People v. Coria

Decision Date28 October 1999
Docket NumberNo. S074251.,S074251.
Citation89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650,21 Cal.4th 868,985 P.2d 970
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Juan Josuel CORIA, Defendant and Appellant.

David E. Roberts, Fresno, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Stan Cross and Catherine G. Tennant, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, we consider whether the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine requires that the defendant know the character of the substance being manufactured. (See Health & Saf.Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a.)) As will appear, we conclude that although defendant may be convicted of the crime without proof that he intended to violate the law, his knowledge of the character of the substance being manufactured is a prerequisite to a conviction under that provision. In short, the Legislature did not intend to create a strict liability offense of manufacturing methamphetamine.

We granted review to settle a conflict between the Court of Appeal opinion in this case and the earlier appellate decision in People v. Telfer (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1194, 284 Cal.Rptr. 913. After reviewing the applicable statutes and case law, we conclude that the Court of Appeal opinion here, which was authored by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Arthur G. Scotland and concurred in by Presiding Justice Robert K. Puglia (now retired) and Associate Justice Coleman A. Blease, correctly holds that Health and Safety Code section 11379.6, subdivision (a), requires proof that the defendant knew the character of the substance being manufactured. We adopt that opinion as the opinion of this court. (See, e.g., Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 116, 892 P.2d 150.) With appropriate deletions and additions,1 that opinion reads as follows:

Defendant Juan Josuel Coria was arrested after he left a clandestine laboratory which was set up for the extraction of pseudoephedrine from cold tablets, a step in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant admitted he received $500 for helping others "wash ephedrine pills," but claimed he agreed to do so without knowing this was an illegal act. According to defendant, he initially thought he was helping to salvage "discarded or dirty" pills so they could be resold. When, during the course of the "washing," he learned from the others that it was being done to make methamphetamine, defendant became scared and left.

A jury found him not guilty of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine (Pen.Code, § 182) and not guilty of possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11383, subd. (c)), but convicted him of manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a); further section references are to the Health and Safety Code unless specified otherwise).

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, to be guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of section 11379.6, subdivision (a), it was not necessary for defendant to have been aware it was methamphetamine that was being manufactured via the extraction process.

This instruction was derived from People v. Telfer [[, supra,]] 233 Cal.App.3d 1194 , which held that manufacturing of methamphetamine is a strict liability offense, i.e., knowledge of the physical character of the substance being manufactured is not an element of the offense and, "[s]o long as the product of the defendant's activity was methamphetamine ..., the defendant is guilty, even if he did not know that methamphetamine would be that product." (Id., at p. 1204 (284 Cal.Rptr. 913).)

For reasons that follow, we disagree with the reasoning of People v. Telfer, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1194 (284 Cal.Rptr. 913), which analogized section 11379.6 to strict liability "public welfare" statutes that generally are regulatory in nature, impose light penalties, have little "damage to reputation," and thus have no mens rea requirement. As we shall explain, the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine—a felony punishable by incarceration in state prison—must be interpreted to include as an element of the offense the accused's knowledge of the character of the substance being manufactured. Hence, the trial court's instruction to the contrary was erroneous. As the error was prejudicial, we shall reverse the judgment.

FACTS

While Officer Lawrence Vila was on surveillance of a residence believed to be a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, he saw defendant and defendant's brother, Jose Coria, emerge from the garage with a bucket. After defendant rinsed out the bucket, the two men reentered the residence. Two hours later, Vila saw defendant outside the house talking with Coria, Ricardo Flores, and Efrain Palacios. When the conversation ended, Palacios left and the other three men entered the building. Approximately 25 minutes later, Palacios returned, picked up defendant and Coria, and drove away.

A lawful search of what was characterized as a "shed" or a "large shop building at the rear of the residence" revealed the following: cans containing ethyl or denatured alcohol; 44-gallon garbage receptacles containing a cloudy liquid and pseudoephedrine; a large metal cooking pot containing a cloudy liquid; propane burners; propane tanks; and 80 pounds of pseudoephedrine. Numerous latent impressions of defendant's fingerprints were found on various items, including the metal cooking pot.

Experts opined that the building housed a laboratory used for the extraction of pseudoephedrine from cold tablets, a step in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. In this step, the cold tablets are mashed, then washed with water or alcohol. The mixture is heated so the water or alcohol will evaporate, leaving pseudoephedrine behind. Hydriotic acid or red phosphorous is then used to convert the pseudoephedrine into methamphetamine.

Evidence indicated that only the extraction of pseudoephedrine was occurring in the building. A criminalist with training and experience in investigating over 200 methamphetamine laboratories testified that, although pseudoephedrine is not a controlled substance, a person who is involved in the extraction of pseudoephedrine from tablets is engaged in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine.

Defendant testified as follows: He agreed to help his brother "wash ephedrine pills" in return for $500. Defendant had seen ephedrine advertised in body building magazines as a "fat loss, muscle sparing agent" used in diets, and assumed they would be washing "discarded or dirty" pills to salvage and resell them. Although he had heard of methamphetamine, he agreed to wash the pills not knowing that methamphetamine was manufactured from pseudoephedrine or ephedrine. He was surprised to find out they were "breaking down pills" to extract the ephedrine. After he had worked at the residence for several hours under the direction of his brother and Flores, defendant asked why they were engaged in "this big production thing just to separate ephedrine from a pill" and why the pill could not be used "exactly like it was...." He was then told they were extracting ephedrine to make methamphetamine. He became scared and said he wanted to go home. Flores agreed to obtain transportation for defendant, telling him he did not have to do any more work. When the transportation arrived, defendant and his brother left. Soon thereafter, law enforcement officers stopped the car and arrested them. Had he known they were going to be involved in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, he would not have agreed to help wash the pills and would have tried to prevent his brother from doing so.

Defendant's wife testified defendant did not use illicit drugs and had never talked about methamphetamine. A master sergeant who had served with defendant in the Marine Corps testified defendant was an honest and conscientious worker who avoided drinking and was somewhat naive about worldly matters.

DISCUSSION

Section 11379.6, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided by law, every person who manufactures, compounds, converts, produces, derives, processes, or prepares, either directly or indirectly by chemical extraction or independently by means of chemical synthesis, any controlled substance specified in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison...." (Stats.1989, ch. 1024, § 1, p. 3546.) The conduct proscribed by this section encompasses the initial and intermediate steps carried out to process a controlled substance. (People v. Lancellotti (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 .) In other words, the statute makes it unlawful to engage in the chemical synthesis of a substance as one part of the process of manufacturing a controlled substance.

The jury instruction which defines the crime of manufacturing a controlled substance, such as methamphetamine, is CALJIC No. 12.09.1.2

At the prosecution's request and over defense counsel's objection, the trial court modified CALJIC No. 12.09.1 to inform the jurors that "[a]wareness of the physical character of the substance being manufactured, i.e., that the product of the chemical synthesis is methamphetamine is not necessary." This modification was based on the holding of People v. Telfer, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 1194 (284 Cal.Rptr. 913) (hereafter Telfer).

Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving this portion of the instruction, thereby incorrectly converting section 11379.6 into a strict liability crime. He argues it would be anomalous to permit him to be convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine if he did not know methamphetamine was being manufactured, when, absent knowledge of the character of the...

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