People v. Crane

Decision Date20 April 1983
Docket NumberCr. 12105
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Edward CRANE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION

TROTTER, Associate Justice. *

Following a jury trial, defendant Robert Edward Crane was convicted of murder (Pen.Code, § 187), robbery (Pen.Code § 211), burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), and use and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen.Code, §§ 12021, 12022, 12022.5). In addition, with respect to the murder conviction, the jury specifically found to be true the special circumstances alleged that the murder was wilful, deliberate and premeditated and that it was committed during the course of a robbery. (Former Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(i); now embodied in Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)).

Defendant was sentenced to state prison for life without possibility for parole for the murder conviction. 2 Sentencing for the remaining convictions was stayed pending appeal; said stay to become permanent upon completion of sentence imposed on the murder conviction. This appeal followed.

Defendant represented himself throughout the trial after a motion to relieve the State Public Defender was granted.

Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's special circumstances finding of premeditated and deliberate murder. Defendant also argues his conviction should be reversed on the following grounds:

(1) That he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to effective self-representation and due process by:

(a) conditions of imprisonment;

(b) inadequate propria persona privileges; and

(c) the use of physical restraints in the courtroom;

(2) That the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5);

(3) That the trial court erred in admitting hypnosis testimony;

(4) That exclusion for cause of jurors holding conscientious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty denied defendant his right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community;

(5) That the punishment imposed in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the United States and California Constitutions.

Lastly, defendant argues that this case should be remanded in order to allow the trial judge to strike the special circumstances finding in accordance with Penal Code section 1385.

FACTS

On Monday, January 30, 1978, Wayne and Barbara Golin owned and operated Leisure World Jewelers in Seal Beach. On that day they returned from lunch at approximately 2 p.m. Several customers, including Renee Rockafeller and Theresa Shemberger, were waiting to get in the store.

Mr. Golin was busy with other customers, so Mrs. Rockafeller visited with Mrs. Golin. While doing so, both Mrs. Golin and Mrs. Rockafeller noticed the defendant enter the store, walk to the center of the store, and look around. As Mrs. Golin walked toward him to see if she could help him, he turned and left the store. Theresa Shemberger who was also in the store saw the defendant. Approximately five minutes later, the defendant came back into the store. By this time most customers had left and only Renee Rockafeller and another customer remained. As the defendant walked in, Mr. Golin commented to Mrs. Rockafeller: "I don't like the looks of that guy. He has been casing my store a couple of times today."

Meanwhile, Mrs. Golin had walked behind her husband in order to get a catalog for a customer. She noticed that her husband had walked over to the counter and laid his hand on it. She knew he had a gun in a cardboard box with a rag over it. Whenever he did not feel good about someone, her husband would slowly walk over and place his hand on the counter.

Mr. Golin asked the defendant if he could help him. The defendant walked up to the counter and said he would like to see some gold chains. Mr. Golin responded that they had no gold chains but that he would get some from Los Angeles if defendant would leave a deposit.

At this point, Mrs. Rockafeller and Mrs. Golin saw defendant pull a gun from his left side, its butt hitting the counter. Mr. Golin tried to duck, and defendant shot him in the shoulder. Mr. Golin fell over to his left side, defendant took a couple of steps over, and Mr. Golin managed to use his own gun, shooting defendant in the arm. Angered, defendant cursed Mr. Golin, stepped toward him and shot him in the head.

Defendant's accomplice, Eddie Burnett entered the store as defendant pulled his gun and immediately after the shots he headed for the safe. Mrs. Golin fell to the floor and tried to crawl toward the front door to get help. She was noticed by defendant, however, when she set off the "ding dong" pad at the front door. Defendant approached her and after threatening to kill her, stepped out of the store. He was shortly followed by his accomplice, Burnett, who also threatened Mrs. Golin as he fled with a paper bag containing jewelry.

Outside the store, defendant passed directly in front of Elysabeth Tompkins who got a good look at him. As the robbers were getting into their car they were observed by Ida Trower who was parked in the shopping center behind the jewelry store. Mr. Golin was transported to the hospital where he died from the gunshot wound to his head.

On February 1, 1978, 40 or 50 police officers surrounded Lorrayne Pinto's house in El Monte and by means of a loud speaker ordered the occupants of the house to exit. Defendant Crane and Eddie Burnett were among the occupants and they were arrested as they came out. The police secured a search warrant for Pinto's house where they found two suitcases filled with jewelry, three revolvers, and a newspaper with an article entitled "Bandit Slays Seal Beach Jeweler." Two of these newspapers were also retrieved from the trash can outside the house. Lab tests performed on one of the weapons seized at Ms. Pinto's house (a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver) determined it matched two bullets recovered from the area where Mr. Golin had been lying after being shot. A metal fragment removed from Mr. Golin's skull was fired from the same weapon.

The police also searched a Buick car parked in front of Ms. Pinto's house. There were red spots on the driver's seat. In the trunk they found a paper bag containing jewelry, jewelry envelopes, and a coin envelope. They also found a toilet kit containing .38 caliber ammunition and a bottle of theatrical scar make up.

Several days after defendant's arrest, Ms. Shemberger, Trower, Tompkins and Mrs. Rockafeller all identified defendant as the man who walked into the Golins' store and fled the store after shooting Mr. Golin.

DISCUSSION

V

Defendant's next argument is that exclusion for cause of prospective jurors, who affirmatively stated that they could be impartial in deciding the issues of guilt and truth of alleged special circumstances but who were unequivocally opposed to the imposition of the death penalty 5 regardless of the evidence presented, deprived defendant of his right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 16.)

There is no contention that exclusion of these prospective jurors was made in violation of the guidelines set forth by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776. 6 Thus, the issue raised by the defendant is whether the selection of a Witherspoon death-qualified jury violates the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. We hold that it does not.

Defendant's contention is based upon the assertion that exclusion for cause of veniremen who were unalterably opposed to the imposition of the death penalty is the equivalent of systematic exclusion from jury service of a legally "cognizable group" under Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595. 7 We disagree.

It is well settled that selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community plays a crucial role in protecting the constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) As was stated in Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, "[t]he purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power--to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 530, 95 S.Ct. at p. 697.) The representative cross-section requirement does not mean, however, "that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; ... [b]ut it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups." (Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 985, 90 L.Ed. 1181.)

In keeping with the above principles the courts have repeatedly safeguarded the cross-sectional requirement by reversing convictions or judgments in cases where certain groups or identifiable segments of the community defined by race, sex, occupation or personal beliefs had been systematically excluded from participating in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Carlos v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1983
    ...aggravated kidnaping is constitutional form of punishment despite lesser penalty for premeditated murder]; see People v. Crane (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 92, 101-103, 190 Cal.Rptr. 785; People v. Noble (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1018-1021, 179 Cal.Rptr. 302.) In an age when the state and nation......
  • People v. Crane
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 13, 1983
    ...Edward CRANE, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. 12105. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California. May 13, 1983. Prior report: 190 Cal.Rptr. 785. MORRIS, Presiding THE COURT: The appellant's petition for rehearing having been considered, it is hereby ordered that the petition be GR......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT