People v. Cowles, Cr. 50

Decision Date18 June 1956
Docket NumberCr. 50
Citation142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 865,298 P.2d 732
CourtCalifornia Superior Court
Parties142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 865 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Paul W. COWLES, Defendant and Appellant. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Alameda County, California

Paul W. Cowles, in rpo. per.

J. F. Coakley, Dist. Atty., and Ralph E. Hoyt, Deputy Dist. Atty., Oakland, for respondent.

WAGLER, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals from his conviction of a violation of Section 123 of the Oakland Municipal Code, which reads as follows:

'It shall be unlawful for any person to park or leave standing any vehicle in any parking meter zone on any street, at any time during which the parking meter shows, indicates, registers or displays that the parking space is illegally in use, except during the time necessary to deposit United States coins in said parking meter so as to show, indicate, register, display or permit legal parking, and excepting also during the time from 6:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M., and excepting also on holidays as designated in Section 128 of this Code when indicated by appropriate signs located on the parking meter.'

Appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence. He contends, however, that the Municipal Court in which he was tried is a court of record; that as such, it does not take judicial notice of ordinances and his conviction must therefore be reversed, since no attempt was made on the part of the prosecution to prove either the contents or enactment of Section 123.

That the Municipal Court in question is a court of record, there can be no doubt. It was declared to be such by constitutional amendment enacted in 1924. See California Constitution, Article VI, § 12. That numerous cases categorically state that courts of record do not take judicial notice of ordinances, also cannot be doubted. See Grant v. California Bench Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 706, 173 P.2d 817; City of Tulare v. Hevren, 126 Cal. 226, 58 P.2d 530; Metter v. Smith, 156 Cal. 572, 105 P. 735; Tilton v. Russek, 171 Cal. 731, 154 P. 860; Marysville Woolen Mills v. Smith, 178 Cal. 786, 175 P. 13.

This statement when originally made was no doubt factually correct. Its basis, however, is entirely historical, having been originally made when the only courts of record were courts of general jurisdiction. As such, they did not take judicial notice of ordinance which are private statutes.

Code of Civil Procedure, § 1875, subd. 2, provides that 'courts take judicial notice of * * * whatever is established by law'. Thus, in obedience to this section, the Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction takes judicial notice of enactments of the State Legislature. By the same token, a Municipal Court which has exclusive jurisdiction of cases involving the violation of ordinances of cities or towns situated in the district in which it is established, P.C. § 1462, takes judicial notice of those ordinances.

Appellant relies upon a decision of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of a neighboring county, wherein a conviction of the violation of an ordinance was reversed because of the failure to the prosecution to introduce the ordinance in evidence. People v. Lum, Criminal Appeal 5867, Contra Costa County, February 8, 1956. This decision while persuasive is, of course, not binding upon this court. We are unable to agree with the conclusions therein reached.

The rule is correctly stated in 18 Cal.Jur. (2) 452, as follows:

'A municipal or justice court in which a proceeding is instituted for the express purpose of enforcing a city or county ordinance, which is the peculiar law of that forum, is bound to take notice of the ordinance. In such cases the rule that judicial notice will not be taken of ordinances...

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3 cases
  • Leh v. General Petroleum Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • April 2, 1964
    ...Bank (1958) 164 C.A. 2d 710, 331 P.2d 103, and even a final decision is not binding on any other superior court. People v. Cowles (1956) 142 C.A.2d Supp. 865, 298 P.2d 732; see generally Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 369 P.2d 937. S......
  • City of Lewiston v. Frary
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1966
    ...the things which, as to it, are established by law.' 47 P. at 259. The rule in the Davis case was adhered to in People v. Cowles, 14i Cal.App.2d Supp. 865, 298 P.2d 732 (1956); Ex parte Hansen, 158 Cal. 494, 111 P. 528 (1910); Ex parte Luening, 3 Cal.App. 76, 84 P. 445 (1906); Ex parte Chil......
  • People v. Dudley
    • United States
    • California Superior Court
    • April 10, 1967
    ...v. Hine (1966) AP--423. Were the Hine case the only expression on the subject we would not be bound thereby (People v. Cowles (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 865, 298 P.2d 732). For reasons hereinafter stated we elect to follow our own prior Penal Code, § 647 reads in part as follows: ' § 647. ......
1 books & journal articles
  • Appendix II Evidence Code
    • United States
    • Full Court Press California Guide to Criminal Evidence Appendix II Evidence Code
    • Invalid date
    ...municipal courts take judicial notice of ordinances in force within their jurisdiction. People v. Cowles, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 865, 867, 298 P.2d 732, 733-734 (1956); People v. Crittenden, 93 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871, 877, 209 P.2d 161, 165 (1949). In addition, an ordinance pleaded in a crimina......

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