People v. Coles

• Decision Date: 26 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50446,50446
• Citation: 74 Ill.2d 393,385 N.E.2d 694,24 Ill.Dec. 553
• Parties: , 24 Ill.Dec. 553 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. George COLES et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 694

385 N.E.2d 694

74 Ill.2d 393, 24 Ill.Dec. 553

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. George COLES et al., Appellees.

No. 50446.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 26, 1979.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (Donald B. Mackay, Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Lee T. Hettinger, Joan S. Cherry and Pamela L. Gray, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Robert P. Isaacson, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

CLARK, Justice:

The defendants, George Coles and Kevin Johnson, were convicted of armed robbery after a joint trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The Appellate Court, First District, reversed both convictions on the grounds that the trial court's restriction of inquiry into the alleged bias of the chief prosecution witness violated the defendants' right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them. (55 Ill.App.3d 528, 529-30, 13 Ill.Dec. 542, 371 N.E.2d 259.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal, and we now affirm as to defendant Coles and vacate and remand the cause with directions, as to defendant Johnson.

The armed robbery in question allegedly took place at the home of Phyllis and Walter Stallworth in Chicago. Mrs. Stallworth was the chief witness against the defendants at trial. She alone allegedly observed defendant Coles during the robbery. Mrs. Stallworth also happened to be the sister of defendant Coles' wife. At trial, counsel for defendant Coles attempted to demonstrate that Mrs. Stallworth was biased against him.

A crucial aspect of this attempt to establish Mrs. Stallworth's alleged bias was counsel's attempt to demonstrate a motive or reason for some of that bias. However, when counsel sought to lay a foundation for inquiring whether, four months prior to the alleged robbery, Mrs. Stallworth had been beaten by her husband as a result of Coles' having told him that she was having an extramarital affair, the court sustained the State's objection as to Any inquiry into the alleged beating. Coles' counsel thereupon made an offer of proof, for the record, of the questions he intended to ask of Mr. and Mrs. Stallworth regarding the alleged beating.

Counsel for defendant Coles was, however, permitted to inquire, Inter alia, whether defendant had visited the Stallworth home, whether Mrs. Stallworth had encouraged her sister not to marry Coles, and whether Mrs. Stallworth had threatened to "fix" Coles.

It is well settled that the trial court is vested with "substantial discretion" to determine both the manner and scope of cross-examination. (People v. McCain (1963), 29 Ill.2d 132, 134, 193 N.E.2d 784. See also People v. Peter (1973), 55 Ill.2d 443, 452, 303 N.E.2d 398.) Accordingly, the trial court's decision on such issues will not be overturned absent a showing of a "clear abuse" of that discretion "resulting in manifest prejudice." (People v. Halteman (1956), 10 Ill.2d 74, 86, 139 N.E.2d 286.) Here, we conclude that the trial court's decision excluding inquiry into the chief prosecution witness' allegedly having been beaten by her husband (for which she allegedly blamed Coles) constituted a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to Coles, against whom that witness provided the most damaging evidence at trial. (See, E. g., People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill.2d 50, 52, 280 N.E.2d 708.) The potential inference, from the alleged beating, of a motive to misrepresent was neither remote nor speculative, nor unduly prejudicial to the government and therefore should have been left to the jury. Cf., generally, People v. Jones (1975), 60 Ill.2d 300, 306, 325 N.E.2d 601 (relationship of a witness to a defendant is clearly a basis for bias as to which cross-examination is appropriate). See also Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347.

Although Davis based its holding upon the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, we see no need to elevate our decision beyond the general evidentiary principles upon which it is based. Accordingly, we eschew reliance upon either the Illinois or the United States Constitution in reaching our decisions with regard to defendant Coles.

With regard to defendant Johnson, however, we hold that the appellate court erred in reversing his conviction based upon an issue which he neither raised in the trial court nor briefed in the appellate court, and which involved the exercise of the trial court's discretion as to matters beyond those addressed by counsel for defendant Coles.

Coles and...