People v. Converse
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 360791 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLINT JAMES CONVERSE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Jackson Circuit Court LC No. 20-002636-FH
Before: Patel, P.J., and Borrello and Shapiro, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench-trial convictions of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and reckless driving, MCL 257.626. Defendant was sentenced to 36 to 180 months' imprisonment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and 93 days in jail for reckless driving, with 93 days' credit for time served. Defendant waived his right to counsel after he was bound over to the trial court. On appeal, defendant argues that his trial was constitutionally deficient because during his waiver of counsel, the trial court did not follow the requisite procedure to ensure defendant knowingly intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The prosecution agrees that the trial court erred, but contends that defendant is not entitled to relief because the error did not ultimately affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate and remand for a new trial.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and reckless driving, MCL 257.626. After finding probable cause, the district court bound defendant over to the trial court on both charges. At a pretrial hearing on February 5, 2021, defendant's then attorney announced that defendant wanted to represent himself and asked the trial court to allow the change in representation. The trial court asked defendant if that was accurate and defendant responded in the affirmative. The trial court stated it had some procedural things it needed to cover with defendant to ensure he "really" intended to represent himself, then discharged defendant's attorney. We cannot glean from the record on appeal any additional discussions the trial court had with defendant regarding self-representation other than a pretrial hearing on March 5, 2021, during which the trial court asked defendant if it was still his intention to represent himself and defendant answered in the affirmative.[1]
At trial, defendant represented himself, but his standby counsel assisted at various points, including performing the direct examination of defendant. Defendant, the victim, and a police detective testified about the incident. On June 6, 2020, the victim was part of a protest which began dying down about the time defendant encountered the group. Defendant was on his way back to work after lunch when he noticed the protestors on the road where he was headed. Defendant slowed down and gingerly approached the group, attempting to proceed on his predetermined route. Protestors approached defendant's car and one tried to signal defendant to turn right. Defendant could not see what was down the street to the right of him because roughly 40 protestors were standing in his line of vision. Feeling apprehensive about turning right, defendant took a quick left after one of the protestors allegedly slammed his hands on the roof of defendant's car. Protestors ran after defendant's vehicle as he drove away. Once defendant made it to the end of the city block, he decided to perform a U-turn and come back toward the protestors. Defendant testified that he was planning on performing an "aggressive" U-turn near the protestors and then leaving. However, defendant came speeding up the street and when he neared the intersection, he veered into the oncoming traffic lane and skidded 3 to 4 feet before hitting the victim. He then backed up and drove away. The victim and other protestors chased after defendant. Shortly thereafter, defendant was stopped by a police officer and arrested.
Defendant maintains that he never intended to hit the victim and that the victim was running at defendant's car when the collision occurred. The victim claims he was trying to run away from the oncoming vehicle when he was struck. Concluding that defendant purposely hit the victim, the trial court found defendant guilty of both reckless driving and assault with intent to cause great bodily harm. This appeal ensued.
At the outset, we note that the parties concur, and rightfully so, that the trial court erred by failing to adhere to the basic requirements succinctly set forth by our appellate courts when adjudicating whether defendants should be afforded the right to self-representation. In order to avoid future errors of this nature, we set forth the legal bases for the procedural requirements to be employed by a trial court when deciding whether to grant a motion for self-representation.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States implicitly guarantees a criminal defendant's right to self-representation. See Faretta v California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820; 95 S.Ct. 2525; 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). As such, a defendant can waive his or her right to counsel. Montejo v Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786; 129 S.Ct. 2079; 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). The Michigan Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to self-representation, see Const 1963, art 1, § 13, and the Legislature also provided for the right by statute, see MCL 763.1. See People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 643; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich.App. 579, 587; 831 N.W.2d 243 (2013). Under the Michigan Constitution, the right extends to appellate and trial proceedings. People v Cross, 30 Mich.App. 326, 333; 186 N.W.2d 398 (1971), aff'd 386 Mich. 237; 191 N.W.2d 321 (1971).
It has been said that the right to represent oneself and the right to have counsel appointed are two faces of the same coin; the waiver of one right constitutes the assertion of the other. See People v Dennany, 445 Mich. 412, 444; 519 N.W.2d 128 (1994) (opinion by Griffin, J.). Accordingly, a defendant cannot logically waive or assert both rights. Id.
The right to self-representation is not absolute. Indiana v Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171; 128 S.Ct. 2379; 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Courts have established strict criteria that must be met before a criminal defendant will be allowed to waive his or her right to counsel. Before a trial court can permit a defendant to represent himself or herself, it must satisfy all the requirements stated in People v Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 367-368; 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976), and those required under MCR 6.005(D). See People v Russell, 471 Mich. 182, 190-191; 684 N.W.2d 745 (2004). Moreover, when examining these factors, courts should make every reasonable presumption against waiver. Id. at 188.
First, the defendant must ask to represent himself, and the trial court must find that the request and waiver was unequivocal. People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 642; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004); People v Odom, 276 Mich.App. 407, 419; 740 N.W.2d 557 (2007). This requirement prevents frivolous appeals by defendants who were represented by counsel. People v Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 367; 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976). However, a defendant is not required personally to make the request; and was the case here, the defendant may do so through their attorney. See People v Hill, 485 Mich. 912; 773 N.W.2d 257 (2009).
Second, the trial court must find that the defendant's assertion of the right was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 642; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich.App. 579, 587; 831 N.W.2d 243 (2013). The existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. People v Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 370; 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976). The relevant circumstances include the defendant's education or sophistication, the complexity of the charge, and the stage of the proceedings. See Iowa v Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88; 124 S.Ct. 1379; 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). Although a defendant's general competence is relevant to the determination whether he or she is knowingly and intelligently asserting the right to self-representation, see People v Lane, 453 Mich. 132, 138 n 8; 551 N.W.2d 382 (1996), a defendant's legal competence is not, see People v Dennany, 445 Mich. 412, 432; 519 N.W.2d 128 (1994).
The court must also make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Iowa v Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88-89; 124 S.Ct. 1379; 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004); People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 642; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004). An explanation of the risks of self-representation requires more than informing the defendant that he waives counsel at his own peril. See People v Blunt, 189 Mich.App. 643, 649-650; 473 N.W.2d 792 (1991). The court should explain the special skills and training necessary to effective representation. See People v Kimber, 133 Mich.App. 184, 189; 348 N.W.2d 60 (1984). However, a defendant who knowingly exercises his right to defend himself need not be repeatedly pressured into relinquishing the right to self-representation. See People v Morton, 175 Mich.App. 1, 7; 437 N.W.2d 284 (1989), lv den 434 Mich. 881, cert den 498 U.S. 836 (1990). A defendant can be competent to stand trial with the representation of counsel and yet lack the capacity to represent himself or herself. Indiana v Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-176; 128 S.Ct. 2379; 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008).
Third the trial court must determine that the defendant's self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, or burden the trial court's proceedings. People v Williams, 470 Mich. 634, 642; 683 N.W.2d 597 (2004); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich.App. 579, 587; 831 N.W.2d 243, lv den 494 Mich. 870 (2013). That trial has already begun does not preclude...
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