People v. Connolly

Decision Date27 May 1957
Citation164 N.Y.S.2d 66,3 A.D.2d 943
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John J. CONNOLLY, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Aaron E. Koota, New York City, for appellant.

Samuel Bader, New York City, for respondent.

Before NOLAN, P. J., and BELDOCK, MURPHY, UGHETTA and KLEINFELD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, dismissing an information charging defendant with violation of section 273 of the Penal Law in that he filed two false statements as to retainer with the Appellate Divisions, Second Judicial Department. Order reversed, demurrer disallowed, and defendant required to plead to the information at a term of the Court of Special Sessions at a time to be provided in the order to be entered hereon.

Defendant is charged with having filed two false statements as to retainer with this court in violation of Rule 3 of our Special Rules Regulating the Conduct of Attorneys and Counselors at Law in the Second Judicial Department. It is provided in Rule 3 that if the action or claim arises from personal injuries or property damage, the attorney filing the statement as to retainer shall state the name of any person who referred the client to the attorney or who had any connection with referring the client to the attorney, stating the connection. In each of two counts the defendant is charged with having willfully and falsely stated as purported compliance with the Rule that a named individual had referred and recommended a client to him. That offense would constitute a deceit with intent to deceive the court within the purview of the stated Penal Law provision. Pendency of an action is not a necessary ingredient of the offense. It is immaterial that section 273 of the Penal Law also provides in the disjunctive that a deceit practiced upon a party is not only a misdemeanor but that the party injured may recover treble damages.

Settle order on notice.

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Bounkhoun v. Barnes
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 11 Abril 2017
    ... ... Courts have to use caution when relying solely on dictionary definitions of terms that ordinary people in everyday life would understand in a different way. "Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on dictionary ... The Wiggin court also cited People v ... Connolly , 164 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (App. Div. 1957), which addressed Section 487's immediate predecessor. The Appellate Division there reversed a trial court ... ...
  • Singer v. Whitman & Ransom
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 17 Agosto 1981
    ... ... is not required; it is sufficient if the deception relates to a prior judicial proceeding or one which may be commenced in the future (see People v. Connolly, 3 A.D.2d 943, 164 N.Y.S.2d 66; Fields v. Turner, 1 Misc.2d 679, 147 N.Y.S.2d 542). Neither circumstance exists in this ... ...
  • Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 1
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 3 Enero 2002
    ... ... For example, the penalty for attorney misconduct found in Judiciary Law § 487 is derived from former Penal Law § 273 (see, People v Connolly, 3 A.D.2d 943; Fields v Turner, 1 Misc.2d 679). Likewise, the statutory provision for treble damages as a penalty for forcible entry and ... ...
  • Bounkhoun v. Barnes
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 17 Abril 2018
    ... ... In the second authority Wiggins relied on, People v ... Connolly , 3 A.D.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1957), the Second Department concludedalbeit, in a summary orderthat "[i]t is immaterial that section [487] of ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT