People v. Copeland, 96CA1992

• Decision Date: 06 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96CA1992,96CA1992
• Citation: 1998 WL 455587,976 P.2d 334
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 4233 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven S. COPELAND, Defendant-Appellant. . IV
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 334

976 P.2d 334

98 CJ C.A.R. 4233

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven S. COPELAND, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96CA1992.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

Aug. 6, 1998.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Oct. 22, 1998.

Certiorari Granted

April 19, 1999.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Eric V. Field, Special Assistant Attorney General, Golden, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, Steven S. Copeland, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of second degree arson and fourth degree arson, and upon the trial court's determination that he was an habitual criminal. We affirm.

Defendant had previously been a house guest of the victim. After a disagreement, she forced him to leave her house, and he angrily departed. According to the victim, defendant threatened to "make her sorry" for forcing him to leave.

Later, a person fitting defendant's description set fire to one of the victim's cars. On the morning after the arson, the victim discovered that the tires on another vehicle she owned had been punctured. When defendant was arrested, a pocket knife was seized that was later confirmed to be the instrument used to puncture the victim's tires.

Immediately before trial, the prosecution sought to amend the information to include a charge relating to the tire puncturing incident. The trial court denied the motion; however, it later admitted evidence concerning the incident.

I.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the tire puncturing incident as an uncharged criminal act, and by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of such evidence. We disagree.

Under CRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

To have extrinsic act evidence admitted under CRE 404(b), the prosecution must demonstrate that: (1) the evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the intermediate inference that the defendant has a bad character; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1990).

The Colorado Rules of Evidence strongly favor the admission of material evidence, People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100 (Colo.1990), and a trial court has substantial discretion in deciding questions concerning admissibility. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366 (Colo.1994).

Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be affirmed. People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983). An abuse of discretion does not occur unless a trial court's ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Delgado, 890 P.2d 141 (Colo.App.1994).

Here, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the tire puncturing incident as reflecting defendant's grudge against the victim as his motive for the arson. The prosecution also argued that this evidence was admissible as res gestae because it was part and parcel of the arson crimes. In addition, the prosecution contended that it was relevant to prove defendant's presence in the area, his identity as the arsonist, and his plan, scheme, and design to take revenge on the victim.

Although the trial court did not explicitly acknowledge the theory on which the evidence was admitted, the court employed language appropriate to a CRE 404(b) analysis, finding that the evidence was logically relevant to show motive, opportunity, plan, and identity.

Defendant argues the evidence was not relevant to establish motive, opportunity, plan, or identity. Regarding motive, defendant notes that the prosecution's theory was that he committed the arson as an act of revenge. Defendant argues that, under this theory, the tire incident did not have any relationship to the arson and thus was not probative of motive.

Although evidence of the tire incident is more directly probative of vengeful intent than motive, the evidence is nevertheless relevant as to motive in burning the car. Evidence that defendant also punctured the victim's tires renders more probable the prosecution's theory that defendant had a motive of revenge when he set fire to the victim's car. See People v. Carlson, 712 P.2d 1018 (Colo.1986) (evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). And, this inference is independent of any inference based on the character of defendant.

Having admitted the evidence, the trial court implicitly found that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We agree with that determination.

Because the trial court's ruling concerning admissibility to prove motive is not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, it did not abuse its discretion; hence, we need not determine whether the evidence was admissible for any other reason.

B.

We reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred by failing to give a cautionary instruction to limit the purpose for which the jury could consider the evidence.

While it is the better practice to issue a limiting instruction to the jury contemporaneously with the introduction of such evidence, when, as here, such an instruction is not requested, the failure to give one is not reversible error. See People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 570 P.2d 231 (1977).

C.

Defendant also asserts that admission of the evidence was improper because it was not disclosed until the day of trial. We disagree.

Crim. P. 16 governs the prosecution's obligation to make disclosures to defendant. Crim P. 16 III(g) authorizes the trial court to order a party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, to prohibit a party from introducing into evidence materials not disclosed, or to enter such other orders as it deems just under the circumstances.

The choice of an appropriate sanction for a violation of a discovery rule lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49 (Colo.App.1987).

Here, sometime before trial, defendant received a copy of the forensics report from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) linking him to the tire puncturing incident.

Moreover, in response to defendant's claims at trial of inadequate disclosure, the court allowed defendant to interview the CBI witness before he testified, and ordered that defendant be provided any further written materials in the possession of the prosecution regarding the puncture marks in the tires.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in formulating a remedy for any possible discovery violation.

II.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the mens rea of knowledge or recklessness did not apply to every element of the offense of fourth degree arson specified in § 18-4-105, C.R.S.1997. We disagree.

The jury instruction on the elements of fourth degree arson included, as pertinent here, that defendant:

3. knowingly or recklessly, started or maintained a fire,

4. on his own property or that of another, and

5. by doing so placed another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court asking whether the "knowingly or recklessly" mental state applied only to element number three, or whether it also applied to element number five. Over defendant's objection, the court responded that it applied only to element three.

Section 18-1-503(4), C.R.S.1997, provides:

When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

Defendant argues that this statute controls the instant case. However, since § 18-1-503(4) was enacted in its current form, the supreme court has stated the following with respect to fourth degree arson:

The fourth degree arson statute penalizes those who start or maintain a fire or cause an explosion which subsequently endangers another person or a building or occupied structure. The mental state required for fourth degree arson is that [the] fire or explosion be started or maintained knowingly or recklessly. The prosecution need not prove intent to endanger the person or building.

People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Colo.1983); see also People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975) (holding that, under a predecessor statute, an actor is guilty of arson if he or she purposefully starts a fire, although he or she may not have intended or foreseen the consequences).

We consider the Owens ruling dispositive here. Hence, the trial court did not err in its response to the jury's inquiry.

III.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to continue the habitual criminal portion of the trial to allow his counsel time to investigate whether there were grounds to attack the validity of his prior convictions. We are not persuaded.

A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. People v. Bakari, 780 P.2d 1089 (Colo.1989).

There are no mechanical tests for determining whether the denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion; rather, it depends on the circumstances present in each case. People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344...