelly, and Nicholas Panarese, defendant's trial attorney.

At the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel asked Lockett to review her entire affidavit and then asked if the affidavit was true. Lockett replied that it was. On cross-examination, Lockett testified that the morning of the shooting was "gloomy" and that she saw the gunman's face for less than a second. She could tell that he was a dark-skinned black male of medium height and build. Lockett testified that she is nearsighted and...

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