People v. Correa
| Decision Date | 19 April 1996 |
| Citation | 643 N.Y.S.2d 310,168 Misc.2d 309 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Ruben CORREA, Defendant. |
| Court | New York City Court |
Agulnick, Gogel & Kliegerman, New York City (Barry Agulnick, of counsel), for defendant.
William L. Murphy, District Attorney of Richmond County (Timothy O'Donovan, of counsel), for plaintiff.
The defendant was arraigned in Kings County on April 13, 1996. He was charged with the misdemeanor crimes of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192(2), (3), and Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree, Penal Law § 145.00(3).
The prosecution alleged that the defendant operated his vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .13 of one per centum. The People contend that the defendant, while operating his vehicle in an intoxicated condition, struck a construction vehicle which was parked behind cones and red lights on the lower level of the Verrazzano Narrows Bridge.
In an alleged statement, the defendant, a New York City fireman, conceded that he had been drinking beers at his firehouse between 8:30 pm and 1:00 am when he left to drive home. The accident occurred at approximately 2:00 am.
At his arraignment in Brooklyn, the Judge suspended the defendant's license pending prosecution pursuant to V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(a). 1 The Judge adjourned the case for two business days for the defendant to make an application for a hardship privilege pursuant to V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e) in Richmond County Criminal Court.
At the hearing, the defendant averred that as a New York City firefighter, an emergency employee, he is required to be a licensed driver. It was acknowledged however that he does not drive any fire apparatus. The defense argued that the defendant needs to drive from Staten Island, his home, to his assigned firehouse on West 83rd Street in Manhattan. It was further contended that he requires his car to travel to firehouses to which he is temporarily assigned. As an example, the defendant had been reassigned to a fire station 30 blocks to the north in Manhattan on one occasion. In support of his contentions, the defendant submitted a letter from Captain Francis Ritchie of Engine Company 74. Captain Ritchie stated that a license "is a requirement of the job".
V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e) provides that if a suspension pending prosecution will result in extreme hardship, the court may grant, in its discretion, a hardship privilege. "Extreme hardship", as is applicable in this case, is explicitly defined as an "inability to obtain alternative means of travel to or from the licensee's employment". The burden to establish an extreme hardship is placed squarely on the defendant.
"Extreme hardship" does not encompass within its definition inconvenience to the defendant or any consideration of whether the defendant is required, as a condition of employment, to operate vehicles as a properly licensed driver. The clear definition of extreme hardship could have easily been enlarged to exclude persons who are employed in positions which may require an emergency response. To interpret the language of this statute to preclude its application to firefighters would engraft a class exception which was not provided for by the legislature.
If the legislature had chosen, the grounds for a hardship privilege could have been broadened to include the criteria employed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in granting conditional licenses to those qualified individuals who enroll in the Drunk Driving Program. V.T.L. § 1196(7). Those criteria include the issuance of a conditional license to accommodate a licensee whose employment requires the operation of a motor vehicle. A defendant whose license has been suspended pending prosecution for thirty (30) days apparently may apply for a conditional license pursuant to V.T.L. § 1196. V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(d). Thus, the commissioner may be empowered to grant a conditional license to meet the requirement that the defendant have a license as a condition of his employment.
The narrow applicability of the extreme hardship exception is arguably consistent with the legislative treatment of individuals who are confronted with requests for chemical tests after an arrest for a violation of V.T.L. § 1192. If an individual agrees to take the test and records a blood alcohol reading of less than .10 of one per centum, that person suffers no license consequences before the case is decided on its merits. ...
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...vehicle as part of or a condition of employment (see People v Mallet, 34 Misc.3d 1216 [A] at *2 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2011]; People v Correa, 168 Misc.2d 309, 311 Ct, Richmond County 1996]), and the statute expressly adds that "[a] hardship privilege shall not be valid for the operation of......
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...The burden of showing the need for extreme hardship privilege is “placed squarely on the defendant.” ( See People v. Correa 168 Misc.2d 309, 311, 643 N.Y.S.2d 310 [1996].) Recognizing that an extreme hardship has been established is “left to the discretion of the court.” ( See People v. Bri......
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People v. Mallet, 2011KN071146.
...(VTL 1193[2][e][7][e] ). The burden of showing the need for an extreme hardship privilege is placed on the defendant ( see People v. Correa, 168 Misc.2d 309, 311 [1996] ). Whether or not an extreme hardship has been established is left to the discretion of the court ( see People v. Bridgman......
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People v. Criollo
...degree or certification ( VTL § 1192 [2] [e] [7] [e] ). The burden of proving "extreme hardship" is placed on the defendant ( People v Correa , 168 Misc 2d 309, 311 [Crim Ct Richmond Co 1996] ). The defendant may present material and relevant evidence at the hardship hearing; however, "a fi......