People v. Coons

Decision Date27 September 2021
Docket Number19SC485
PartiesThe People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Dylan Thomas Coons, Respondent
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Britta Kruse, Lead Deputy Public Defender Denver Colorado

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE GABRIEL concurs in the judgment, and JUSTICE HOOD and JUSTICE HART join in the concurrence in the judgment.

OPINION

SAMOUR, JUSTICE

¶1 Before expert testimony is admitted into evidence, a trial court must find that it is both reliable and relevant. Only the relevance requirement is before us today. To determine whether expert testimony is relevant, a trial court must consider the testimony's helpfulness to the jury, which hinges on whether the testimony "fits" the facts of the particular case. But just how close a fit is required? The questions we agreed to review in this case and the lead companion case of People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, __P.3d__, call upon us to explore the fit requirement in the context of generalized expert testimony (i.e., testimony aimed at educating the jury about general concepts or principles without attempting to discuss the particular facts of the case).[1]

¶2 We now hold that generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar. In evaluating the fit of generalized expert testimony, a trial court must be mindful of the purposes for which such testimony is offered-that is, the reasons why the proponent of the evidence has asked the expert to educate the jury about certain concepts or principles.

¶3 The trial court in this case admitted the generalized expert testimony offered by the People on the dynamics of domestic violence, ruling that it would be helpful to the jury and impliedly finding that it passed muster under CRE 403. A jury then returned guilty verdicts against the defendant, Dylan Thomas Coons, for sexual assault, extortion (involving an unlawful act), extortion (involving a third party), and assault in the third degree. But a division of the court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that some of the People's generalized expert testimony did not fit the case. More specifically, the division ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about some aspects of the Power and Control Wheel (a tool adopted by social scientists to explain the common dynamics of domestic violence), including "certain of the examples of abusive acts that abusers may commit." People v. Coons, No. 15CA1922, ¶ 45 (May 23, 2019). According to the division, since this testimony had no logical relation to the facts of the case, it should have been excluded and the trial court's failure to do so was reversible error.

¶4 As we explain in Cooper, however, while generalized expert testimony must fit the case, the fit need not be perfect. Cooper, ¶¶ 5, 53. In other words, each aspect of such testimony need not match a factual issue. Id. Since generalized expert testimony, by definition, seeks to inform the jury about generic concepts or principles without knowledge of the facts, it is almost inevitable that parts of such testimony will not be logically connected to the case. Id. For that reason, the fit inquiry must be flexible. Id. A trial court should certainly not be expected to parse the proposed testimony and determine whether each statement the expert intends to utter is logically connected to a fact in the case. Id. If the generalized expert testimony's logical connection to the factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to the jury without running afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the case. Id.

¶5 Still, attorneys and trial courts should do their best to avoid introducing generalized expert testimony that has no logical connection to the facts of the case. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 54. As relevant here, prosecutors should take care to endorse generalized expert testimony about domestic violence only in appropriate cases; and, when they do so, they should endeavor to present only testimony that is logically connected to the factual issues. Id. Trial courts, in turn, should exercise their discretion in deciding whether to permit all, some, or none of the proffered testimony under the fit standard we articulate today. Id. In doing so, trial courts should consider the feasibility and propriety of admitting only a portion of the proposed generalized expert testimony on a particular subject. Id.

¶6 As in Cooper, we recognize in this case that some aspects of the expert's testimony about the Power and Control Wheel had no logical connection to the factual issues. See id. at ¶ 84. But, consistent with Cooper, we rule that it would have been infeasible and improper to require the expert to present an incomplete (and arguably inaccurate and misleading) version of the Power and Control Wheel. See id. at ¶¶ 86-87.

¶ 7 Because the court of appeals employed a fit standard that's inflexible and overly exacting, and because the trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence was entitled to deference, the division erred. See id. at ¶ 4. Applying the correct fit standard and affording the trial court's decision its due deference, we conclude that the admission of the generalized expert testimony in question did not constitute an abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts

¶8 The victim, K.J., met Coons when they were in high school; she was a freshman, and he was a senior. The day after K.J. turned fifteen, they began a sexual relationship. She initially performed oral sex on Coons, but a few months later, he started caning her during their sexual encounters. Coons subsequently used a shock collar on K.J. She didn't like the shock collar, but Coons told her that if she liked him, she would agree to it. Coons also tied up K.J. and suspended her from ropes.

¶9 According to K.J., she was very shy and thought of herself as a "loser." She explained that nobody had ever been interested in her before and that it was "nice having someone older interested in [her] who was good looking [and] nice."

¶10 Coons eventually shared with K.J. that his girlfriend, Leanna Rutledge, knew about their sexual relationship. At Coons's suggestion, Rutledge became involved in the relationship during K.J.'s junior year. In the trio's first sexual session, K.J. performed oral sex on Coons while Rutledge caned her. On other occasions, K.J. performed sexual acts on Rutledge.

¶11 During K.J.'s senior year, she began having vaginal and anal sex with Coons. Coons and Rutledge got engaged around this time.

¶12 While K.J. was in high school, she never told anyone about her sexual relationship with Coons and Rutledge, and the relationship was never public knowledge. K.J. was afraid that her family and friends would be disappointed in her and would stop speaking with her if they found out about the sexual relationship.

¶13 In the summer after K.J.'s high school graduation, Coons and Rutledge sought to take sexually explicit photographs of her. K.J. was hesitant, fearing that the pictures could become public. But she ultimately allowed Rutledge to photograph her.

¶14 As K.J. prepared to go away to college, she told Coons and Rutledge that she wanted a break from them. Coons and Rutledge didn't take the news well and began threatening to send the sexually explicit photographs to K.J.'s family and friends and to post them on Facebook. These threats continued after K.J. started attending college in the fall of 2013. One day, Coons and Rutledge unexpectedly showed up on campus. K.J. told them she had to study, and that rejection, combined with her failure to visit them after starting college, upset them.

¶15 K.J. participated in the Reserve Officer Training Corps ("ROTC") in her first college semester. Upon learning about K.J.'s involvement in ROTC, Coons threatened to release the photographs to her ROTC captain and the school's administration. K.J. eventually quit ROTC because she was worried about the disclosure of the photographs. She was convinced that if the pictures became public, she would be kicked out of school. K.J. was also afraid that dissemination of the pictures would cause her family to stop supporting her financially and would adversely affect her employment prospects.

¶16 The threats from Coons to publish the photographs persisted into the spring of 2014 (K.J.'s second college semester). K.J. told Coons that she didn't like his threats. But Coons told her that she was "not giving [him] a choice" and that she knew "how to fix things" between them. He asked her, "[W]hy keep fighting it?" ¶17 Coons often used the term "blackmail" when referring to his threats to disclose the photographs. For example, he blamed K.J. for not "fix[ing] things earlier" and said that she "would have gotten [her] pictures" and "the blackmail would have stopped" already had she done what he wanted. And, on at least one occasion, he apologized for "blackmailing" her.

¶18 At some point during K.J.'s second semester, Coons told her that he had deleted the photos. K.J. responded that it was the right thing to do because the "blackmail was awful." Coons said that he was "truly sorry" and asked for her forgiveness, and she, in turn, forgave him but told him that things needed to be different going forward. K.J. mentioned that if she found someone with...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT