People v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 08 January 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 22987
• Citation: 239 N.W.2d 670,66 Mich.App. 581
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lamont CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant. 66 Mich.App. 581, 239 N.W.2d 670
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 670

239 N.W.2d 670

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lamont CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 22987.

66 Mich.App. 581, 239 N.W.2d 670

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 8, 1976.

Released for Publication March 24, 1976.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

[66 MICHAPP 582] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Bruce A. Barton, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

[66 MICHAPP 583] Before McGREGOR, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and KAUFMAN, JJ.

McGREGOR, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, Lamont Crawford, was convicted by a jury of escape from prison (M.C.L.A. § 750.193; M.S.A. § 28.390) and subsequently sentenced to a term of 1 to 5 years, to commence at the expiration of his present sentence. Defendant now appeals as a matter of right.

I.

Defendant's first assignment of error relates to the trial court's determination that defendant was competent to stand trial. On January 9, 1974, the trial court issued an order committing defendant to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry for an evaluation of his competency to stand trial. Following that evaluation, the forensic center submitted a report stating that, in the opinion of its examiners, the defendant was competent to stand trial. This report was signed by Newton L. P. Jackson, Jr., a Ph.D. in psychology, and Leon J. Quinn, M.D., a psychiatrist. A competency hearing was held on October 11, 1974, at which time Dr. Jackson was offered by the prosecution as an expert witness. The trial court, over objection, allowed Dr. Jackson to testify concerning defendant's competency. No additional experts were offered at the hearing by either the prosecution or the defense. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the defendant was competent to stand trial.

Defendant contends that he was deprived of due process of law and his statutory rights because (1) the trial court erroneously allowed Dr. Jackson to [66 MICHAPP 584] give expert testimony concerning defendant's competency, and (2) the defendant's competency evaluation at the forensic center was inadequate because it was primarily conducted by Dr. Jackson.

The two grounds of error advanced by the defendant are closely related. If Dr. Jackson was not qualified to evaluate the defendant's competency, then, of course, he would also not be qualified to offer in-court expert testimony on that subject. Likewise, if he was unqualified to offer the expert testimony, he would similarly be unqualified to make the evaluation. Thus, resolution of these issues essentially involves the question of whether an experienced clinical psychologist is sufficiently qualified to evaluate the competency of a defendant and to give expert testimony in regard thereto.

Defendant first argues, under the general common law principles regarding expert testimony, that only a psychiatrist is qualified to give expert testimony concerning a defendant's competency to stand trial. ¹ We disagree.

In People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940), five Justices of our Supreme Court would have allowed a wellqualified psychologist to testify on the issue of a defendant's insanity. This case has been followed in other jurisdictions, using an abuse of discretion standard. See Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.A.pp.D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 637 (1962), and State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 298, 347 P.2d 312, 318 (1959), that Court stating:

'We adopt the modern trend of authority in allowing a properly qualified psychologist to give his opinion as an expert as to the result of tests made by him, but that such testimony should be limited to that which the witness is qualified to offer on the basis of his professional[66 MICHAPP 585] training and experience and which he can substantiate by evidence that would be acceptable to recognized specialists in the same field.' (Citations omitted.)

While the Hawthorne case involved the issue of a defendant's insanity, we believe that its holding can be extended to the issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial. Both issues require an expert witness to determine the mental state of a defendant and then to decide whether that mental state meets the criteria of an established legal standard. In fact, where the issue is insanity, a much stronger case can be made for allowing only psychiatrists to give expert testimony on the subject. This is so because present legal standards regarding insanity require the existence of a mental disease or defect, whereas the legal standards concerning competency do not necessarily require the same. Moreover, insanity requires the expert to determine the defendant's mental state at some time in the past (when the crime was committed), while competency to stand trial only requires the expert to determine the defendant's present mental state. Consequently, we hold under common law principles that a psychologist is qualified to evaluate a defendant's competency to stand trial and also to give expert testimony concerning the same at a competency hearing. ²

