People v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 02 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 310179,310179 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEON CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and METER and DONOFRIO, JJ.
A jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; felonious assault, MCL 750.82; felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 to 50 years for the second-degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively to a five-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, and to time served for the felonious assault and felon-in-possession convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant's convictions, but remand this case for correction of defendant's felony-firearm sentence to reflect a reduced term of two years.
Defendant lost control of a stolen car and crashed into several parked vehicles. He and his passengers, Stacey Harris and Rasheed Washington, fled. Othell Lightfoot, who owned one of the damaged vehicles, his brother David Hicks, Jr., and two companions left their homes to investigate. They encountered and confronted Harris. According to Hicks, defendant and another man approached the group and Lightfoot told Hicks, "I peep gang," which Hicks understood to mean that Lightfoot thought the men were "up to no good." When Lightfoot stepped down from the curb, defendant shot him in the face from a distance of approximately 2-1/2 feet. After defendant shot Lightfoot, the man who was with defendant asked defendant, "Hey, what []ya doin'?" and hit defendant's hand, pushing the gun down. Hicks ran away. Defendant fired three or more shots at Hicks as he ran away. Hicks's foot and calf were injured by the gunfire. At trial, defendant admitted shooting Lightfoot and firing shots at Hicks. The principal issue at trial was whether defendant acted in self-defense. When the police discovered Lightfoot's body, his arm was extended into the waist area of his pants. Defendant testified that he shot Lightfoot because he thought Lightfoot had a weapon, but defendant acknowledged that he did not see one. There was no evidence that either Lightfoot or Hicks was armed with a weapon.
The jury acquitted defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), but convicted him of second-degree murder for the shooting death of Lightfoot. Although defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, with respect to Hicks, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on that charge and instead instructed the jury on the lesser offense of felonious assault, without objection by defendant. The jury convicted defendant of that offense, as well as felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm.
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant preserved this issue by filing a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Cf. People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 571 NW2d 764 (1997). On appeal, however, in addition to referring to the great weight of the evidence, defendant's substantive argument also includes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution and we will not interfere with the jury's determinations regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses." People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
When a defendant claims self-defense, the defendant has the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of self-defense exist. Reese, 491 Mich at 155-156. "[O]nce the defendant satisfies the initial burden of production, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the common-law defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Id. at 155.
"[T]he killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide only if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm and that it is necessary to exercise deadly force to prevent such harm to himself." People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 127; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). The initial aggressor is not entitled to use the doctrine of self-defense as justification. Reese, 491 Mich at 158. A defendant's actions are judged from the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time and not as they actually existed. Hurd v People, 25 Mich 405, 412 (1872), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518-521; 648 NW2d 153 (2002); People v Green, 113 Mich App 699, 703-704; 318 NW2d 547 (1982).
Defendant's claim of self-defense turned on whether he honestly and reasonably believed that his life was in imminent danger and that use of deadly force was necessary. The police found Lightfoot with his left hand in his pants. Defendant testified that Lightfoot put his hand in his pants a couple of seconds before defendant pulled out his gun and shot Lightfoot. No onedirectly testified to the contrary. However, Hicks testified that after defendant fired the shot, defendant's companion pushed defendant's arm down and said, "Hey, what []ya doin'?" This evidence supported an inference that defendant's companion did not perceive that Lightfoot was an imminent threat to their safety. Defendant's subsequent actions also called into question the credibility of his claim that he feared for his life. Defendant admittedly fired more than three shots at Hicks, who was fleeing, even though defendant did not see Hicks with a weapon. Moreover, defendant admitted that he initially lied to the police about his involvement in the offense and did not assert that he acted in self-defense until his lawyer suggested that the doctrine might apply.
Whether defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that his life was imminently endangered by Lightfoot and that shooting Lightfoot was necessary to prevent such harm was a question of fact for the jury. The jury could have determined that defendant was the initial aggressor. The jury also could have determined that defendant did not have a reasonable belief that his life was in imminent danger in that Lightfoot had not displayed a gun. The jury could have determined that defendant did not have an honest and reasonable belief that shooting Lightfoot in the face1 when Lightfoot was standing five feet away with his hand in his pants was necessary to prevent death or bodily harm. The jury also could have credited Hicks's testimony that defendant's companion questioned defendant's conduct immediately after the shooting and found that it demonstrated that defendant could not have honestly and reasonably believed that his life was in imminent danger or that Lightfoot presented a threat of serious bodily harm. In addition, the jury could have viewed defendant's conduct in firing additional shots at an unarmed Hicks, as Hicks was fleeing, as an indication that defendant's act of shooting Lightfoot was the product of a felonious intent and was not motivated by any concern for defendant's personal safety. Ultimately, the jury's verdict reflects its assessment of defendant's credibility. This Court does not interfere with the jury's determination of credibility. Unger, 278 Mich App at 222. "'Juries, not appellate courts, see and hear witnesses and are in a much better position to decide the weight and credibility to be given to their testimony.'" People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992), quoting People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 375-376; 220 NW2d 393 (1974). Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense.
Defendant also argues that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. He notes discrepancies in the accounts of the witnesses and asserts that the trial was "contaminated with unreliable testimony." He contends that the evidence showed that he went to aid Harris, but was met with aggressive actions by Lightfoot, and, in fear of his life, he defended himself.
A new trial may be granted on some or all of the issues if a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. MCR 6.431(B); MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e). "New trial motions based solelyon the weight of the evidence regarding witness credibility are not favored." People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 639; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Even if the "testimony is in direct conflict and testimony supporting the verdict has been impeached, if it cannot be said as a matter of law that the testimony thus impeached was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury." Id. at 643 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Exceptional circumstances that may justify a new trial include situations where "testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, [w]here the testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities, [w]here a witness's testimony is material and so inherently implausible that it could not be believed...
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