People v. Crouch

• Decision Date: 26 November 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37883,37883
• Citation: 29 Ill.2d 485,194 N.E.2d 248
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. John F. CROUCH, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 248

194 N.E.2d 248

29 Ill.2d 485

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. John F. CROUCH, Defendant in Error.

No. 37883.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 26, 1963.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield and Robert J. Waaler, State's Atty., Urbana (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Andrew Stecyk, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Arthur M. Lerner, Champaign, for defendant in error.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

The sole question presented by the People on this writ of error is the correctness of the order of the Champaign County circuit court quashing a forgery indictment against defendant for failure to identify the person whom defendant intended to defraud.

The indictment charged defendant 'committed the offense of FORGERY, in that he, with intent to defraud, knowingly delivered to Ralph E. Scogin, doing business as the Elbo Room, a check, a document apparently capable of defrauding another, drawn on the SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF DANVILLE, a corporation, in the sum of seventy-three dollars and eighty-five cents, ($73.85), knowing such check to be forged in such manner that it purported to have been made by James D. Willis, which check is in the words and figures following:'

(Here appears a photostatic copy of the check and endorsements.)

Defendant maintains (1) that forgery is a specific intent crime, and that identification of the person intended to be defrauded is essential to the validity of an indictment, and (2) the absence of such identification could subject defendant to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, contrary to the constitutional safeguards against being twice put in jeopardy. Ill.Const. art II, sec. 10, S.H.A.; U.S.Const. amend. V.

The indictment was drawn under section 17-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 17-3), which is a codification of the separate sections relating to forgery previously found in sections 105 and 107 of division I of the prior Criminal Code. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, pars. 277 and 279.) Section 17-3 provides: 'A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly * * * (2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered.' Section 17-3(b) defines an intent to defraud as 'an intention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property.'

In support of his position defendant relies principally upon People v. Ernst, 306 Ill. 452, 138 N.E. 116, Fox v. People 95 Ill. 71, and People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548. While the decisions in Fox and Ernst, strictly speaking, turned upon grounds other than the necessity of alleging the name of the party intended to be defrauded, it must be conceded that there exists in those opinions language indicating such an allegation was essential. However, the later (Fore) case involved an indictment for forgery in which no intent to defraud, either general or particular, was alleged. The court there stated: 'Since intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of forgery, an indictment which fails to charge fraudulent intent is fatally defective. People v. Barnes, 314 Ill. 140, 145 N.E. 391. Here, the indictment neither charges a general intent to defraud and prejudice nor a specific intent to defraud and prejudice a particular person.' The clear implication of this language is that had the indictment contained an allegation of a general intent to defraud, the court would have considered it sufficient.

One of the more recent decisions of this court, not cited by either party, is People v. Christison, 396 Ill. 549, 72 N.E.2d 185, in which defendant was charged with uttering as true and genuine a forged bank check, 'knowing it to be forged and with intent to defraud.' The court held 'The crime of forgery is complete with the making of a false instrument, the subject of forgery with intent to defraud, and it is immaterial whether anyone was in fact defrauded.'

A substantial number of States have express legislative enactments obviating the need to allege an intent to defraud a specific person. In other States having no statutory solution to the question, the reviewing courts have considered the problem. In Johnson v. State, 35 Tex.Cr. 271, 33 S.W. 231, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held: 'At common law, while it was the practice to name the party intended to be defrauded or injured, still an indictment was sufficient which failed to do this. ...