People v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 22 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 73326,73326
• Citation: 187 Ill.Dec. 479,155 Ill.2d 507,617 N.E.2d 1200
• Parties: , 187 Ill.Dec. 479 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Keith COLEMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1200

617 N.E.2d 1200

155 Ill.2d 507, 187 Ill.Dec. 479

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Keith COLEMAN, Appellant.

No. 73326.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 22, 1993.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago, Stephen L. Richards, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel, for appellant.

Roland Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Randall Roberts and Lou Anne Corey, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel, for the People.

Justice NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Keith Coleman, was tried by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and convicted of murder and two counts of armed robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 35 years' imprisonment for murder and 15 years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. (223 Ill.App.3d 975, 166 Ill.Dec 312, 586 N.E.2d 270.) This court subsequently granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315).

Defendant raised several issues in the appellate court and attempted to present them again in his brief before this court. However, the State's motion to limit consideration of defendant's brief to the Batson issue was granted. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.) Therefore, the only issue for our review is whether the appellate court erred by refusing to remand the cause for a Batson hearing. We present only the facts necessary for resolution of this issue.

Defendant and Nathan Haley were tried jointly. Haley is not a party to this appeal. Defendant and Haley were each allotted five peremptory challenges and the State was allotted a total of 10 peremptory challenges. After the State exercised four peremptory challenges to excuse venirepersons, codefendant Haley's counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was based in part on what counsel described as "on a collision course of an all-white jury in this case." Haley's counsel went on to note for the record that it was "a black crime, which happened in the black community." He indicated that it would be proper "to send down and get some more jurors up here so my client can have a proper jury of his peers." Haley's counsel stated that it would be "patently unfair to try a black person before an all-white jury * * * and it appears these prosecutors are not going to let any blacks sit on this jury."

Defendant's attorney joined in the motion for a mistrial. He asserted that the State had used at least one half of its peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans or Hispanic-Americans from the jury. The court denied the motion for mistrial.

The State later exercised two peremptory challenges. It then used a seventh peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American, venireperson Maulden. Defendant's counsel objected, but the trial judge overruled the objection. However, the trial judge stated, "Mr. State's Attorney, I want [sic ] you, if another black is called, and you excuse him or her, I am going to declare a mis-trial [sic ]."

The assistant State's Attorney subsequently informed the court that he believed the jury had been tainted against the State by the judge's remark. He asked for a cautionary instruction, explaining that he excused Maulden because Maulden said he had a tendency to favor the defense. The judge responded:

"THE COURT: But he said he would put that aside, and he was an intelligent man, and you can bet your bottom dollar he would have done that.

Mr. Victorson [Assistant State's Attorney]: Well, that may be, but we did not excuse him because he was black.

THE COURT: Well, I will accept that.

Mr. Victorson: But, it looked that way.

THE COURT: It might have, but I said what I said, and that is what you will have to live with."

Following the trial the jury rendered its verdicts. Haley's counsel noted that one of the jurors appeared to be upset, pointing out that "she was the only black juror on the jury." He asked that she be brought back and polled individually. The court denied the request.

In the appellate court defendant contended that the trial court erred in the jury-selection process by not conducting a hearing under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. The court determined that defendant waived any objection to the jury selection by failing to note the race of any of the excluded venirepersons for the record, except as to the juror whose race was identified. The court acknowledged that Batson applied retroactively to this case because the case was on direct appeal at the time Batson was decided. However, the appellate court concluded that defendant was still required to make an adequate record before a reviewing court would recognize a claim under either the Swain standard (Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759) or the Batson-type standard that had been recognized in an opinion of that court, People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill.App.3d 1034, 62 Ill.Dec. 744, 436 N.E.2d 1046, rev'd (1983), 99 Ill.2d 135, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 457 N.E.2d 1202.

Based on the record presented by defendant, the appellate court concluded that neither the earlier Swain standard nor the current Batson standard had been met. Further, with respect to Maulden, the only venireperson whose race had been identified, the court found that the trial court followed a procedure similar to what would be required under Batson. The trial court then accepted the State's representation that the peremptory challenge of Maulden was race neutral. The appellate court found it unnecessary to remand the cause as it related to this juror.

Defendant contends that the appellate court opinion is contrary to the law established in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, and a number of this court's opinions which subsequently followed Batson, e.g., People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 139 Ill.Dec. 469, 548 N.E.2d 1025, and People v. Hooper (1987), 118 Ill.2d 244, 107 Ill.Dec. 250, 506 N.E.2d 1305. He correctly points out that while his case preceded the Batson decision, Batson applies retroactively to the case because it was on direct appeal at the time Batson was decided. (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649; Hooper, 118 Ill.2d 244, 107 Ill.Dec. 250, 506 N.E.2d 1305.) It is defendant's position that he cannot be denied an opportunity to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory strikes due to deficiencies in a pre-Batson record. He argues that the cause should be remanded for a Batson hearing wherein a proper record may be established from which to determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination exists.

In response the State contends that unlike the cases cited by defendant, the record herein shows there is no colorable claim of race discrimination to justify a Batson hearing. The State argues that its peremptory challenge of Maulden cannot be used to assist defendant in demonstrating a viable claim because the trial court accepted the State's race-neutral reason for excusing him. The State asserts that when defendant raised his first objection to jury selection by a motion for mistrial, the State had exercised only 4 of its 10 peremptory challenges. The State points to defense counsel's statement that "at least one half" of the State's peremptory challenges were used "against any black or Latino juror." It infers from this remark that two of the four challenges were used to exclude an African-American and an Hispanic-American, asserting that defendant's claim rests solely upon one unidentifiable African-American venireperson. The State concedes that even if the statement can be interpreted to mean more than one African-American was excused, at least one of the peremptory challenges was directed at an Hispanic-American. At most then, the State contends that only three of the four challenges were used to excuse African-American venirepersons.

The State continues its argument by noting that if Maulden were included, the State exercised four of its seven peremptory challenges to exclude African-American venirepersons. This number was less than one-half of its 10 allotted peremptory challenges. The State claims that these numbers do not substantiate a colorable claim of race discrimination. It further dismisses the trial judge's cautionary remark regarding a possible mistrial and argues that defense counsel's remarks add nothing to the record. Therefore, the State claims that remand is not proper because there is no showing of a colorable claim of race discrimination.

The State's position is somewhat different from the position taken by the appellate court. The appellate court found that defendant waived any objection to jury selection by failing to preserve a record under either the Swain or Batson standards because defendant failed to note the race of excluded venirepersons, save one. The State essentially acknowledges that the record shows peremptory challenges were used to exclude African-Americans, but argues that since a sufficient number of African-Americans were not excluded, a colorable claim of race discrimination is not supported by the record. In essence the State is asserting that defendant has failed to present a prima facie case based on a pre-Batson record merely on the basis of peremptory challenges used.

Simply because African-American venirepersons are peremptorily challenged does not, without more, raise the specter or inference of race discrimination. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 101, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90 L.Ed.2d at 91; People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 64, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360.) As noted by Justice Ryan in his special concurrence in People v. Hooper (1987), 118 Ill.2d 244, 107 Ill.Dec. 250, 506 N.E.2d 1305, "We must avoid arbitrarily deciding the delicate question we now consider [racial discrimination...