People v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 27 June 1950
• Docket Number: No. 67,A,67
• Citation: 328 Mich. 159,43 N.W.2d 310
• Parties: PEOPLE v. COOPER. pril Term 1949.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 310

43 N.W.2d 310

328 Mich. 159

PEOPLE v. COOPER.

No. 67, April Term 1949.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 27, 1950.

Chris M. Youngjohn, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Stephen J. Roth, Attorney General, Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, Lansing, Daniel J. O'Hara, Assistant Attorney General, Richard B. Foster, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench except DETHMERS, BUTZEL and CARR, JJ.

BOYLES, Chief Justice.

This appellant is one of the defendants charged with conspiracy to corrupt the legislature and its members, whose conviction was affirmed by this Court. People v. Cooper, 326 Mich. 514, 40 N.W.2d 708. We granted rehearing and oral argument, and in the brief filed on the rehearing Cooper raises certain questions which he claims are additional grounds for reversal. They will be referred to.

After conviction and sentence Cooper filed a motion for a new trial, setting up various grounds therefor, one of which was that the verdict of the jury was 'contrary to the great weight of the evidence.' This was the No. 1 question originally raised by this appellant on the appeal here, and the proofs as they applied to Cooper were discussed in the Court's former opinion in the case. Cooper now seeks reversal on the ground that the trial court, in effect, refused to pass upon that question, and relies on the reference made by the trial court to People v. Howard, 50 Mich. 239, 15 N.W. 101, and other cases. Those decisions, together with other more recent ones which might be cited, indicate the difference in the phraseology used by members of the Court at various times, in passing on the question whether verdicts are against the great weight of the evidence. In the instant case the ultimate fact remains that the trial court, in denying Cooper's motion for a new trial, decided that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. With that, we concur. A correct result may be reached and affirmed, although based on a wrong reason; and the granting of a new trial rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Moshier, 306 Mich. 714, 11 N.W.2d 300; People v. Lowenstein, 309 Mich. 94, 14 N.W.2d 794. Furthermore, in accordance with the correct rule, we consider that the proofs were sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury as to the guilt of this defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant renews the claim that the court erred in allowing any testimony to be received which referred to Senate Bill 41, and claims that we considered the case as if Cooper had been accused of having conspired to bribe with reference to said Senate Bill 41. Such was not our intention, nor does a fair reading of the opinion sustain the claim.

It was repeatedly made apparent to the jury during the trial, and by the charge to the jury, that Cooper could not be convicted of conspiracy based on Senate Bill 41. At the outset of the trial, it was withdrawn from the charge in the information. Early, in the trial, the special prosecutor stated before the jury that Senate Bill 41 was introduced solely to show certain procedures, for no other purpose, and not claimed that any payment was made on any bills other than Senate Bills 85 and 166. The court ruled early in the trial, and subsequently repeated: 'The jury understands that Senate Bill 41 is only for the purpose of explaining or showing the motive or intent in regard to this legislative session as it was, and the acquaintance of these finance company defendants with Mr. Hemans.'

Finally, the court charged the jury: 'I further charge you that during the trial certain evidence was allowed pertaining to Senate Bill 41 and various other bills introduced in the legislature that the people claim affected the finance companies. These bills were only admitted by way of explanation as to the conduct of the finance defendants, and to show probable motive and intent, and not to show that they were guilty of a conspiracy as...