People v. Crowe
| Citation | 506 P.2d 193,8 Cal.3d 815,106 Cal.Rptr. 369 |
| Decision Date | 08 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 16261 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
| Parties | , 506 P.2d 193 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Irwin CROWE, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank |
Velma E. Williams, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
Wilbur F. Littlefield and Herbert M. Barish, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William R. Pounders, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
D. Lowell Jensen, Dist. Atty., Alameda, as amicus curiae.
Defendant John Irwin Crowe appeals from a conviction, following jury verdict, of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm (Pen.Code, § 245 subd. (a)) and robbery (Pen.Code, § 211). The jury determined the robbery to be of the second degree. (Pen.Code, § 211a).
The principal issue of the case turns on defendant's contention that the trial court's conduct of the Voir dire violated Penal Code section 1078. Voir dire does, indeed, often entail a protracted undertaking by counsel that is designed for tactical advantage rather than for the elimination of an undesirable juror. To avoid such misuse, the trial court itself in the instant case examined the jurors with the assistance of written questions submitted by counsel. We shall explain that section 1078 permits this method of examination; counsel, instead of directly questioning the prospective juror, submits to the court questions, which, if found within the scope of reasonable examination, can be propounded by the court to the jurors.
In approving such procedure we point out that Voir dire, designed as a device to weed out unsuitable jurors, may, if over-extended by counsel, be self-destructive. If Voir dire is burdened with the weight of excess recocco examination, the trial structure itself can be endangered. We believe that section 1078 permits the Voir dire to be left to the discretion of the trial judge, who among other methods, can put the questions to the jurors, aided by counsel.
We likewise reject defendant's contentions that the court prejudicially erred in refusing to put to the jurors certain additional questions requested by defense counsel, that defendant was denied his right to 10 peremptory challenges, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the defendant's conviction.
1. In undertaking the entire examination of prospective jurors itself, assisted by questions submitted by counsel, the trial court did not deny counsel for defendant his right to reasonable examination of jurors as provided in Penal Code section 1078.
Penal Code section 1078 states that The issue before us is whether the procedure employed by the trial court in the Voir dire of the jury in the present case comports with the requirements of section 1078.
We summarize the manner in which the court conducted the Voir dire. Prior to trial the court notified counsel that it would not permit direct Voir dire by counsel. Defense counsel then submitted to the court a written list of twelve general and six individual questions delineating the subject matter that he wished to be covered on Voir dire. The court tentatively seated 12 jurors, explained the nature of the case, and advised the jurors that the court bore the duty to examine them to select a fair and impartial panel. After giving general instructions on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, the court introduced defendant and both counsel, and stated the names of prospective witnesses. The jurors indicated that they were not acquainted with defendant, counsel, or the witnesses. After describing generally the duties and functions of the jurors, the court examined each juror as to his jury experience, ability to follow the law, racial prejudice, general area of residence, occupation, marital and family status, and relationships to law enforcement agencies. The judge asked each juror whether he had been charged with committing an assault or robbery or had been a victim of such an offense. The court then inquired into the consequences to the juror from involvement in a lengthy trial; finally, the court asked each juror generally whether that juror knew of any reason why he could not be fair and impartial.
After concluding this examination, the court asked counsel to approach the bench, and the following colloquy occurred:
'THE COURT: All right, now, are there any other questions you want the Court to ask the jurors?
'MR. FIORE (defense counsel): Your Honor, I would like to have the opportunity to ask some questions myself. I am accorded that right under section 1078 of the Penal Code.
'I also want to delve a little further into the nature of the occupation of the husbands of three other jurors; namely, Mrs. Rotman, Mrs. Klobucar and Mrs. Hupp.
'I want to ask if they all understand the fact that he is in custody because he cannot afford bail.
'I also want to ask specific questions of individual jurors as to whether or not they have participated in a situation where they were asked to identify any individual. In other words, if they were ever asked, as a eye witness, to make an identification; if they believed that an individual can be mistaken in an identification, and questions relative to the identification of individuals.
'These would be substantially the questions I would like to ask personally. Depending upon their answers there may be others.
'THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Meals answered that the question I asked of Mrs. Day, concerning whether or not there were any prejudice for or against the defendant by reason of his color.
'Your motion is denied.'
The court then permitted counsel to exercise peremptory challenges. After the dismissal of each challenged juror, the court questioned his replacement in the same fashion as it had questioned the original 12. Following the completion of the jury selection defense counsel again argued that the procedure employed by the court denied defendant the rights accorded him under Penal Code section 1078.
We begin our analysis of defendant's argument with an account of the history of jury Voir dire in California, and of the enactment and interpretation of Penal Code section 1078. This history, we believe, will demonstrate that although section 1078 confers upon counsel a right to reasonable examination of jurors, neither that section, nor any of the cases construing it, require that such examination be conducted directly by counsel without the intervening supervision of the trial judge. To the contrary, the cases construing section 1078 illustrate that the court will uphold any method of Vior dire which results in reasonable examination of prospective jurors, submission of proposed questions by counsel to the court which, after eliminating improper or duplicative queries, itself interrogates the prospective jurors.
The right of counsel to examine a prospective juror before challenge was established by court decision in 1855. 1 (People v. Backus (1855) 5 Cal. 275.) Many years later, however, in People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752, 753, 127 P. 58, the court observed that 'The records of the cases appealed to this court, in which rulings made while impaneling a jury have been involved, indicate that there is an increasing tendency to prolong the proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge in tedious examination of jurors, apparently with no definite purpose or object in view, but with the hope of eliciting something indicating the advisability of a peremptory challenge, and that the supposed privilege of doing this has been greatly abused.' In the hope of curbing this abuse Edwards overruled past decisions and held that counsel could not Voir dire a juror as to matters immaterial to a challenge for cause. 2
Despite the Edwards decision, the problem of lengthy and inordinate Voir dire continued, and in 1927 the Commission for the Reform of Criminal Procedure in California recommended the enactment of a statute to govern the procedure. This proposed statute was to read as follows: 3 (Emphasis added.) The Legislature, however, rejected the commission's proposal to place Voir dire entirely in the discretion of the trial court, and instead enacted the present section 1078, 4 which in the second sentence, changed the word 'may' to 'shall' and eliminated 'in his discretion.' As we have noted the statute now reads: (Emphasis added.)
Shortly after the enactment of section 1078, this court decided several cases ...
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People v. Cooks
...163 Cal. 752, 753, 127 P. 58; People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 244, 10 Cal.Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23; People v. Crowe (1973) 8 Cal.3d 815, 830, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193.) That limitation, however, was abolished by the decision in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 174 Cal.Rp......
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Hawk v. Superior Court
...that is designed for partisan advantage rather than for the elimination of an unqualified juror (People v. Crowe (1973) 8 Cal.3d 815, 828, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193; People v. Semone (1934) 140 Cal.App. 318, 326, 35 P.2d 379). Petitioner's persistence in interjecting prejudicial comme......
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Hovey v. Superior Court
...jurors were channeled from counsel to the trial court, rather than directly to each individual juror. (People v. Crowe (1973) 8 Cal.3d 815, 106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193.) In Crowe, we unequivocally stated that "We approve this method of curtailing the inordinate time consumed in the proc......