Defendant further contends that, even if we decide that a psychologist is so qualified under common law principles, the statutory scheme pertaining to competency nevertheless requires that [66 MICHAPP 586] the evaluation be made only by psychiatrists. The statute in question, M.C.L.A. § 767.27a; M.S.A. § 28.966(11), provides in part as follows:

'(3) Upon a showing that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall commit the defendant in the criminal case to the custody of the Center for forensic psychiatry or to any other diagnostic facility certified by the department of mental health for the Performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation. The commitment shall be for a period not to exceed 60 days. Within that period the center or other facility shall prepare a diagnostic report and recommendations which are to be transmitted to the committing court.

'(4) Upon receipt of the diagnostic report and recommendations the sheriff shall immediately return the defendant to the committing court and the court shall immediately hear and determine the issue of competence to stand trial. The diagnostic report and recommendations shall be admissible as evidence in the hearing, but not for any other purpose in the pending criminal proceedings.

'(6) If at any time within 18 months of the entry of the order of commitment entered under section (5) the defendant has regained competence to stand trial, in the opinion of the department of mental health, it shall certify its opinion, together with a detailed Psychiatric report, to the committing court and shall return the defendant to the control of that court. The return shall be made by the sheriff at the request of the department. The court shall immediately hear and determine the question of competence to stand trial. The certificate and Psychiatric report shall be admissible as evidence in the hearing, but not for any other purpose in the pending criminal proceedings.' (Emphasis added.)

Defendant argues that the above statute, employing as it does the words 'psychiatry' and 'psychiatric', mandates a finding that only psychiatrists are qualified to evaluate and give expert [66 MICHAPP 587] testimony concerning competency. Again, we disagree.

Some light is shed on this issue by the recent Supreme Court case of People v. Blocker, 393 Mich. 501, 227 N.W.2d 767 (1975), where the majority opinion found that the statutory procedure was not properly invoked because no evidence of incompetency had been submitted to the trial court. However, the dissenting opinion, by Justice Swainson, after disposing of that initial hurdle, went on to discuss the above-quoted portions of the competency statute. He stated:

'The statutory procedure is very explicit and designed to guarantee that a questionably incompetent defendant is examined by qualified experts. The fundamental nature of the right involved demands that an evaluation of a defendant's competence be made by a person who would be qualified to offer in court expert testimony on the subject. The Legislature has further refined this right by requiring that the expert be associated with 'the center for forensic psychiatry or * * * any other diagnostic facility certified by the department of mental health for the performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation.' M.C.L.A. § 767.27a(3); M.S.A. § 28.966(11)(3). The court's action herein failed to afford Blocker with either his basic or his statutory rights to an expert evaluation.' 393 Mich. 501, 518--519, 227 N.W.2d 767, 774.

Thus, under Justice Swainson's interpretation of the statute, there is statutory compliance if two factors are established: First, the evaluation of a defendant's competence must be made by a person who would be qualified to offer in-court testimony on the subject, and secondly, that expert must be associated with the Center for Forensic Psychiatry or another diagnostic facility certified by the Department of Mental Health.

In the present case, both factors have been [66 MICHAPP 588] established. We have previously decided that a psychologist is qualified to evaluate a defendant's competence and to offer in-court expert testimony on that subject. Additionally, Dr. Jackson was associated with the Center for Forensic Psychiatry.

Furthermore, it appears that the Legislature enacted the statute for the purpose of implementing a defendant's constitutional right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial. In so doing, it safeguarded that right by requiring that the necessary tests be performed only at the forensic center or another diagnostic facility which has met the standards established by the Department of Mental Health. It does not, however, state who is or who is not a qualified expert at one of these approved facilities. Thus, it would seem that the Legislature or the Department of Mental Health, by certifying a facility, has made a determination that the staffs...