People v. Shahideh

• Decision Date: 25 October 2007
• Docket Number: Docket No. 267961.
• Citation: 277 Mich. App. 111,743 N.W.2d 233
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amir Aziz SHAHIDEH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

743 N.W.2d 233

277 Mich. App. 111

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amir Aziz SHAHIDEH, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 267961.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 5, 2007, at Detroit.

Decided October 25, 2007, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication January 7, 2008.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Eric J. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert Berlin, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Joshua D. Abbott, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Neil H. Fink and Kimberly W. Stout, Birmingham, for the defendant.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and JANSEN and SCHUETTE, JJ.

JANSEN, J.

A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1). He was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant appeals by right, asserting that the trial court erred by refusing to authorize his privately retained psychologist to evaluate him while he was in jail awaiting trial. We agree, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Defendant's girlfriend was bludgeoned to death. Defendant was arrested for the crime. After the arrest, defendant moved for a court order to permit his own privately retained psychologist to evaluate him and to determine whether it would be appropriate to pursue an insanity defense at trial. The prosecution refused to agree to such an order absent defendant's exact compliance with the procedures set forth in MCL 768.20a. The trial court ruled that defendant had not complied with MCL 768.20a and thus determined that defendant was not entitled to an independent psychological examination. The trial court accordingly denied defendant's motion.

The matter proceeded. Defendant did not assert the defense of insanity at trial. During deliberations, the jury sent a message to the court asking whether defendant would have been "able to propose a defense of `temporarily insane' if in fact he made a confession, plus [a] statement to the police department prior to [the time when] defense counsel was involved." The trial court answered, "Please base your decision on the evidence introduced during the trial and the law provided by the [c]ourt." The jury found defendant guilty.

II

Whether MCL 768.20a applies in a certain case is a question of statutory interpretation. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. People v. Davis, 468 Mich. 77, 79, 658 N.W.2d 800 (2003). We similarly review de novo questions of constitutional law. People v. LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 579, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002). We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a psychological evaluation. See People v. Freeman (After Remand), 406 Mich. 514, 516, 280 N.W.2d 446 (1979); People v. Graham, 173 Mich. App. 473, 477, 434 N.W.2d 165 (1988).

III

Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial request for an independent examination by his privately retained psychologist. We agree.

A

We begin by addressing whether defendant's request for an independent psychological evaluation was governed by MCL 768.20a. The prosecution asserts that it was. We conclude that it was not.

MCL 768.20a generally describes the procedure that a defendant must follow before he or she may raise the defense of legal insanity at trial. MCL 768.20a provides in pertinent part:

(1) If a defendant in a felony case proposes to offer in his or her defense testimony to establish his or her insanity at the time of an alleged offense, the defendant shall file and serve upon the court and the prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of his or her intention to assert the defense of insanity not less than 30 days before the date set for the trial of the case, or at such other time as the court directs.

(2) Upon receipt of a notice of an intention to assert the defense of insanity, a court shall order the defendant to undergo an examination relating to his or her claim of insanity by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry or by other qualified personnel, as applicable, for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of the order. . . .

(3) The defendant may, at his or her own expense, secure an independent psychiatric evaluation by a clinician of his or her choice on the issue of his or her insanity at the time the alleged offense was committed. If the defendant is indigent, the court may, upon showing of good cause, order that the county pay for an independent psychiatric evaluation. The defendant shall notify the prosecuting attorney at least 5 days before the day scheduled for the independent evaluation that he or she intends to secure such an evaluation. The prosecuting attorney may similarly obtain independent psychiatric evaluation. A clinician secured by an indigent defendant is entitled to receive a reasonable fee as approved by the court.

When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, "[w]e begin by construing the language of the statute itself." People v. Morson, 471 Mich. 248, 255, 685 N.W.2d 203 (2004). "Our concern is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed by the plain language of the statute." People v. Thomas, 260 Mich.App. 450, 458, 678 N.W.2d 631 (2004). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted." People v. Giovannini, 271 Mich.App. 409, 412, 722 N.W.2d 237 (2006). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed, People v. Petty, 469 Mich. 108, 114, 665 N.W.2d 443 (2003), and we may not speculate about the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the language expressed in the statute, People v. Hock Shop, Inc., 261 Mich.App. 521, 528, 681 N.W.2d 669 (2004).

When examining a statute, we presume that every word has some meaning. People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278, 285, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). Every word in a statute should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Fennell, 260 Mich.App. 261, 267, 677 N.W.2d 66 (2004). If a word is not defined in the statute, we may refer to dictionary definitions. People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 563, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001).

According to the plain statutory language, MCL 768.20a comes into play "[i]f a defendant in a felony case proposes to offer in his or her defense testimony to establish his or her insanity at the time of an alleged offense. . . ." MCL 768.20a(1) (emphasis added). Of particular relevance in this context, the word "propose" is defined as "to plan; intend," Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), and "to form or declare a plan or intention," Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1965). Thus, only a defendant who "plan[s]" or "intend[s]" to raise the insanity defense at trial must comply with the procedures set forth in MCL 768.20a.

After defendant's arrest, defense counsel set out to gain more information concerning defendant's mental condition and to further investigate whether there might be a sufficient basis for asserting the defense of insanity in this case. The defense moved the trial court to allow its privately retained psychologist to examine defendant in jail for the express purpose of ascertaining whether it would be advisable or even reasonable to raise an insanity defense at trial. At the time that the defense sought this permission, it was not clear whether defendant was sane or insane at the time of the underlying offense, and it was not yet known whether an insanity defense would even be viable. Counsel simply wished to adequately investigate all potential defenses.

We cannot conclude that by requesting an independent psychological evaluation for defendant, defense counsel was "propos[ing] to offer . . . testimony to establish [defendant's] insanity at the time of an alleged offense. . . ." MCL 768.20a(1). As noted, it was not yet known whether an insanity defense would even be viable, and it would be unreasonable to deduce from counsel's mere request to investigate defendant's mental state that the defense had solidified "a plan or intention" to raise the insanity defense at trial. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1965). At the earliest, defense counsel could have reasonably "form[ed] or declare[d] a plan or intention" to raise the insanity defense only after fully and adequately investigating defendant's sanity itself. When the defense filed its motion for an independent psychological examination of defendant, it quite simply did not yet possess sufficient data from which it could "form or declare a plan or intention" to assert the insanity defense at trial.¹

Defense counsel's request for an independent psychological evaluation of defendant was clearly not a "propos[al] to offer" the insanity defense at trial. Instead, it was merely a request for permission to fully and adequately investigate all potential defenses that might be viable in this case. Pursuant to the plain statutory language, MCL 768.20a does not come into play until a defendant definitively "proposes to offer in his or her defense testimony to establish his or her insanity . . . ." A mere request to investigate and examine the viability or feasibility of a potential insanity defense is not sufficient to trigger the statute. We conclude that defendant's request for an independent psychological evaluation was not governed by MCL 768.20a because the defense had not yet "propose[d] to offer" an insanity defense in this case.²

B

Having determined that MCL 768.20a did not govern defendant's request to be evaluated by his privately retained psychologist while in jail pending trial, we must now determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request. We conclude that it did.

The abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there may be more than one principled outcome in any given case. People v. Babcock, 469 Mich....