People v. Cook
| Decision Date | 23 October 1975 |
| Citation | 338 N.E.2d 619,37 N.Y.2d 591,376 N.Y.S.2d 110 |
| Parties | , 338 N.E.2d 619 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David COOK, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Lynn Fahey and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.
Nicholas Ferraro, Dist. Atty. (Jon Michael Bevilacqua, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent.
After a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle. On this appeal we are asked to consider the propriety of disclosing defendant's prior youthful offender adjudication during cross-examination.
The People's case rested principally on the testimony of Patrolman Newton who testified that on the night of April 12, 1972 he and his partner discovered a stolen vehicle on a street in Queens County. As they were observing the car they noticed two youths entering it. When the police pulled up alongside the stolen car, both occupants alighted and ran in different directions. After a chase through several backyards and streets, defendant Cook was apprehended.
During the trial the defendant Cook took the stand and denied any knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. The cross-examination focused on defendant's past involvement with the law and he was asked whether he recalled being in Juvenile Term in 1970. Defense counsel objected and the court instructed the prosecutor to change the form of the question. In response to further questions, defendant acknowledged that he was found in possession of a stolen car in July of 1970 but denied that he was involved with a stolen vehicle in April, 1971. At this point the inquiry as to the latter incident was taken over by the court who asked defendant if, apart from the 1970 incident, he was 'ever charged again with the theft of a car?' Defendant's attorney objected to the use of the word charged. The court then rephrased the question asking defendant if he had ever been 'processed again for (a) stolen car in this building by another judge?' In light of the fact that defendant had never been convicted of stealing a car, and had only been adjudicated a youthful offender for resisting arrest which he had already admitted, defendant moved for a mistrial claiming undue prejudice. The court denied the motion and cross-examination was allowed to continue.
Defendant was then asked if he remembered being arrested in July, 1971 and pleading guilty to resisting arrest. Defendant answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor then attempted to develop the facts surrounding this occurrence. After the summations the court attempted to give a corrective charge concerning defendant's prior youthful offender adjudication: Defense counsel excepted. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of both counts.
On appeal to our court, defendant contends that the cross-examination was improper in several respects. He claims that the disclosure of the previous youthful offender adjudication and subsequent corrective charge by the court contravened CPL article 720. Furthermore, defendant contends that it was error to have elicited the fact that defendant had been 'charged' or 'processed' for car theft since these charges did not result in conviction. Lastly defendant argues that the People improperly attempted to establish a propensity for car theft. The People answer that any errors in cross-examination must be considered harmless in light of the clear evidence of guilt. We cannot agree that the errors were harmless and would reverse.
The youthful offender statute (CPL art. 720, formerly Code Crim.Pro., §§ 913--n, 913--o) abrogates the common law which treated infant offenders in the same manner as adults (43 C.J.S. Infants § 93 Et seq.). Subject to certain exceptions, persons accused of crimes who are between 16 and 19 years of age at the time the alleged crimes were committed are eligible for youthful offender treatment (CPL 720.20). The primary advantage of such treatment is the avoidance of the stigma and practical consequences which accompany a criminal conviction (People v. Shannon, 1 A.D.2d 226, 231, 149 N.Y.S.2d 550, 556, affd. 2 N.Y.2d 792, 158 N.Y.S.2d 334, 139 N.E.2d 430; Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL art. 720). When the court determines an eligible youth is a youthful offender the conviction is deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful offender adjudication (CPL 720.20, subd. 3).
Since a youthful offender adjudication is not a conviction...
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