People v. Russell
| Decision Date | 27 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 122998. Calendar No. 1. |
| Citation | 471 Mich. 182,684 N.W.2d 745 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lord Shawn RUSSELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, William A. Forsyth, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Gary A. Moore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Grand Rapids, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Jacqueline J. McCann), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider whether a defendant may, by conduct alone, "unequivocally" waive his Sixth Amendment Right to counsel and elect to proceed pro se. We need not reach that question in this case because a review of the record reveals that defendant clearly and unequivocally declined self-representation. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of both cocaine and heroin.1 At the beginning of trial, defendant informed the trial court that he wanted his trial counsel, Damian Nunzio, removed and new trial counsel appointed.2
The trial court did not grant defendant's request, but noted that he "would entertain" the request if defendant presented "some valid reason" to appoint substitute counsel other than "personality difficulties." Defendant offered no such explanation. After refusing to grant defendant's request, the trial court offered defendant the following four options:
After defendant continued to indicate that he did not "feel comfortable" with his appointed attorney's representation, the trial court reminded defendant of his other available options-defendant could retain counsel or he could represent himself:
At a later point in the proceedings, the following exchange occurred:
Although the trial court then gave defendant several more opportunities to select among the four proffered options, defendant continued to reject all of them. The trial court then empaneled the jury and asked defendant if he had any questions for the panel. Defendant stated:
After a four-day trial, defendant was convicted of both charges and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 2 1/2 to 40 years for each conviction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions in a published opinion. The panel concluded that defendant implicitly "made his unequivocal choice" to proceed in propria persona "by his own conduct" when he continued to reject appointed counsel's representation.4
We review for clear error the trial court's factual findings surrounding a defendant's waiver. However, to the extent that a ruling involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.5
The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused in a criminal prosecution "shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." US Const, Am VI.6 This requirement was made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The right to counsel is considered fundamental because it is essential to a fair trial and attaches at the trial stage, which is clearly a critical stage of the proceedings.8 While a defendant may choose to forgo the assistance of counsel at trial, any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.9 In addition, it is a long-held principle that courts are to make every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right,10 including the waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel.11
In Faretta v. California,12 the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant "has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so."13 While the Faretta majority noted that the framers of the Constitution never imagined that the right of self-representation "might be considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel,"14 the United States Supreme Court has also noted that the "right to self-representation is not absolute."15 Indeed, because a defendant automatically enjoys the right to the assistance of counsel,16 and the right of self-representation and the right to counsel are mutually exclusive, a defendant must elect to conduct his own defense "`voluntarily and intelligently,' "17 and must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "in order to"18 proceed pro se.19 Therefore, while the right of self-representation is a fundamental constitutional right, other interests, such as the failure to effectively waive the right to counsel or a governmental interest in "ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial" may in some instances outweigh the defendant's constitutional right to act as his own counsel.20 In sum, although the right to counsel and the right of self-representation are both fundamental constitutional rights, representation by counsel, as guarantor of a fair trial, "is the standard, not the exception,"21 in the absence of a proper waiver.
In People v. Anderson,22 this Court applied the Faretta standard for self-representation and established requirements regarding the judicial inquest necessary to effectuate a valid waiver and permit a defendant to represent himself. Upon a defendant's initial request to proceed pro se, a court must determine that (1) the defendant's request is unequivocal, (2) the defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily through a colloquy advising the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and (3) the defendant's self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court and the administration of the court's business.
In addition, a trial court must satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.005(D), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
In Adkins, this Court clarified the scope of judicial inquiry required by Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) when confronted with an initial request for self-representation. Adkins rejected a "litany approach" in favor of a "substantial compliance" standard:
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